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Abstract 
 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has recognized the Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) as a key element of the Communications, Navigation, and 
Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) systems as well as a foundation upon 
which States can deliver improved aeronautical navigation services. But civil aviation 
requirements can be very stringent and up to now, the bare systems cannot alone be used as a 
means of navigation. Therefore, in order to ensure the levels required in terms of accuracy, 
integrity, continuity of service and availability, ICAO standards define different architectures 
to augment the basic constellations. Some of them use control stations to monitor satellite 
signals and provide corrections, others only use measurement redundancy. This study focuses 
on this last type of augmentation system and more particularly on Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) techniques and performance. 
 
RAIM is currently a simple and efficient solution to check the integrity of GNSS down to 
Non Precision Approaches. But the future introduction of new satellite constellations such as 
the European satellite navigation system Galileo or modernized Global Positioning System 
(GPS) will imply great improvements in the number as well as the quality of available 
measurements. Thus, more demanding phases of flight such as APproaches with Vertical 
guidance could be targeted using RAIM to provide integrity monitoring. This would result in 
some interesting safety, operational and environmental benefits. This Ph.D. evaluates the 
potential capacity of RAIM algorithms to support approach and landing phases of flight with 
vertical guidance. 
 
A thorough bibliographic study of civil aviation requirements is first presented; some 
candidate LPV200 signal in space performance requirements not yet included in the ICAO 
standards are also provided. 
 
To evaluate GNSS positioning performance, pseudorange measurements have to be modeled 
as precisely as possible and especially the different errors that affect them. The main sources 
of error are signal propagation delays caused by the ionosphere and the troposphere, space 
vehicle clock error, satellite position estimation error, multipath, receiver errors which main 
source is code tracking loop noise. Thus, these errors can be due to the space segment, the 
control segment or the user segment. Systematic errors are gathered in the fault free case 
measurement model; unusual errors, that may cause a dangerous positioning failure and that 
may have to be detected, are gathered in the faulty case measurement model. Finally, a 
complete model of pseudo range measurements, including interference effects and satellite 
failures, is given. A special attention is put on the User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) 
variance computation. Indeed, among all input parameters of RAIM availability simulator, 
UERE has, by far, the most significant impact on the estimated availability. 
 
Three distinct classes of RAIM algorithms are studied in this thesis. The Least Square 
Residual method in which the sum of the squares of the pseudorange residuals plays the role 
of the basic observable is first recalled. The Maximum Solution Separation method which is 
Abstract 
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based on the observation of the separation between the position estimate generated by a full-
set filter (using all the satellite measurements) and the position estimate generated by each 
one of the subset filters (each using all but one of the satellite measurements) is then 
discussed and an improved way of computing the associated protection level is proposed. 
Finally, a new promising method based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio test is presented 
and several implementations are described. 
 
The way these different methods are implemented to take into account both civil aviation 
requirements and threat model is then detailed. In particular some methods to obtain the inner 
probability values that RAIM algorithms need to use are presented. Indeed, high level 
requirements interpretation for RAIM design is not clearly standardized. 
 
Finally simulations results are presented. They permit to evaluate RAIM ability to provide 
integrity monitoring for approaches with vertical guidance operations considering various 
scenarios. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis are a detailed computation of user equivalent range error 
variance, an analysis of the effect of interferences on pseudorange measurement, an 
adaptation of LSR RAIM algorithm to nominal biases, an improvement of MSS protection 
levels computation, the implementation of GLR algorithm as a RAIM including the 
computation of an analytical expression of the threshold that satisfies the false alarm 
probability and the prediction of the probability of missed detection, design of a sequential 
GLR algorithm to detect step plus ramp failure and an analysis of the amplitude of smallest 
single biases that lead to a positioning failure. 
 
Least Squared Residual, Maximum Solution Separation and constrained Generalized 
Likelihood Ratio RAIM availabilities have been computed for APVI and LPV200 approaches 
using both GPS L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b pseudorange measurements. It appears that both 
APV I and LPV200 (VAL=35m) operations are available using GPS/Galileo + RAIM to 
provide integrity as an availability of 100 % has been obtained for the detection function of 
the three studied algorithms. An availability of 100 % has also been obtained for the LSR 
exclusion function. On the contrary, LSR RAIM FDE availabilities seem not sufficient to 
have Galileo + RAIM or GPS +RAIM as a sole means of navigation for vertically guided 
approaches. 
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Résumé 
 
 
L‟Organisation de l‟Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI) a reconnu la navigation par 
satellite, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), comme un élément clé des systèmes 
CNS/ATM (Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance / Air Traffic Management) et 
comme une base sur laquelle les Etats peuvent s‟appuyer afin de délivrer des services de 
navigation aérienne performants. 
 
Mais l‟utilisation des systèmes de navigation par satellites pour des applications de type 
aviation civile ne va pas sans répondre à des exigences en terme de précision, de continuité, 
d‟intégrité et de disponibilité. Ces exigences opérationnelles liées aux différentes phases de 
vol requièrent pour les systèmes GNSS l‟appui de moyens d‟augmentation tels ceux utilisant 
des stations de surveillance sol pour vérifier la validité des signaux satellitaires et calculer des 
corrections ou ceux fonctionnant de manière autonome, tel le RAIM (Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring). 
 
Ce dernier moyen est particulièrement intéressant car il engendre des coûts de mise en œuvre 
réduits et il constitue à l‟heure actuelle un moyen simple et efficace d‟effectuer des approches 
de non précision. La prochaine mise en place du système de navigation européen Galileo ainsi 
que la modernisation du système historique américain GPS vont entrainer une nette 
amélioration, à la fois en terme de nombre et de qualité, des mesures satellitaires disponibles, 
laissant entrevoir la possible utilisation du RAIM pour des approches à guidage vertical, très 
intéressantes du point de vue opérationnel. 
 
Les différentes notions liées aux exigences de l‟aviation civile sont définies dans le chapitre 2, 
notamment les différents critères de performance. Chaque phase de vol, et plus 
particulièrement chaque catégorie d‟approche, y est également décrite ainsi que les niveaux de 
performance associés. 
 
Plusieurs types d‟erreurs sont susceptibles d‟affecter les mesures GNSS. Parmi elles il 
convient de distinguer les erreurs systématiques ou nominales des perturbations liées à une 
défaillance du système de navigation. Ces dernières peuvent être dues soit à un problème 
matériel survenant au niveau d‟un des satellites ou du récepteur, soit d‟une perturbation de 
l‟environnement de propagation des signaux GNSS. Ces aspects sont adressés dans le chapitre 
3 à l‟issu duquel un modèle complet de mesure de pseudo distance GNSS est proposé. 
 
Les algorithmes de contrôle d‟intégrité ont été développés pour détecter ces anomalies et 
exclure les mesures erronées de la solution de navigation. Il s‟agit de méthodes uniquement 
basées sur la redondance des mesures satellite, éventuellement enrichies de celles d‟autres 
capteurs, devant déterminer si les conditions sont réunies pour occasionner une erreur de 
position dépassant une limite spécifiée. Devant répondre à des exigences relatives aux 
performances décrites dans le chapitre 2, le choix du type d‟algorithme de contrôle d‟intégrité 
est laissé à l‟utilisateur. Le chapitre 4 étudie plusieurs de ces méthodes et propose des 
innovations. 
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Les chapitres 5 et 6 adressent l‟implémentation puis l‟évaluation des performances des 
différents algorithmes pour les approches à guidage vertical.  
 
Les principales contributions de cette thèse sont le calcul détaillé de la variance de l‟erreur 
equivalente utilisateur de mesure de pseudodistance, une adaptation de l‟algorithme LSR à la 
présence de biais nominaux, une amélioration du calcul des niveaux de protection de 
l‟algorithme MSS, l‟implémentation de la technique GLR en tant qu‟algorithme RAIM à part 
entière (calcul analytique du seuil de détection satisfaisant à la probabilité de fausse alarme, 
prédiction de la probabilité de détection manquée), la conception d‟un algorithme séquentiel 
GLR destiné à detecter les pannes de type échelon – rampe ainsi qu‟une analyse de 
l‟amplitude des plus petits biais pouvant conduire à une erreur de positionnement. 
 
Les disponibilités des algorithmes RAIM LSR, MSR et GLR contraint ont été évaluées pour 
les approches APVI et LPV 200 en utilisant à la fois les mesures de pseudodistance GPS 
L1/L5 et Galileo E1/E5b. Une disponibilté de 100% a été obtenue pour la fonction de 
detection des ces trois algorithmes pour ces deux types d‟approche. Une disponibilté de 100% 
a également été obtenue pour la fonction d‟exclusion du RAIM LSR. Par contre, les 
disponibilités prédites de cette fonction d‟exclusion ne semblent pas suffisament élévées pour 
considérer Galileo + RAIM ou GPS +RAIM comme un moyen primaire de navigation pour 
les approches à guidage vertical. 
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Chapître 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Alors que les systèmes et les procédures de navigation aérienne de l‟époque semblaient 
atteindre leurs limites (coût élevé des équipements, manque de cohérence des méthodes de 
gestion du trafic au niveau mondial) et ne pas permettre le développement du trafic aérien au 
rythme prévu, l'Organisation de l'Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI) créa en 1983 le 
comité sur les Futurs Systèmes de la Navigation Aérienne (FANS). Sa tâche était d'étudier les 
questions techniques, opérationnelles, institutionnelles et économiques relatives aux potentiels 
futurs systèmes aériens de navigation, d‟identifier et d‟évaluer de nouveaux concepts et de 
nouvelles technologies ainsi que de faire des recommandations. En 1991 la dixième 
conférence de l‟OACI sur la navigation aérienne, approuvant les conclusions de FANS, 
adopta le concept CNS/ATM, (Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management) et en particulier le concept de navigation par satellite Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) [ICAO, 1991].  
 
Mais l'utilisation de la navigation par satellite pour l'aviation civile fut rendue possible par la 
décision du gouvernement américain d'offrir le service de positionnement GPS sans percevoir 
de charges directes. Cela conduisit l‟OACI à engager les travaux de standardisation du GNSS, 
avec pour objectif de définir des systèmes utilisables durant toutes les phases de vol, de la 
navigation océanique aux atterrissages de précision de Catégorie III. Les travaux du groupe 
d‟expert GNSS Panel permirrent à l‟OACI, en Novembre 2002, de publier dans l‟Annexe 10 à 
la Convention de Chicago, une première version des standards GNSS couvrant l‟ensemble des 
phases de vol jusqu‟aux approches de Catégorie I [Roturier, 2004]. 
 
Cependant les exigences aviation civile peuvent être très strictes, en particulier celle liées  au 
contrôle d'intégrité et même si des procedures de qualité ont été implémentées en termes de 
surveillance d‟erreur, le segment de contrôle du système GPS ne peut pas corriger des pannes 
satellitaires ou prévenir l'utilisateur en l‟espace des quelques secondes exigées par l‟OACI. 
Ainsi, jusqu'à présent, les systèmes de navigation par satellites seuls ne peuvent pas être 
utilisés comme un moyen unique de navigation. Afin d‟assurer les niveaux requis en matière 
de précision, d‟intégrité, de continuité de service et de disponibilité pour les différentes 
phases de vol, les normes GNSS OACI définissent différentes architectures de venant 
compléter les constellations de base: 
 
- Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS)  
- Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) 
- Airborne Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS) 
 
Un système GBAS consiste en une station de referénce qui émet dans la zone de service de 
l‟aéroport des corrections de mesure de pseudo-distance, des informations d‟intégrité ainsi 
que des données concernant le segment d'approche final par un lien VHF. Actuellement, GPS 
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L1 C/A et un système GBAS permettent d‟atteindre toutes les phases de vol jusqu‟à la CAT I 
incluse avec pour objectif futur les approches de précision de catégorie III. 
 
Un système SBAS consiste en un réseau de stations de référence qui surveillent les signaux 
des satellites de la constellation de base et qui transmettent les informations pertinentes 
(corrections, message d‟intégrité) aux utilisateurs au moyen de satellites géostationnaires. 
Selon l'architecture du système et le niveau de performance attendu, 20 à 35 stations peuvent 
être nécessaire pour couvrir la zone de service qui est typiquement de la taille d‟un un 
continent. Au vu des couts de mise en œuvre des stations de surveillance sol, le meilleur 
niveau de performance pouvant actuellement être atteint par les systèmes SBAS correspond 
aux approches APV.  
 
Finalement, les systèmes ABAS fournissent un contrôle d'intégrité du calcul de position en 
utilisant la redondance des mesures fournies par les constellations GNSS. À la différence 
d'autres systèmes d'augmentations du type de GBAS ou SBAS, ce moyen d‟augmentation  
n'améliore pas la précision du positionement. On parle de contrôle autonome d‟intégrité (en 
anglais Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring, RAIM) lorsqu‟on utilise exclusivement 
les mesures GNSS (mesures de distances) et d‟AAIM (de l‟anglais Aircraft Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring) lorsque des informations issues d‟autres capteurs embarquées tels que 
altimètres barométriques, horloge ou systèmes de navigation inertielle sont utilisés. 
 
Cette étude se concentrera sur ce dernier type de système d'augmentation et plus 
particulièrement sur les techniques RAIM et leurs performances. 
 
Les techniques RAIM sont largement utilisées aujourd'hui pour fournir le contrôle d‟intégrité 
jusqu'aux approches de non précision (en anglais, Non Precision Approaches NPA) en 
utilisant la constellation GPS et les mesures disponibles sur la fréquence L1. Il s‟agit en effet 
d‟un moyen simple et efficace de controler l'intégrité pour les applications aviation civile. 
Cependant ses performances sont limitées jusqu'à présent aux approches de non précision.  
 
D'autre part, l‟OACI et l'industrie aéronautique reconnaissent depuis longtemps que les 
approches aux instruments à guidage vertical présentent un apport significatif en termes de 
sécurité ainsi que de réels avantages opérationnels et environnementaux par rapport aux 
approches de non précision pourtant largement pratiquées.  
 
Avec la future introduction de nouvelles constellations satellitaires, comme Galileo et GPS 
modernisé, de grandes améliorations pourraient être attendues quant à la performance des 
algorithmes RAIM. Tout d'abord grace à la qualité des mesures disponibles. GPS et Galileo 
transmettront des signaux réservés à l‟usage aéronautique sur deux fréquences distinctes ce 
qui permettra l'utilisation de mesures exemptes d‟erreur ionosphérique. De plus les futurs 
signaux offriront de meilleures performances de poursuite. Ces futurs systèmes fourniront 
aussi des informations d‟horloge et d‟ephemeride plus précises. Ces facteurs contribueront 
donc de manière significative à réduire les erreurs de mesures de pseudodistances. D‟autre 
part, le nombre de mesures disponibles augmentera considérablement, ce qui réduira l'impact 
d'une panne satellite sur l'erreur globale d'estimation de position. Pourtant, ce potentiel 
bénéfice en terme de contrôle d'intégrité doit être précisement évalué. En effet un plus grand 
nombre de mesures disponibles implique également un plus grand nombre de mesures 
défectueuses potentielles au niveau du récepteur. De plus, les phases de vol visées sont 
caractérisées par des erreurs de position tolérables plus petites comparées à NPA. Donc les 
erreurs sur les mesures pseudodistance dite « dangereuses » devant être détectées par 
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l'algorithme de surveillance doivent être réexaminées. En effet, elles pourraient avoir une plus 
petite amplitude et des taux d'occurrence qui ne sont pas clairement définie pour le moment.  
 
C'est dans ce contexte que la Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile a initié cette thèse dont 
l‟objectif est d'évaluer le potentiel des algorithmes RAIM pour les approches à guidage 
vertical. On tachera de savoir dans quelle mesure l'augmentation du nombre de satellites et de 
l'amélioration de qualité de mesures de pseudodistance pourraient elles permettre l'utilisation 
de RAIM les approches à guidage vertical. 
 
Cette thèse est organisée de la manière suivante. Tout d'abord, le chapitre 2 présente les 
exigences de l'aviation civile quant à l'utilisation du GNSS. Cette section inclut une 
description des différentes phases de vol et plus particulièrement des phases d‟approche. Elle 
introduit les concepts RNAV et RNP et définit également les critères de performance requis 
par l‟OACI pour chaque les phases de vol. Finalement, les termes de détectionet d‟exclusion 
de faute, plus spécifiques au contrôle autonome d'intégrité, sont définis. Le chapitre 3 a pour 
objectif de donner un modèle complet des mesures GNSS en adressant aussi bien le mode 
nominal et le mode défectueux, en tenant compte des pannes satellite et de l‟effet des 
interférences. Le chapitre 4 a pour but d‟étudier differents algorithmes RAIM mais certains 
aspects généraux comme l'estimation de la position d'utilisateur ou le calcul du plus petit biais 
sur une mesure de pseudo distance entrainant une erreur de positionnement sont d'abord 
présentés. La manière dont les exigences aviation civile et le modèle d‟erreur sont interprétés 
afin de constituer les paramètres d‟entrée des algorithmes RAIM est discutée au chapitre 5. Le 
chapitre 6 présente des résultats des simulations qui ont été effectuées pour évaluer la 
performance RAIM pour les approches à guidage vertical. Cette évaluation a été réalisée 
grâce à des simulations Matlab. Finalement, le chapitre 7 résume les principaux résultats de ce 
travail de doctorat et propose quelques pistes de reflexion quant à de futurs travaux. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1-1 Motivation 
1-2 Original Contributions 
1-3 Dissertation Organization 
 
1-1 Motivation 
 
As it was recognized that the ever-increasing demand for air transportation services, the high 
cost of equipment and the need for increased efficiency while maintaining safety were 
beginning to stress the existing global air navigation system to its limits, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established the Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) 
committee in 1983. Its task was to study technical, operational, institutional and economic 
questions relative to future potential air navigation systems, to identify and assess new 
concepts and new technology and to make recommendations for the coordinated evolutionary 
development of air navigation. The ICAO‟s Tenth Air Navigation Conference in 1991, 
approving the FANS conclusions, agreed to endorse the satellite-based Communications, 
Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) and Air Traffic Management (ATM) system for the use of 
international civil aviation well into the 21
st
 century [ICAO, 1991]. But the use of satellite 
navigation for civil aviation has been made possible by the United States government decision 
to offer the Global Positioning System (GPS) for civilian use without collecting direct costs. 
This has lead ICAO to undertake standardization work for Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS), with the objective of defining GNSS systems that could be used during all phases of 
flight, ranging from ocean navigation to Category III precision landings. The work done by 
the GNSS Panel expert group enabled ICAO, in November 2002, to publish a first version of 
GNSS standards covering all phases of flight up to Category I approaches in Annex 10 of the 
Chicago Convention [Roturier, 2004]. 
 
But civil aviation requirements can be very stringent, in particular integrity monitoring ones. 
For instance, even if quality failure monitoring processes have been implemented, GPS 
Control Segment cannot correct satellite anomalies or warn the user within the few seconds 
required by ICAO and, up to now, satellite systems alone cannot be used as a means of 
navigation. Therefore, in order to ensure the levels required in terms of precision, integrity, 
continuity of service and availability of GNSS for various phases of flight, the ICAO GNSS 
standards define different architectures to augment the basic constellations: 
 
- Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS)  
- Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) 
Chapter n°1: Introduction 
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- Airborne Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS) 
 
GBAS uses a technique known as local area differential corrections. A control station at an 
airport for example, precisely measures errors and relays them to a user so that he can 
eliminate them from his own measurement. This technique uses a data link in the VHF 
frequency band of ILS - VOR systems (108 - 118 MHz). The other elements transmitted 
through this VHF link are integrity data of various satellites in view, as well as the database 
used for the final approach segment. For a GBAS station, the coverage is about thirty 
kilometers and the objective of GBAS systems is to carry out Category I precision 
approaches. GBAS is also foreseen to support Category II and Category III operations. 
 
SBAS transmits differential corrections and integrity messages for navigation satellites that 
are within sight of a network of stations, typically deployed for an entire continent. 
Depending on the architecture of the system and the required performance level, 20 to 35 
stations may be required to cover a continent. There are four important differences compared 
to GBAS. First of all, the frequency band of the data link is identical to that of the GPS 
signals. Next, the use of geostationary satellites enables messages to be broadcast over very 
wide areas. These geostationary satellites can also transmit ranging measurements, as if they 
were GPS satellites. Finally, SBAS provides vectorial corrections (clock, ionosphere, 
ephemeris corrections) while GBAS transmits scalar ones (pseudorange corrections). 
Considering the limitation of the number of ground-based control stations to control 
deployment and operation costs, it is thought that the best performance level that can 
currently be attained by the SBAS corresponds to APV I or II performance approaches. 
Today, various SBAS are implemented: 
 
- the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), operated by the United States Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).  
 
- the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), today operated by 
the European Space Agency (ESA) and then operated by the ESSP (European Satellite 
Service Provider) from the beginning of the year 2009. 
 
- the Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) system, operated by 
Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB). 
 
Finally, ABAS provides integrity monitoring for the position solution using redundant 
information that is within the GNSS constellation. Unlike other types of augmentations of the 
GBAS and SBAS type, ABAS augmentation does not improve positioning accuracy. ABAS 
are referred as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) when GNSS information 
(range measurements) is exclusively used and as Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(AAIM) when information from additional on-board sensors (e.g. barometric altimeter, clock 
and Inertial Navigation System, INS) is also used. 
 
This study will focus on this last type of augmentation system and more particularly on RAIM 
techniques and performance. 
 
RAIM is worldwide used today to provide integrity monitoring up to Non Precision Approach 
(NPA) operations using the GPS constellation with single frequency L1 measurements. 
Indeed, it is a simple and efficient solution to check the integrity of GNSS in civil aviation 
applications. But its performance is limited at best to NPA up to now. Indeed current nominal 
errors on GPS L1 C/A pseudorange measurements and current constellation geometry do not 
allow GPS L1 C/A+RAIM to fulfil stringent vertical requirement on positioning error. 
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On the other hand, ICAO and the international aviation industry have long recognized that 
instrument approaches that give pilots vertical guidance provide significant safety, operational 
and environmental benefits over the now widely used non precision approaches. Specific 
advantages of approaches with vertical guidance include safer approach path guidance, 
simpler approach procedures and lower minimum descent altitudes in adverse weather. 
 
In the context of the introduction of future satellite constellations, such as Galileo and 
modernized Global Positioning System GPS, great improvements could be expected from 
RAIM performance.  
 
First concerning the quality of the available measurements. Both GPS and Galileo will 
broadcast signal for aeronautic use on two distinct frequencies that will allow the use of iono-
free measurements. Moreover future signals will offer improved tracking accuracy. Future 
systems will also provide better clock and ephemeris information. These factors will 
contribute to significantly reduce the nominal error on pseudo range measurements. 
 
Secondly, the number of available measurements will considerably increase. That will reduce 
the impact of a single satellite failure on the position estimation error and significantly 
improve RAIM capability to monitor integrity during more stringent operations. 
 
Thus, approaches with vertical guidance such as APV or LPV 200 operations could 
reasonably be targeted using RAIM to provide integrity monitoring. 
 
However, the benefit for position integrity needs to be evaluated, as a larger number of 
available measurements also implies a larger number of potential faulty measurements for the 
receiver. Moreover, the targeted phases of flight are characterized by smaller horizontal and 
vertical tolerable position errors compared to NPA, and by lower acceptable probabilities for 
the corresponding alert limits to be exceeded. Therefore, the threatening range errors that need 
to be detected by the fault detection algorithm have to be reconsidered, since they could have 
smaller amplitude, and a probability of occurrence that is not clearly defined currently. This is 
why these improvements need to be precisely quantified. 
 
It is within this context that the French Civil Aviation has sponsored this Ph.D. which 
objective is to evaluate the potential capacity of RAIM algorithms to support approach and 
landing phases of flight with vertical guidance. The extent to which the augmentation of the 
number of satellites and the improvement of pseudorange measurements quality could enable 
the use of RAIM for both horizontal and vertical guidance is investigated. 
 
Currently, several studies deal with these aspects and address common issues. Among these 
projects we can mention: 
 
The GNSS Evolutionary Architecture Study GEAS panel which is an expert panel established 
by the FAA GNSS Program Office in order to develop candidates for an integrity architecture 
for modernized GNSS that would satisfy en route, terminal and precision approach operation 
and be capable to provide LPV 200 performance worldwide [GEAS, 2008]. 
 
The Galileo Supervising Authority GSA project GIRASOLE (Galileo Integrity Receiver for 
Advanced Safety Of Life Equipment) which scope includes the definition of the three types of 
receivers (aviation, maritime and rail), core technologies investigation and implementation 
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with main focus on integrity concepts, breadboards development and finally the development 
of testing tools. The objective of the project is that, at the end, receiver manufacturers will 
have available basic building blocks to continue the development of the Galileo SoL receiver 
of their own application domain [GSA, 2008] 
 
The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, EUROCONTROL, study which 
analyzes the RAIM capabilities in a multi-constellation and multi-frequency GNSS 
environment in order to evaluate the actual need for the Galileo Safety-of-Life Service. 
 
The European Commission Framework Programme (FP6) ANASTASIA (Airborne New 
Advanced Satellite Techniques and Technologies in A System Integrated Approach) whose 
scientific and technical objectives are to provide on-board Communication, Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS) solutions to cope with the foreseen doubling of air traffic by 2020. In 
particular, ANASTASIA project carries out research of future technology and system 
architectures for navigation, resulting in the development of a new generation of airborne 
GNSS receivers for all phases of flight. This program started in April 2005 and is expected to 
continue until early 2009 [Anastasia, 2008]. 
 
1-2 Original contributions 
 
The main contributions of this thesis are enumerated below and are detailed all along this 
dissertation. We indicate the section number where contributions can be found knowing that 
contributions from other authors are also presented in each of these sections: 
 
- Detailed computation of user equivalent range error variance (3.2) 
- Analysis of the effect of interferences on pseudorange measurement (3.3) 
- Adaptation of LSR RAIM algorithm to nominal biases (appendix B) 
- Improvement of Maximum Solution Separation protection levels computation (4.3) 
- Implementation of GLR algorithm as a RAIM: analytical expression of the threshold 
that satisfies the false alarm probability, prediction of the probability of missed 
detection (4.4) 
- Design of a sequential GLR algorithm to detect step plus ramp failure (4.4) 
- Analysis of the amplitude of smallest single biases that lead to a positioning failure 
(5.6) 
 
Details on the specific contributions compared to background information are provided in 
each section.  
 
1-3 Dissertation organization 
 
This dissertation is structured as follows. 
 
First of all, chapter 2 presents the civil aviation requirements relative to GNSS use. This 
section includes a description of the different phases of flight and especially approaches 
operations. It provides an introduction to the area navigation and to the required navigation 
performance concepts. It also defines each ICAO performance navigation criteria and Signal 
in Space Requirement for each phases of flight is then given. Finally, fault 
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detection/exclusion terms which are more specific to autonomous integrity monitoring are 
defined. 
 
Chapter 3 intends to give a complete model of GNSS measurement addressing the fault free 
and the faulty case, taking into account satellite failure and interference effects. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the study that has been made concerning RAIM techniques. Some 
general aspects like the user position estimation or the computation of the smallest single 
pseudorange bias that leads to a positioning failure are first presented. The most classical 
RAIM technique that is to say the least square residual method is then recalled. The 
Maximum Solution Separation method is also studied and new ways of computing horizontal 
protection level are presented. The use of generalized likelihood ratio test as a RAIM 
technique is then considered for snapshot and sequential implementation. 
 
The way both civil aviation requirements and threat model are interpreted to constitute an 
input to RAIM algorithms is discussed in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 presents results of the simulations that have been conducted to measure RAIM 
performance for vertically guided approaches. This evaluation has been realized thanks to 
Matlab simulations. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the main results of this Ph.D. work and concludes on the 
obtained results. Some outstanding issues are introduced as opening and propositions for 
future work. 
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Chapître 2 
 
Exigences Aviation Civile  
 
 
L‟Organisation de l'Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI), en anglais International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), est une organisation internationale qui dépend des Nations 
Unies. Son rôle est de participer à l‟élaboration des normes qui permettent la standardisation 
du transport aéronautique international ainsi que d‟assurer un développement sûr, sécuritaire 
et durable de l'aviation civile. Le conseil de l‟OACI adopte les normes et recommandations 
règlementant la navigation (en anglais : SARP, Standards and Recommended Practices), le 
partage des fréquences radio, les brevets du personnel d'aviation, la circulation aérienne, etc. 
Il définit aussi les protocoles à suivre lors des enquêtes sur les accidents aériens, protocoles 
qui sont respectés par les pays signataires de la Convention de l‟Aviation Civile 
Internationale, communément appelée Convention de Chicago [ICAO, 2008]. 
 
En particulier, l‟OACI établit les standards concernant les moyens de radionavigation, dont 
ceux concernant la navigation par satellite. Ils sont principalement recensés dans l‟annexe 10 
de Convention de l‟Aviation Civile Internationale. 
 
L‟objectif de ce chapitre est de rappeler les principales définitions et les principales exigences 
relatives aux approches à guidage vertical anisi qu‟au contrôle d‟intégrité. 
 
Les principales phases de vol ainsi que les classes d‟appoches sont tout d‟abord présentées 
dans la section 2.1.  
 
La section 2.2 présente le concept de navigation fondée sur les performances (en anglais 
Performance Based Navigation concept, PBN), qui s‟appuit notamment sur les concepts 
RNAV et RNP et au sein duquel la navigation par satellite aura un role prépondérant. Ainsi la 
navigation de surface (RNAV) est une méthode de navigation de plus en plus répandue, 
permettant le vol sur n'importe quelle trajectoire voulue, utilisant une position absolue de 
l'aéronef indépendante de l'emplacement des infrastructures sol. Le concept RNP (Required 
Navigation Performance) est défini par l‟OACI comme l‟indication de la précision de 
navigation nécessaire pour évoluer à l‟intérieur d‟un espace aérien défini.  
 
La section 2.3 présente les critères de performance de navigation que doivent remplir les 
signaux GNSS. 
 
Ainsi la précision est le degré de conformité entre la position ou la vitesse mesurée ou estimée 
à un instant donné et la position ou la vitesse réelle. La précision de position est généralement 
présentéecomme la borne de l'intervalle de confiance à 95% de l'erreur de position. 
 
La disponibilité du service est la probabilité que le service soit rendu au début de chaque 
cycle d‟utilisation (par exemple pour une approche). 
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La continuité de service est la probabilité que les performances seront atteintes pendant toute 
la durée d'un cycle d'opération (par exemple pendant une approche), à condition que les 
performances soient atteintes au début de l'opération. 
 
L‟intégrité représente la confiance qui peut être accordée à la validité des informations 
fournies par le système. Elle inclut la capacité du système à fournir des alertes à l‟utilisateur 
dans le temps imparti lorsque le système ne peut plus être utilisé. 
 
Les valeurs assignées à ces paramètres dependent de l‟application ou de l‟opération envisagée 
Elles sont fixées par l‟OACI et sont détaillées dans la section 2.4 
 
Des définitions plus spécifiques au contrôle autonome d‟intégrité sont ensuite présentées dans 
la section 2.5. 
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2-3 Performance Navigation Criteria 
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2-5 Fault Detection, Fault Exclusion 
2-6 Synthesis 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the agency of the United Nations, 
which codifies the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the 
planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth. 
The ICAO Council adopts standards and recommended practices concerning air navigation, 
prevention of unlawful interference, and facilitation of border-crossing procedures for 
international civil aviation. In addition, the ICAO defines the protocols for air accident 
investigation followed by transport safety authorities in countries signatory to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, commonly known as the Chicago Convention [ICAO, 2008]. 
 
In particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is responsible for 
establishing the standards for radio navigation aids, including the ones concerning GNSS. 
They are mainly defined in the Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to recall the main definitions and the main requirements 
related to approaches with vertical guidance operations and especially integrity monitoring. 
 
2-1 Phases of flight 
 
A flight of an aircraft consists of six major phases [CICTT, 2006]:  
 
- Take-Off: “From the application of takeoff power, through rotation and to an altitude 
of 35 feet above runway elevation or until gear-up selection, whichever comes first”.  
 
- Departure: “From the end of the Takeoff sub-phase to the first prescribed power 
reduction, or until reaching 1000 feet above runway elevation or the VFR pattern 
(Visual Flight Rules), whichever comes first” 
 
- Cruise: “Any level flight segment after arrival at initial cruise altitude until the start of 
descent to the destination.”  
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- Descent:  
- Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): Descent from cruise to either Initial Approach 
Fix (IAF) or VFR pattern entry).  
- Visual Flight Rules (VFR): Descent from cruise to the VFR pattern entry or 
1000 feet above the runway elevation, whichever comes first.  
 
- Final Approach: “From the FAF (Final Approach Fix) to the beginning of the landing 
flare.” 
 
- Landing: “Transition from nose-low to nose-up attitude just before landing until 
touchdown.” 
 
Three classes of approaches and landing operation have been defined by the ICAO in the 
Annex 6 [ICAO, 2001] and are classified as follow: 
 
- Non precision Approaches and landing operations: an instrument approach and 
landing which utilizes lateral guidance but does not utilize vertical guidance 
 
- Approaches and landing operations with vertical guidance: an instrument approach 
and landing which utilizes lateral and vertical guidance but does not meet the 
requirements established for precision approach and landing operation. 
 
- Precision Approaches and landing operation: an instrument approach and landing 
using precision lateral and vertical guidance with minima as determined by the 
category of operation. 
 
 
Figure 1 - ICAO classification of approaches [Roturier, 2004] 
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where PAR stand for Precision Approach Radar, DME for Distance Measuring Equipment, 
NDB for Non Directional Beacon, MLS for Microwave Landing System, ILS for Instrument 
Landing System, VOR for Very High Frequency Omni directional Range, RNAV for Area 
Navigation and VNAV for Vertical Navigation 
 
Categories of aircraft approaches are defined according to the level of confidence that can be 
placed by the pilot into the system he is using to help him land the plane safely. Approaches 
are divided in two main segments: the aircraft first follows the indication provided by the 
landing system, then the pilot takes over in the final part and controls the aircraft using visual 
outside information. As the reliability of the aircraft, of the crew and of the landing system 
increases, the height of the aircraft over the ground at the end of the interval of use of the 
information provided by the system can be decreased [Macabiau, 1997]. 
 
The Decision Height (DH) is specified as the critical point in the approach path which is the 
minimum height above the runway threshold at which a missed approach procedure must be 
executed if the minimum visual reference is not established. 
 
The Visibility is the greatest distance determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in 
unit of length at which it is possible with the unaided eye to see and identify, in daylight a 
prominent dark object and at night a remarkable light source [ICAO, 2005] 
 
The Runway Visual Range (RVR) is the maximum distance in the landing direction at which 
the pilot on the center line can see the runway surface markings or the runway lights, as 
measured at different point along the runway and in particular in the touchdown area [OFCM, 
2005]. 
 
Approaches can be defined by their decision height, the visibility or runway visual range: 
 
Approaches Decision Height Visual Requirement 
NPA 𝐷𝐻 ≥ 350 𝑓𝑡 
Depending on the 
airport equipment 
APV 𝐷𝐻 ≥ 250 𝑓𝑡 
LPV 200 𝐷𝐻 ≥ 60 𝑚  200 𝑓𝑡    
CAT I 𝐷𝐻 ≥ 60 𝑚  200 𝑓𝑡  
Visibility ≥ 800𝑚  
𝑅𝑉𝑅 ≥ 550 m 
CAT II  100 𝑓𝑡  30 m ≤ 𝐷𝐻 ≤ 60 m  𝑅𝑉𝑅 ≥ 350 m 
CAT III 
A 0 m ≤ 𝐷𝐻 ≤ 30 m 𝑅𝑉𝑅 ≥ 200 m 
B 0 m ≤ 𝐷𝐻 ≤ 15 m 50 m ≤ 𝑅𝑉𝑅 ≤ 200 m 
C 𝐷𝐻 = 0 m 𝑅𝑉𝑅 = 0 𝑚 
 
Table 1 - Decision heights and Visual requirements [ICAO, 2006] 
 
2-2 Performance based Navigation Concept 
 
The Performance Based Navigation (PBN) concept specifies aircraft RNAV system 
performance requirements in terms of accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity and 
functionality needed for the proposed operations in the context of a particular airspace 
concept. It represents a shift from sensor-based to performance-based navigation. 
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Performance requirements are identified in navigation specifications, which also identify the 
choice of navigation sensors and equipment that may be used to meet the performance 
requirements. This concept relies on the area navigation method and is implemented through 
the required navigation performance procedures [ICAO, 2008]. 
 
2-2-1 Area Navigation (RNAV) 
 
Area Navigation (RNAV) is a method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on any 
desired flight path within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or within the 
limits of the capability of self-contained navigation aids, or a combination of these [RTCA, 
2003]. 
 
This navigation method allows designing more routes and most of all shorter routes, permits 
noise reduction and offers greater flexibility in the use of the airspace resources. It allows 
aircraft to fly user-preferred routes from waypoint to waypoint, where waypoints do not 
depend on ground infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2 - RNAV principle 
 
The trend toward an Area Navigation concept means a greater role for GNSS, especially in 
areas that lack suitable ground based navigation aids or surveillance equipment. 
 
As the future CNS/ATM operations are expected to be based on navigation defined by 
geographic fixes and not to be restricted to the location of ground-based navigation aids, this 
concept of RNAV has been developed. But an element that has been missing is the level of 
confidence of navigation accuracy. This is provides by the Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) concept. 
 
2-2-2 Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) is defined by ICAO as a statement of the navigation 
performance necessary for operation within a defined airspace.  
 
Part of the broader concept PBN, RNP is a method of implementing routes and flight paths 
that differs from previous methods in that not only does it have an associated performance 
specification that an aircraft must meet before the path can be flown but must also monitors 
the achieved performance and provide an alert in the event that this fails to meet the 
specification. It is the monitoring and alerting facility that distinguishes RNP from RNAV 
from which it is developed. RNP equipped aircrafts can safely operate routes with less 
separation than previously required which is significant because it increases the number of 
RNAV Routes 
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Total System 
Error (TSE) 
aircraft that can safely use a particular airspace and therefore accommodate the increasing 
demand for air traffic capacity. GNSS is the primary navigation system to support currently 
defined RNP standards.  
 
Under RNP, the nature of the navigational aids is not specified, rather the volume of airspace 
around the aircraft is, and this volume may be smaller (in some cases much smaller) than the 
one of conventional navigation. 
 
The performance required to fly an RNP route is generally specified in nautical miles, for 
example, RNP 4. This RNP type is a statement of the navigation performance accuracy to be 
achieved within the corresponding airspace by the population of aircraft operating within the 
airspace. The RNP specification also requires that if the error exceeds or is likely to exceed 
twice the specified value (i.e. 8NM for RNP 4) then an alert must be generated (containment 
region). As route spacing must be sufficient to ensure that two aircraft deviating to the alert 
level toward one another will remain safely separated, it is typically set to 5 or 6 times the 
RNP value [ICAO, 1999]. Thus RNP types can be used by airspace planners to determine 
airspace utilization potential and as an input in defining route widths and traffic separation 
requirements, although RNP by itself is not sufficient basis for setting a separation standard. 
 
To evaluate RNP RNAV compliance, several errors are to be taken into account. According to 
[RTCA, 2003], the required navigation performance is defined by the Total System Error 
(TSE), which represents: 
 
- PDE (Path Definition Error): difference between the desired path (the path that the 
crew and air traffic control can expect the aircraft to fly) and the path defined by the 
Flight Management System (FMS). 
 
- FTE (Flight Technical Error): difference between the estimated position of the aircraft 
and the path defined by the FMS.  This error is due to the way the aircraft is controlled 
and it is also called XTK (Cross Track Error) 
 
- NSE (Navigation System Error): difference between the estimated position and the 
true position of the aircraft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Total System Error 
Defined Path 
Estimated Position 
Path Steering Error (PSE) or Flight Technical Error 
(FTE) 
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System Error (NSE) 
True Position 
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2-3 Performance Navigation Criteria 
 
Navigation system performance requirements are defined in the Manual on Required 
Navigation Performance [ICAO, 1999] for a single aircraft and for the total system which 
includes the signal-in-space, the airborne equipment and the ability of the aircraft to fly the 
desired trajectory. These total system requirements were used as a starting point to derive 
GNSS signal-in-space performance requirements which criteria definitions are given in this 
section [ICAO, 2006].  
 
2-3-1 Accuracy 
 
GNSS position error is the difference between the estimated position and the actual position. 
For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability that the position error is within 
the accuracy requirement should be at least 95 per cent. 
 
2-3-2 Availability 
 
The availability of a navigation system is the ability of the system to provide the required 
function and performance at the initiation of the intended operation. 
 
The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used for 
navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot, or 
other system managing the flight of the aircraft. 
 
2-3-3 Continuity 
 
The continuity of a system is the ability of the total system to perform its function without 
unscheduled interruption during the intended operation.  
 
More specifically, continuity is the probability that the specified system performance will be 
maintained for the duration of a phase operation, presuming that the system was available at 
the beginning of that phase operation and was predicted to operate throughout the operation. 
 
2-3-4 Integrity 
 
Integrity is a measure of trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied 
by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid 
warning to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used for the intended operation (or 
phase of flight). 
 
Integrity requirements are defined thanks to three parameters: 
- the integrity risk 
- the alert limit 
- the time to alert 
 
Integrity risk is the probability of providing a signal that is out of tolerance without warning 
the user in a given period of time.  
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To assure that the position error is acceptable, an alert limits is defined that represents the 
largest position error allowable for safe operation: 
 
- The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane (the 
local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, 
that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated horizontal position 
with the required probability for a particular navigation mode 
 
- The Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis 
(perpendicular to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid) ), with its center being at 
the true position, that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated 
vertical position with the required probability for a particular navigation mode 
 
Time to alert is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the onset of a positioning failure 
until the equipment annunciates the alert. 
 
The probability of non-integrity detection quantifies the integrity risk. It represents the 
probability that an error exceeds the alert limit without the user being informed within the 
time to alert. 
 
The values assigned to these three parameters depend on the specific application and intended 
operation, and are determined by the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
 
2-4 Signal in Space Performance Requirements 
 
2-4-1 Annex 10 Signal in Space Performance Requirements 
 
According to [ICAO, 2006] the combination of GNSS elements and a fault-free GNSS user 
receiver shall meet the signal-in-space requirements defined in the table next page. 
 
The concept of a fault-free user receiver is applied only as a means of defining the 
performance of combinations of different GNSS elements. The fault-free receiver is assumed 
to be a receiver with nominal accuracy and time-to-alert performance. Such a receiver is 
assumed to have no failures that affect the integrity, availability and continuity performance. 
 
Ranges of values are given for the continuity requirement for en-route, terminal, initial 
approach, NPA and departure operations, as this requirement is dependent upon several 
factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and 
availability of alternative navigation aids. The lower value given is the minimum requirement 
for areas with low traffic density and airspace complexity. The higher value given is 
appropriate for areas with high traffic density and airspace complexity. 
 
A range of values is also given for the availability requirements as these requirements are 
dependent upon the operational need which is based upon several factors including the 
frequency of operations, weather environments, the size and duration of the outages, 
availability of alternate navigation aids, radar coverage, traffic density and reversionary 
operational procedures. 
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Typical Operation 
Accuracy 
Horizontal 
95% 
Accuracy 
Vertical 
95% 
 
Integrity risk 
Time 
To  
Alert 
Horizontal 
Alert limit 
Vertical 
Alert limit 
 
Continuity 
 
Availability 
En-route 
3.7 km 
(2.0 NM) 
N/A 1 − 1 × 10−7/h  5 min 7.4 km N/A 1 − 1 × 10−4/h to 
1 − 1 × 10−8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
En-route,  
Terminal 
0.74 km 
(0.4 NM) 
N/A 1 − 1 × 10−7/h 15 s 3.7 km N/A 1 − 1 × 10−4/h to 
1 − 1 × 10−8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Initial approach, 
Intermediate approach, 
Non precision 
approach, 
Departure 
220 m 
(720 ft) 
N/A 1 − 1 × 10−7/h 10 s 556 m N/A 1 − 1 × 10−4/h to 
1 − 1 × 10−8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Approach Operations 
with vertical Guidance 
APV I 
16 m 
(52 ft) 
20 m 
(66 ft) 
1 − 2 × 10−7 
per approach 
10 s 40 m 50 m 1 − 8 × 10−6/h  
in any 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Approach Operations 
with vertical Guidance 
APV II 
16 m 
(52 ft) 
8 m 
(26 ft) 
1 − 2 × 10−7 
per approach 
6 s 40 m 20 m 1 − 8 × 10−6/h  
in any 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Category I  precision 
approach 
16 m 
(52 ft) 
6 m to 4m 
(20 ft to 
13ft) 
1 − 2 × 10−7 
per approach 
6 s 40 m 15.0 m to 
10 m 
1 − 8 × 10−6/h  
in any 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
 
Table 2 - Signal in Space Performance [ICAO, 2006] 
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2-4-2 LPV 200 Signal in Space Performance  
 
Whereas Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance (LPV) approaches is a category of 
approaches with vertical guidance that include APV I and APV II operations, LPV 200 is a 
new concept of aircraft instrument approach procedure in which guidance is provided down to 
a minimum decision altitude as low as 200 feet height above touchdown. 
 
LPV 200 approaches are published by the FAA and built to exploit the high accuracy of the 
American satellite-based augmentation system WAAS. This operation allows a lateral 
guidance with the accuracy of the typical ILS and would provide a significant operational 
benefit compared to the existing APV operations [Cabler and DeCleene, 2002]. 
 
This category of approach is not included yet in the Annex 10 but some proposed 
requirements to support this new operation can be presented [DeCleene, 2007]: 
 
Accuracy 
Horizontal 
95% 
Accuracy 
Vertical 
95% 
Integrity 
risk 
Time
To 
Alert 
Horizontal 
Alert limit 
Vertical 
Alert 
limit 
Continuity Availability 
16 m 4 m 
1 − 2 ×
10−7/h 
6 s 40 m 35 m 
1 − 1 ×
10−4/h to 
1 − 1 ×
10−8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
 
Table 3 - LPV 200 Signal in Space Performance 
 
The accuracy requirement is equivalent to ILS. The accuracy has a significant effect on 
obstacle clearance criteria and on the probability of a successful landing after transitioning to 
the visual segment. The continuity and availability are also equivalent to ILS and are already 
harmonized across precision approach, APV II and APV I. 
 
The integrity risk requirement is equivalent to ILS and is already harmonized across precision 
approach, APV II and APV I. The time-to-alert is equivalent to ILS. This time-to-alert for 
APV II and precision approach is based on the requirement for ILS glideslope, which is 6 
seconds. The HAL is equivalent to ILS, and is already harmonized across precision approach, 
APV II and APV I. The VAL was derived by assuming a bias error equal to the VAL and 
evaluating the conditional risk of going outside the obstacle clearance area. The 35 m VAL 
was initially derived using a simplified analysis technique, which has since been validated 
through more rigorous analysis including consideration of the impact to the missed approach 
surface. 
 
LPV200 operations would then fall between APV II and Category I approaches. 
 
It is to be noticed that the 35 m VAL satisfies obstacle clearance requirement but does not 
necessarily set up the aircraft to land safely on the runway. Studies conducted by the FAA and 
NavCanada show that more than a positive 10 m bias in positioning causes pilots to 
overcompensate and descent too rapidly in a way that would cause significant damage to the 
aircraft. This is why a system that is intended to provide LPV 200 must also have a very low 
probability of 10 meter positioning errors. Unfortunately this requirement is not yet well 
documented [Walter, 2008]. 
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2-5 Fault Detection, Fault Exclusion 
 
The aim of this section is to recall Minimal Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) 
definitions relative to integrity monitoring functions [RTCA, 2006]. 
 
2-5-1 Introduction 
 
Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) is a receiver processing scheme that autonomously 
provides integrity monitoring for the position solution, using redundant range measurements. 
 
The FDE consists of two distinct parts:  
 
- The fault detection part detects the presence of an unacceptably large position error for 
a given mode of flight. 
 
- Upon the detection, the fault exclusion follows and excludes the source of the 
unacceptably large position error, thereby allowing navigation to return to normal 
performance without an interruption of service. 
 
The fault detection aspects of FDE are referred to as Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring. 
 
2-5-2 FDE algorithms events 
 
If the equipment is aware of the navigation mode, a Positioning Failure is defined to occur 
whenever the difference between the true position and the indicated position exceeds the 
applicable alert limit. If the equipment is not aware of the navigation mode/alert limit, a 
positioning failure is defined to occur whenever the difference between the true position and 
the indicated position exceeds the applicable protection level. 
 
A Missed Detection is defined to occur when a positioning failure is not detected. 
 
A Failed Exclusion is defined to occur when a true position failure is detected and the 
detection condition is not eliminated within the time to alert (from the onset of the positioning 
failure). A failed exclusion would cause a navigation alert. 
 
A Wrong Exclusion is defined to occur when a detection occurs, and a positioning failure 
exists but is undetected after exclusion. 
 
Positioning failures that are not annunciated as an alert within the time-to-alert are defined to 
be Missed Alerts. Both missed detection and wrong exclusion can cause missed alerts after 
the time-to-alert expires. 
 
A False Detection is defined as the detection of a positioning failure when a positioning 
failure has not occurred. 
 
A False Alert is defined as the indication of a positioning failure when a positioning failure 
has not occurred (a result of false detection). A false alert would cause a navigation alert. 
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Figure 4 - Diagram of FDE Conditions [RTCA, 2006] 
 
2-5-3 Protection Levels 
 
As the position error remains unknown for the user, statistic tools have to be used to check 
requirements compliance. 
 
The Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane (the 
local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that 
describes the region assured to contain the indicated horizontal position. It is an horizontal 
region where the missed alert and false alert requirement are met for the chosen set of 
satellites when autonomous fault detection is used.  
 
The Vertical Protection Level (VPL) is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis 
(perpendicular to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true 
position, that describes the region assured to contain the indicated vertical position. It defines 
the vertical region where the missed alert and false alert requirement are met for the chosen 
set of satellites when autonomous fault detection is used. 
 
Protection Levels are functions of the satellites and user geometry and the expected error 
characteristics: they are not affected by actual measurements. Their value is predictable given 
reasonable assumptions regarding the expected error characteristics. 
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2-6 Synthesis 
 
Major aircraft phases of flight and especially approaches operation have been described. The 
Area Navigation method and the Required Navigation Performance concept have been briefly 
introduced. A review of Signal In Space performance requirements as defined by ICAO and 
the associated criteria definitions have been then presented. In particular, autonomous 
integrity monitoring function specifications have been recalled. 
 
More internal parameters such as the allowed probability of missed detection (Pmd) or the 
required probability of false alert will be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
These requirements and terms definitions constitute a major input to RAIM algorithms design 
as well as the measurement model which is addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapître 3 
 
Modèle de Mesure 
 
 
La mesure fondamentale en navigation par satellite est la mesure de pseudodistance. 
L‟utilisateur reçoit un signal de navigation et en particulier un code pseudo aléatoire de la part 
d‟un satellite. Le satellite est identifié par le recepteur qui génére une réplique locale du code. 
La durée dont laquelle la replique doit être décalée pour maintenir le maximum de correlation 
avec le signal en provenance du satellite, multipliée par la vitessse de la lumière correspond 
approximativement à la distance entre le satellite et l‟utilisateur. On parle de pseudo distance 
en raison de la présence de l‟erreur de l‟horloge utilisateur considérée comme une quatrième 
inconnue au même titre que les trois inconnues de position. 
 
Les principales différences entre la pseudodistance réelle et la pseudodistance mesurée sont 
dues à plusieurs sources d‟erreur : 
 
- les retards de propagation du signal causés par l‟ionosphère et la troposphère 
- erreur d‟horloge du satellite 
- erreur équivalente d‟estimation de la position satellite  
- les phénomènes de multitrajet 
- le bruit recepteur 
 
Ces erreurs peuvent être dues au segment spatial, au segment de controle et au segment 
utilisateur. 
 
Afin d‟évaluer précisement les performances de positionement GNSS, toutes ces sources 
d‟erreur doivent être prises en compte et les erreurs de mesures correspondantes doivent être 
modélisées aussi précisement que possible. Les erreurs systèmatiques seront adressées dans le 
modèle dit « sans panne » (en anglais, fault free case) et les erreurs inhabituelles pouvant 
causer une erreur de positionnement dangereuse et devant peutêtre être détectées seront 
traitées dans le modèle dit « avec panne » (en anglais, faulty case). 
 
La section 3.1 présente les signaux GNSS destinés à un usage aéronautique et plus 
précisément les signaux GPS et Galiléo situés dans les bandes L1/E1 et L5/E5. Les densités 
spectrales de puissance de ces différents signaux sont données. Elles servent de base au calcul 
du bruit de poursuite au niveau du recepteur. 
 
La section 3.2 décrit le modèle « sans panne » (fault free case). La plupart de ces modèles 
suppose que les composantes de l‟erreur de mesure de pseudodistance suivent une loi nomale 
centrée dont la variance est supposée connue. L‟erreur résultante a pour distribution 𝑁 0, 𝜍2  
où la variance 𝜍2 est égale à la somme des variances de chacune de ses composantes. 
Cependant, certaines composantes d‟erreur ne sont pas rigoureusement modélisables par une 
distribution centrée ainsi on peut trouver des biais nominaux dans le cas « fault free ». Ceci 
est adressé dans la section 3-2-2. La section 3 2 1 traite du calcul de la variance de l‟erreur 
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globale de pseudo distance au niveau uilisateur (en anglais User Equivalent Range Error, 
UERE). C‟est pourquoi les effets sur les mesures de pseudodistances des principales source 
d‟erreur sont modélisées.  
 
La section 3.3 adresse le modèle de mesure avec « panne ». On parle de panne lorsqu‟une 
erreur significativement grande apparait sur une mesure de pseudodistance (que cette erreur 
soit due au dysfonctionnement du satellite lui-même ou à des pertubations locales du signal 
comme des multitrajets ou des interferences) pouvant causer une perte d‟intégrité. Afin de 
concevoir des systèmes de controle d‟intégrité adaptés dont on puisse correctement évaluer 
les performances, il est nécessaire d‟etudier ces modes de défaillance ainsi que leur probablité 
d‟occurrence. C‟est l‟objet de cette section qui traite en premier lieu des pannes satellitaires 
(section 3.3.1) puis de l‟effet des interferences sur les mesures de pseudo distance (section 
3.3.2).  
 
La question de l‟autocorrélation temporelle des mesures, devant notamment être prise en 
compte par algorithmes de contrôle d‟intégrité sequentiels mais également dans la 
spécification du taux de fausse alarme, est abordée dans la section 3.4. 
 
Un modèle de mesure complet est ensuite proposé en section 3.5.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Measurement Model 
 
 
3-1 GNSS signals for Civil Aviation 
3-2 Fault free case measurement model 
3-3 Faulty case measurement model 
3-4 Temporal Aspects 
3-5 Synthesis 
 
The fundamental measurement in satellite navigation is pseudorange. The user equipment 
receives the navigation signal, and in particular the pseudo random noise code, from a satellite 
and, generates code replicas in order to identify the satellite. The phase by which the code 
replica must be shifted in the receiver to maintain maximum correlation with the satellite 
code, multiplied by the speed of light, is approximately equal to the satellite to receiver range. 
It is called the pseudorange because of the presence of the user‟s receiver clock error which is 
considered as a fourth unknown in addition to the three position unknowns.  
 
The true pseudorange model can be expressed as follow: 
 
 𝜌𝑖 =   𝑥0 − 𝑥𝑖 2 +  𝑦0 − 𝑦𝑖 2 +  𝑧0 − 𝑧𝑖 2 + 𝑐 ∆𝑡 (3-1) 
 
where  𝑥0, 𝑦0, 𝑧0 design the user position 
 ∆𝑡 is the offset between the receiver clock and GNSS system time 
 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖  design the i
th
 satellite position 
 
The main differences between the true pseudorange and the measured pseudorange are due to 
several sources of error from the space segment, the control segment or the user segment: 
 
- signal propagation delays caused by the ionosphere and the troposphere 
- space vehicle clock error 
- satellite position estimation error 
- multipath 
- receiver errors which main source is code tracking loop noise 
 
Some satellite payload hardware propagation delays could also exist. In this study, we will 
assume that they are corrected by the Timing Group Delay (TGD). 
 
To evaluate GNSS positioning performance, error sources have to be taken into account and 
corresponding measurement errors have to be modeled as precisely as possible. Systematic 
errors will be gathered in the fault free case, and unusual errors that may cause a dangerous 
positioning failure and that may have to be detected are addressed in the faulty case. 
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3-1 GNSS signals for Civil Aviation 
 
The aim of this part is to briefly present the different signals that will be available for a civil 
aviation use in the future for both GPS and Galileo systems. Because of their influence on 
acquisition and tracking performances, each available signal structure will be described. In 
particular, the power spectrum density of each these signal will be used to determine the 
standard deviation of the tracking error due to noise using [Betz and Kolodziejski, 2000] 
formulas and to analyse the impact of interferences. 
 
The available GNSS signals for Civil Aviation (frequency occupation, structure) are 
summarized in the following table [Macabiau and Julien, 2006]: 
 
 Signal 
Code 
Length 
Chip 
Rate 
(Mcps) 
Modulation 
Navigation 
Data (sps) 
Secondary 
code 
Galileo 
E5b-I 10230 10.23 
𝑄𝑃𝑆𝐾(10) 
Yes (250) Yes 
E5b-Q 10230 10.23 Pilot Yes 
E1B 4092 1.023 
𝐶𝐵𝑂𝐶(6, 1, 1/11) 
Yes (250) No 
E1C 
8184 (on 
GIOVEA) 
1.023 Pilot Yes 
GPS 
L5-I 10230 10.23 
𝑄𝑃𝑆𝐾(10) 
Yes (1000) Yes 
L5-Q 10230 10.23 Pilot Yes 
L1 C/A 1023 1.023 𝐵𝑃𝑆𝐾(1) Yes (50) No 
L1 C-I 10230 1.023 
𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶(6, 1, 1/11) 
Yes (100) No 
L1 C-Q 10230 1.023 Pilot Yes 
 
Table 4 - GNSS Signals for Civil Aviation 
 
3-1-1 GNSS signals for civil aviation use in L1 band 
 
L1 is an Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) band dedicated to Radio Navigation 
Satellite Service (RNSS) where both GPS and Galileo propose restricted and open signal.  
 
The Galileo E1 OS and GPSIII L1C signals are still under a definition phase but the desire of 
interoperability of both signals has led to a common US/EU agreement that defines a common 
normalized power spectral density for both civil signals referred to as Multiplexed Binary 
Offset Carrier (MBOC).  
 
The 𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶 power spectral density is defined as a weighted linear combination of the 
𝐵𝑂𝐶 1,1  and 𝐵𝑂𝐶 6,1  normalized power spectral densities and includes the whole GPS III 
L1C or Galileo E1 OS civil signals, which means both their data and pilot components. Its 
expression is given as follows [Julien et al., 2007]: 
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𝐺𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶  𝑓 =
10
11
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝐶 1,1  𝑓 +
1
11
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝐶 6,1  𝑓  (3-2) 
 
The use of 𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶 modulation will allow better mitigation of thermal noise, multipath and 
narrow-band interference compared to the current GPS legacy signal. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Frequency plan for L1 for GPS (red colours) and Galileo (blue colours) 
 
Since the 𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶 is defined only in the frequency domain, different compliant temporal 
signals can be used. In the literature, two different modulations were proposed to implement 
the 𝑀𝐵𝑂𝐶:  
 
- the Time-Multiplexed BOC (TMBOC) modulation, that multiplexes in the time 
domain BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) sub-carriers  
 
- the Composite BOC (CBOC) modulation, that linearly combines the BOC(1,1) and 
BOC(6,1) sub-carriers (both components being present at all times).  
 
The CBOC modulation is the candidate for Galileo E1 OS signal whereas TMBOC 
modulation will be used for GPS L1C. 
 
This Ph.D. study assumes that receivers for civil aviation will be designed to only track 
BOC(1,1) modulation. 
 
3-1-2 GNSS signals for civil aviation use in L5 band 
 
L5 is an Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) band where GPS proposes one 
signal L5 and Galileo two signals. This is meant to have a third Galileo signal in ARNS band.  
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The Galileo signals broadcast on E5a and E5b originate from the same modulation known as 
ALTBOC modulation. It offers the possibility of coherently tracking the whole signal 
(E5a+E5b) or non-coherently E5a and E5b signals separately. The former configuration 
allows for extremely high code tracking accuracy, but with the constraint of using an extra-
wide front-end filter (minimum of 50 MHz).  
 
Both GPS and Galileo broadcast wide-band signals in this frequency band (resulting in 
excellent tracking accuracy). 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Frequency plan for L5(E5a)/E5b for GPS (red col.) and Galileo (blue col.) 
 
3-1-3 Structure of the broadcasted signals 
 
3-1-3-1 BPSK signal definition and power spectrum density expression  
 
The expression of the broadcasted signal is: 
 
𝑠𝐵𝑃𝑆𝐾 𝑡 = 𝐴𝑑 𝑡 𝑐 𝑡 cos 2𝜋𝑓0𝑡  
with 
𝑑 𝑡 =   𝑑𝑘𝛿 𝑡 − 𝑘𝑇𝐷 
∞
𝑘=−∞
 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑡 −
𝑇𝐷
2
𝑇𝐷
  
𝑐 𝑡 =  𝑐𝑘𝑚 𝑡 − 𝑘𝑇𝐶 
∞
𝑘=−∞
 
where 𝑑𝑘 = ±1 contains the information, 𝑇𝐷 is 𝑑𝑘bit length, 
𝑐𝑘 = ±1 is the spreading code, 𝑇𝐶  is 𝑐𝑘  bit length 
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𝑚 𝑡  is the code materialization such as: 
𝑚 𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑡 −
𝑇𝐶
2
𝑇𝐶
  
Assuming the complete binary sequence 𝑑𝑘 × 𝑐𝑘  is random (without considering the temporal 
repetition period of the Pseudo Random Noise sequence), the normalized power spectrum 
density expression of the signal is: 
 
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑆𝐾  𝑓 =
1
𝑇𝐶
 𝑀 𝑓  2 = 𝑇𝐶  
sin 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶 
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
 
2
 (3-3) 
 
3-1-3-2 BOC signal definition and power spectrum density expression  
 
The BOC signal is defined as the product of a materialized code with a sub - carrier which is 
equal to the sign of a sine or a cosine waveform. If 𝑐 𝑡  is the code sequence waveform and 
sf  the sub - carrier frequency, the expression of the sine - phased BOC signal is: 
 
𝑥 𝑡 = 𝑐 𝑡  sign sin 2𝜋𝑓𝑆 𝑡  
with 
𝑐 𝑡 =  𝑐𝑘𝑚 𝑡 − 𝑘𝑇𝐶 
∞
𝑘=−∞
 
𝑚 𝑡  is the NRZ code materialization equal to 1 over  0, 𝑇𝐶  and 0 everywhere else. 
 
BOC signals are commonly referred to 𝐵𝑂𝐶 𝑝, 𝑞 . The first parameter p defines the sub-
carrier rate and the second q defines the spreading code rate: 
 
𝑓𝑆 = 𝑝 × 1.023 𝑀𝐻𝑧 
𝑓𝐶 = 𝑞 × 1.023 𝑀𝐻𝑧 
 
The ratio 𝑛 = 2
𝑓𝑆
𝑓𝐶
= 2
𝑝
𝑞
 is the number of half periods of the sub carrier during one code chip. 
It can be odd or even. 
 
If the BOC signal is sine-phase and n is even, the normalized power spectrum densities are 
equal to: 
 
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝐶 𝑓 =
1
𝑇𝐶
 
sin  
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
𝑛   sin
 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶 
𝜋𝑓 cos  
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
𝑛  
 
2
 (3-4) 
In particular, 
 
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝐶 1,1  𝑓 =
1
𝑇𝐶
 
1 − cos 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶 
𝜋𝑓
 
2
= 𝑇𝐶  
1 − cos 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶 
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
 
2
 (3-5) 
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3-1-3-3 ALTBOC signal definition and power spectrum density definition 
 
The ALTBOC signal is defined as the product of a PRN code sequence with a complex sub 
carrier and can be composed of two or four codes. 
 
If there are two codes, there is no pilot component and the expression of the signal is: 
 
𝑥𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐶  𝑡 = 𝑐𝑈 𝑡 . er 𝑡 + 𝑐𝐿 𝑡 . er
∗ 𝑡  
 
If there is a pilot channel, four codes are needed and the expression becomes: 
 
𝑥𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐶  𝑡 =  𝑐𝑈 𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑈 ′ 𝑡  . er 𝑡 +  𝑐𝐿 𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝐿′ 𝑡  . er
∗ 𝑡  
 
with er 𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 cos 2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡  + 𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 sin 2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡  = 𝑐𝑟 𝑡 + 𝑗 𝑠𝑟 𝑡   
𝑐𝑈   the data upper code 
𝑐𝑈 ′ the pilot upper code 
𝑐𝐿  the data lower code 
𝑐𝐿′ the pilot lower code 
 
In order to have a constant envelope and avoid distortions in the satellite payload due to 
nonlinear amplification, a new signal has been created and called constant envelope 
ALTBOC. Its expression is [Rebeyrol and Macabiau, 2005]: 
 
𝑥𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐶  𝑡 =
 
 
 
 
 
 
  𝑐𝐿 𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝐿′ 𝑡  .  scas  t − j scas  t −
TS
4
  +
 𝑐𝑈 𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑈 ′ 𝑡  .  scas  t + j scas  t −
TS
4
  +
 𝑐𝐿 𝑡        + 𝑗𝑐𝐿′ 𝑡         .  scap  t − j scap  t −
TS
4
  +
 𝑐𝑈 𝑡        + 𝑗𝑐𝑈 ′ 𝑡          .  scap  t + j scap  t −
TS
4
  
  
 
with  𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐𝑈𝑐𝑈 ′𝑐𝐿′, 𝑐𝐿′    = 𝑐𝑈𝑐𝑈 ′𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈   = 𝑐𝐿𝑐𝑈 ′𝑐𝐿′ and 𝑐𝑈 ′    = 𝑐𝐿𝑐𝐿′𝑐𝑈  
scas  t =
 2
4
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  cos  2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡 −
𝜋
4
  +
1
2
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 cos 2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡  +
 2
4
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  cos  2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡 +
𝜋
4
   
scap  t = −
 2
4
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  cos  2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡 −
𝜋
4
  +
1
2
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 cos 2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡  −
 2
4
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  cos  2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝑡 +
𝜋
4
   
 
The normalized power spectrum density of the constant envelope ALTBOC signal for n odd 
is: 
 
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐶  𝑓 =
4
𝜋2𝑓2𝑇𝐶
cos2 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶 
cos2  𝜋𝑓
𝑇𝐶
𝑛  
 
×  cos2  𝜋𝑓
𝑇𝑆
2
 − cos  𝜋𝑓
𝑇𝑆
2
 − 2 cos  𝜋𝑓
𝑇𝑆
2
 cos  𝜋𝑓
𝑇𝑆
4
 + 2  
(3-6) 
 
In fact, receivers for civil aviation will be designed to track separately E5a and E5b signals as 
two QPSK. 
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3-2 Fault free case measurement model 
 
Most of the fault free case models assume that the pseudorange error components have a 
normal distribution with a known variance and a zero mean and that the pseudorange error 
components are combined by convolving their error distributions. The resulting pseudorange 
error distribution is set as 𝑁 0, 𝜍2  where the variance is defined by the root-sum-square of 
the component variances. But some error components are not well characterized by a normal 
distribution, this aspect is addressed in part 3-2-2. In the next part of the study all errors are 
assumed to be zero mean and Gaussian and the global pseudorange error variance 
computation is detailed. 
 
3-2-1 Pseudo range measurement error variance 
 
The pseudo range measurement error variances from different sources are gathered in the 
User Equivalent Range Error UERE. The main contributions that have to be considered are: 
orbit determination and synchronization equivalent error, troposphere residual error, 
ionosphere residual error, multipath residual error and receiver noise residual error.  
 
3-2-1-1 Receiver noise residual error 
 
3-2-1-1-1 Introduction 
 
Let„s consider the way a GNSS receiver works. The goal is to line up a locally generated 
replica of the received PRN code with the received signal in order to determine its frequency 
and its propagation delay. The synchronisation is first roughly made through the acquisition 
step. A more precise estimation of signal parameters is then conducted thanks to two different 
cooperating tracking loops: 
 
- the “Carrier-loop”, also called “Phase Lock Loop” (PLL) or “Frequency lock Loop” 
(FLL), whether it is the phase or the frequency that is being tracked. Its objective is to 
continuously generate a local carrier with the same phase or frequency that the incoming 
signal. 
- the “Code-loop”, also called “Delay Lock Loop” (DLL), whose purpose is to 
continuously follow (“track”) the succession of code sequences (internal structure and coding 
depending on the GNSS system and frequency band), hence providing the receiver navigation 
computing unit with pseudo range measurements between the GNSS satellites and the 
receiver. 
 
That constitutes the tracking program which is processed as long as the estimation error is 
lower than a given threshold. In the contrary case, a re-acquisition step is necessary. This 
mainly depends on the signal to noise ratio: 
 
- If 𝐶 𝑁0 ≥  𝐶 𝑁0  threshold  : the tracking loops are working 
 
- If 𝐶 𝑁0 <  𝐶 𝑁0  threshold  : a loss of lock of the tracking loops is possible and it is 
necessary to initiate a re-acquisition or to re-conduct a signal acquisition, and a bias 
can appear 
 
The threshold  𝐶 𝑁0  threshold  is usually set such that the tracking loop does not provide 
abnormal measurements. 
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3-2-1-1-2 Code delay tracking: Error variance of a code-tracking loop 
 
 
Figure 7 - Code delay tracking scheme 
 
After the carrier wipe-offstage, the resulting in-phase and quadrature phase component are 
multiplied by three delayed spreading sequence replicas: Early, Prompt and Late that are 
given by: 
𝐸 𝑡 = 𝑐  𝑡 − 𝜏 +
𝐶𝑆
2
  
𝑃 𝑡 = 𝑐 𝑡 − 𝜏  
𝐿 𝑡 = 𝑐  𝑡 − 𝜏 −
𝐶𝑆
2
  
 
with c the spreading sequence and 𝐶𝑆  the chip spacing 
 
The result of the multiplication of the in-phase and quadra-phase component with different 
delayed spreading sequences is followed by the I&D filtering that provide six correlation 
values: 
𝐼𝐿 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾  𝜀𝜏 −
𝐶𝑆
2
 cos 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝐼𝐿 𝑛  
𝐼𝐸 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾  𝜀𝜏 +
𝐶𝑆
2
 cos 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝐼𝐸 𝑛  
𝐼𝑃 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾 𝜀𝜏 cos 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝐼𝑃 𝑛  
 
𝑄𝐿 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾  𝜀𝜏 −
𝐶𝑆
2
 sin 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝑄𝐿 𝑛  
DCO 
Code Generator DLL 
Discriminator 
DCO 
DLL Loop 
Filter 
I&D 
Filter 
I&D 
Filter 
LI
PI
EI
LQ
PQ
EQ
 zVe zVc
PLL Loop 
Filter 
PLL 
Discriminator 
𝑟𝐵𝑃𝑆𝐾  𝑡 = 
𝐴𝑑 𝑡 − 𝜏 𝑐 𝑡 − 𝜏  
cos 2𝜋𝑓0 𝑡 − 𝜃   
+𝑛 𝑡  
 
𝑐  𝑡 − 𝜏 −
𝐶𝑆
2
  𝑐  𝑡 − 𝜏 +
𝐶𝑆
2
  
cos  2𝜋𝑓0 𝑡 − 𝜃    
sin  2𝜋𝑓0 𝑡 − 𝜃    
 55 
 
𝑄𝐸 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾  𝜀𝜏 +
𝐶𝑆
2
 sin 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝑄𝐸 𝑛  
𝑄𝑃 𝑛 =
𝐴
2
 𝑑 𝑛 𝐾 𝜀𝜏 sin 𝜀𝜃 + 𝑛𝑄𝑃 𝑛  
where 
 𝐴  the signal amplitude 
 𝑑 the information signal 
 𝐾 the code autocorrelation 
 𝜀𝜏  the code delay error 
 𝜀𝜃  the phase delay error 
 𝑛𝐼 the in-phase correlation noise 
 𝑛𝑄  the quadra-phase correlation noise 
 
These correlation values are then fed into a code delay discriminator that will use them to 
estimate the code delay tracking error 𝜀𝜏 . 
 
Two types of discriminator are widely used in GNSS receivers: the Early –Minus Late Power 
(EMLP) and the Dot –Product (DP). They are given by [Julien, 2005]: 
 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃 =  𝐼𝐸
2 + 𝑄𝐸
2 −  𝐼𝐿
2 + 𝑄𝐿
2  (3-7) 
 
 𝐷𝐷𝑃 =  𝐼𝐸 − 𝐼𝐿 𝐼𝑃 +  𝑄𝐸 − 𝑄𝐿 𝑄𝑃 (3-8) 
 
The error variance of the code-tracking loop will depend on the choice of the discriminator 
[Betz and Kolodziejski, 2000]: 
 
𝜍𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃
2 =
𝐵𝐿 1 − 0.5𝐵𝐿𝑇  𝐺 𝑓 sin
2 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
𝐶
𝑁0
 2𝜋  𝑓𝐺 𝑓 sin 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓 
2  1 +
 𝐺 𝑓 cos2 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
𝐶
𝑁0
𝑇  𝐺 𝑓 cos 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
  
  (3-9) 
 
𝜍𝐷𝑃
2 =
𝐵𝐿 1 − 0.5𝐵𝐿𝑇  𝐺 𝑓 sin
2 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
𝐶
𝑁0
 2𝜋  𝑓𝐺 𝑓 sin 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓 
2  1 +
1
𝐶
𝑁0
𝑇  𝐺 𝑓 cos 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
  
  (3-10) 
where 
 
LB  𝐻𝑧   the one sided bandwidth of the equivalent loop filter 
 𝑇 the data period 
 𝐺 the power spectrum density of the signal 
 𝐶 𝑁0  the signal to noise ratio 
 𝐶𝑆 the chip spacing 
 𝐵 the two sided bandwidth of the front end filter 
 
Note that this model is adequate when the loops implemented were derived from an analog 
loop model using an approximate analog to discrete transform. When the loops are directly 
designed in the digital domain using [Stephens and Thomas, 1995], the factor  1 − 0.5𝐵𝐿𝑇   
can be removed. 
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Without considering the temporal repetition period of the PN sequence, the power spectrum 
density expression of the BPSK signal is: 
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑆𝐾 𝑓 = 𝑇𝑐  
sin 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
 
2
 
with 𝑇𝐶  the code period.  
 
This expression is used for GPS L1, GPS L5 and GALILEO E5b code tracking loop error 
variance. For Galileo E1, the normalized power spectrum density of the BOC(1,1) is equal to: 
 
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝐶 1,1  𝑓 = 𝑇𝑐  
1 − cos 𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
𝜋𝑓𝑇𝐶
 
2
 
 
The error variance of the code tracking loop, error due to noise, can be thus computed for 
different kind of signals, using for example the following values: 
 
 
GPS L1 C/A GPS L5 Galileo E1 Galileo E5b 
CS  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
BL  1 1 1 1 
B 16 × 106Hz 20 × 106Hz 20 × 106Hz 14 × 106Hz 
C
N0
  35 dBHz 29 dBHz 36.5 dBHz 29.7 dBHz 
T 0.02 𝑠 0.02 𝑠 0.1 𝑠 0.1 𝑠 
𝑇𝐶  1 1.023 MHz  1 1.023 MHz  1 1.023 MHz  1 10.23 MHz  
 
Table 5 - Values for code delay tracking error variance computation 
Note that worst case  C N0
  are given here and not typical values [Eurocae, 2006]. This drop of 
the equivalent C N0
  down to tracking threshold allows to take into account some level of 
interference in our fault free case model. 
 
The obtained error variance of the code-tracking loop values are gathered in the following 
table: 
 
 GPS L1 C/A GPS L5 Galileo E1 Galileo E5b 
𝜍𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃  (m) 2.00 0.53 0.86 0.59 
𝜍𝐷𝑃  (m) 2.00 0.53 0.86 0.59 
 
Table 6 - Code-tracking loop error variance 
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3-2-1-1-3 Iono free measurements 
 
In nominal mode, the pseudorange measurements that will be available to the aircraft receiver 
are the GPS L1, GPS L5, GALILEO E1, GALILEO E5b code and phase measurements. But 
for future civil aviation GNSS receivers complying with EUROCAE requirements, dual 
frequency measurements will be combined into a single composite measurement called the 
iono-free measurement, corrected for ionospheric error (see section 3-2-1-3). 
 
Thus, from GPS L1 – L5, and from GALILEO E1 – E5b, two distinct iono-free measurements 
are built. 
 
Denoting 𝑃 𝑘  the code measurement at the instant k and 𝜑 𝑘  the phase measurement: 
 
 
𝑃L1−L5 𝑘 =
𝑓L1
2
𝑓L1
2 − 𝑓L5
2 𝑃L1 𝑘 +
𝑓L5
2
𝑓L5
2 − 𝑓L1
2 𝑃L5 𝑘  (3-11) 
 
 
𝑃E1−E5b 𝑘 =
𝑓E1
2
𝑓E1
2 − 𝑓E5b
2 𝑃E1 𝑘 +
𝑓E5b
2
𝑓E5b
2 − 𝑓E1
2 𝑃E5b 𝑘  (3-12) 
 
 
𝜑L1−L5 𝑘 =
𝑓L1
2
𝑓L1
2 − 𝑓L5
2 𝜑L1 𝑘 +
𝑓L5
2
𝑓L5
2 − 𝑓L1
2 𝜑L5 𝑘  (3-13) 
 
 
𝜑E1−E5b 𝑘 =
𝑓E1
2
𝑓E1
2 − 𝑓E5b
2 𝜑E1 𝑘 +
𝑓E5b
2
𝑓E5b
2 − 𝑓E1
2 𝜑E5b 𝑘  (3-14) 
with 
𝑓L1
2
𝑓L1
2 − 𝑓L5
2 ≈ 2.261 ,
𝑓E1
2
𝑓E1
2 − 𝑓E5b
2 ≈ 2.422 ,
𝑓L5
2
 𝑓L5
2 − 𝑓L1
2 ≈ −1.261 ,
𝑓E5b
2
𝑓E5b
2 − 𝑓E1
2 ≈ −1.422 
 
No significant correlation factor can be expected for the noise and multipath error affecting 
the different measurements made on the four carrier frequencies. This is why the standard 
deviation of the error affecting the iono-free measurement is modeled as: 
 
 
𝜍𝐿1−𝐿5 =  2.2612𝜍𝐿1
2 + 1.2612𝜍𝐿5
2  (3-15) 
 
𝜍𝐸1−𝐸5𝑏 =  2.4222𝜍𝐿1
2 + 1.4222𝜍𝐿5
2  (3-16) 
 
Thus, 
 
𝜍code ,𝐿1−𝐿5 =  2.2612𝜍code ,𝐿1
2 + 1.2612𝜍code ,𝐿5
2  (3-17) 
 
 
𝜍code ,𝐸1−𝐸5𝑏 =  2.4222𝜍code ,𝐸1
2 + 1.4222𝜍code ,𝐸5b
2  (3-18) 
 
  
Chapter n°3: Measurement Model 
58 
 
 
3-2-1-1-4 Smoothing 
 
Once elaborated, these two GPS and GALILEO iono-free measurements are then smoothed to 
reduce the influence of noise and multipath [Hegarty, 1996]: 
 
 
𝜍𝑃 
2 ≈
𝜍𝑃
2
2𝑇smooth
 (3-19) 
 
where  𝑇𝑠mooth  is the time smoothing constant in seconds 
𝜍𝑃
2 is the raw code pseudorange measurement error variance 
𝜍𝑃 
2 is the smoothed code pseudorange measurement error variance 
 
3-2-1-1-5 Conclusion 
 
Finally, the receiver noise residual error variance 𝜍𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 of smoothed iono free measurements 
is obtained. It corresponds to the receiver noise, thermal noise, inter channel bias and 
processing error. 
 
 GPS L1/L5 Galileo E1/ E5b 
𝜍𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 ,𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃  (𝑚) 0.32 0.16 
 
Table 7 - Receiver noise residual error variance 
 
3-2-1-2 Multipath error 
 
This section addresses the multipath phenomenon during aircraft approaches. The sum of 
direct and reflected signal induces a biased measurement. Even if the resulting error may not 
be very large, it needs to be appropriately taken into account into the error budget. 
 
This work has been tackled by RTCA for GPS L1/CA code users and the final result was a 
standard curve adopted in the ICAO SARPs stating the standard deviation of the error due to 
multipath as a function of the GPS satellite elevation angle [Booth, 2000]. 
 
This model was validated and adopted for GPS L1 C/A thanks to efforts made by the FAA, 
Boeing and Honeywell, mainly using data collected during normal production flight testing 
[Murphy and Booth, 2000], [Liu, 1998]. Their studies have shown that even if the distribution 
of airframe multipath errors does depend on the specific airframe, these distributions are 
similar enough that a single model may adequately cover all airframe. 
 
The smoothed multipath error for the airborne equipment is described by [RTCA, 2006]: 
 
 𝜍multipath = 0.13 + 0.53 𝑒𝑥𝑝  
−𝜃
10deg   (3-20) 
 
where 𝜃 is the elevation angle in degrees of the considered satellite.  
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The characteristics of the error induced by multipath need to be determined for an aircraft 
using new GNSS signals transmitted by future GPS and Galileo constellations. Preliminary 
studies have shown that smaller error can be anticipated for GPS L5, Galileo E1 and E5b 
since a flat sigma curve referring to a constant deviation of 7 cm for any elevation is proposed 
[Macabiau et al., 2006].  
 
Nevertheless, to be conservative and before further validation, the L1 C/A SARPs [ICAO, 
2006] error curve will be used in the following calculation for the other GNSS signals. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Multipath error curve [Macabiau et al., 2006] 
 
As for the error variance of the code-tracking loop, the smoothed multipath errors of each 
available signal are affected by the iono free combination: 
 
 
𝜍multipa th  𝐿1−𝐿5 =  2.2612𝜍multipath  𝐿1
2 + 1.2612𝜍multipath  𝐿5
2  (3-21) 
 
 
𝜍multipath  𝐸1−𝐸5𝑏 =  2.4222𝜍multipath  𝐸1
2 + 1.4222𝜍multipath  𝐸5b
2  (3-22) 
 
The resulting values of multipath error variance are represented on the following figure for 
GPS L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b. 
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Figure 9 - Multipath error curve 
 
3-2-1-3 Ionospheric residual error 
 
The ionosphere is a dispersive medium which is located between 60 km and 1000 km above 
the earth‟s surface, in the atmosphere. In this area, ultraviolet rays coming from the sun ionize 
a portion of gas molecules and thus, it releases free electrons. These electrons influence the 
propagation of the electromagnetic waves and thus, the GNSS signals [Chibout, 2005]. 
 
The main problem to model the ionosphere is its very important versatility, both 
geographically and temporally speaking. Indeed, the electron density is very different from 
places to places in the world. Moreover, the ionosphere content changes a lot within the day 
duration (difference between night and day) and also during larger time scale.  
 
Fortunately the ionospheric delay on GNSS signals is frequency-dependent and hence impacts 
on the L1 and L5 signals by a different amount. A linear combination of pseudo-range or 
carrier phase observations on the L1 and L5 carrier waves can be created to almost entirely 
eliminate this delay. The resulting observable is known as the ionosphere-free carrier phase 
(or pseudo-range). 
 
Future civil aviation GNSS receivers will use dual frequency measurements and will combine 
them into this single composite measurement called the ionospheric-free measurement, 
corrected for ionospheric error. By this way the ionospheric residual error is not considered as 
significant anymore: 
 𝜍iono = 0 (3-23) 
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3-2-1-4 Tropospheric residual error 
 
The troposphere is the lowest portion of Earth's atmosphere which contains approximately 
90% of its mass and almost all of its water vapor and aerosols. The average depth of the 
troposphere is about 11 km in the middle latitudes. It is deeper in the tropical regions (up to 
20 km) and shallower near the poles (about 7 km) [Météo France, 2008]. 
 
Whereas the ionosphere correction is obtained either by measurement of dispersion using two 
frequencies or by calculation from a mathematical model, the tropospheric delay must be 
calculated since the troposphere is nondispersive. The model for the residual error for the 
tropospheric delay estimate is [RTCA, 2006]: 
 
 
𝜍tropo =
1.001
 0.002001 + sin2 𝐸𝑙
× 0.12 𝑚 (3-24) 
where 𝐸𝑙 is the elevation angle 
 
This model was adopted for GPS L1 C/A and is assumed for GPS L5 and Galileo E1 and E5b. 
 
Figure 10 - Tropospheric residual error curve 
 
3-2-1-5 Satellite clock and ephemeris error 
 
Satellite clock and ephemeris error components will depend on the considered system and for 
GPS it has to be computed depending on the modernization step. 
 
User Range Accuracy (URA) is the standard deviation of the range component of clock 
ephemeris error. Indeed, ephemeris errors result from a mismatch between the actual location 
of the satellite and the predicted satellite position as broadcast in the navigation message. 
Clock errors are due to satellite clock offset with regard to GPS time. For GPS, the 
distribution of every satellite‟s range error is over bounded by a zero mean Gaussian 
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distribution with standard deviation equal to URA [Have, 2003] and [Lee and McLaughlin, 
2007]. 
 
For Galileo, the signal in space error (not necessarily Gaussian) of each satellite will be over-
bounded by a nonbiased Gaussian distribution with the minimum standard deviation called 
Signal In Space Accuracy (SISA). The integrity performance requirement specifies a SISA 
value for both nominal and degraded mode [ESA, 2005]. This parameter will correspond to 
the GPS URA. 
 GPS current GPS II GPS III Galileo 
𝜍𝑈𝑅𝐴  (m)  3.9 1.5 0.35 to 1 0.85 
 
Table 8 - User Range Accuracy values [ESA, 2005], [Have, 2003] and [Lee and 
McLaughlin, 2007] 
 
3-2-1-6 User equivalent range error 
 
The User Equivalent Range Error is the value reflecting the error budget and it is based on the 
computation of the following contributions: orbit determination and synchronization 
equivalent error, troposphere residual error, ionosphere residual error, multipath residual error 
and receiver noise residual error. 
 
 𝜍𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸
2 = 𝜍𝑈𝑅𝐴
2 + 𝜍iono
2 + 𝜍noise
2 + 𝜍multipath
2 + 𝜍tropo
2  (3-25) 
 
Figure 11 – User equivalent range error components 
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The effects of the interference is taken into account in this total standard deviation as the 
sigma noise is computed at the lowest C N0
  possible for nominal conditions. 
The following figure represents the obtained Galileo smoothed iono - free UERE for different 
elevation angles.  
 
 
Figure 12 - GPS L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b smoothed iono-free UERE 
Those values are gathered in the following table for  𝑈𝑅𝐴 = 1 𝑚 : 
  
UERE (m) 
Elevation angle (°) 
5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90 
GPS III 
L1/L5 
1.993 1. 504 1.314 1.224 1.151 1.127 1.117 1.113 1.110 
Galileo 
E1/E5b 
2.034 1.519 1.312 1.211 1.129 1.102 1.091 1.086 1.083 
 
Table 9 - L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b smoothed iono-free UERE values 
For  𝑈𝑅𝐴 = 0.85 𝑚 : 
 
UERE (m) 
Elevation angle (°) 
5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90 
GPS III 
L1/L5 
1.923 1.408 1.204 1.105 1.024 0.996 0.985 0.981 0.977 
Galileo 
E1/E5b 
1.964 1.425 1.201 1.091 0.999 0.968 0.956 0.950 0.946 
 
Table 10 - L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b smoothed iono-free UERE values 
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3-2-2 Nominal biases 
 
Most of the models assume that the pseudorange error components have a normal distribution 
with a known variance and zero mean. This is realistic thanks to overbounding techniques. 
Some of these methods require that the mean of the component distribution is exactly zero but 
several approaches address the effect of this mean by only requiring symmetry and 
unimodality [DeCleene, 2000]. 
 
Indeed, small nominal biases could exist even in fault free conditions. The error components 
that could create a mean are listed below: 
 
- Mis-calibration of antenna phase center. 
 
In fact GNSS receiver determines the coordinates of the antenna's electrical phase center. The 
phase center is defined as being the point where the satellite signal is collected. The offset 
between the mean phase center and the geometric center of an antenna can range from a few 
millimeters to several centimeters [Akrour et al, 2005]. As it can change as a function of 
elevation angle, the phase center of the antenna has to be carefully calibrated [DeCleene, 
2000]. According to [Murphy et al, 2007], GPS antenna group delay variation can induce 
pseudorange measurement errors of the order of 1 meter. 
 
- Multipath 
 
In this study, it is considered that multipath is completely taken into account by the model 
presented in section 3.2.1.2. 
 
- Nominal signal deformation, imperfection in the modulation of signals with PRN code 
 
Therefore, in order to be more realistic, pseudorange measurement models can take into 
account a bias that bounds errors that may appear random but that affect user in the same way 
repeatedly [Walter et al., 2008]. 
 
For example, the study panel initiated by the FAA called the GPS Evolutionary Architectural 
Study (GEAS) has agreed to consider explicitly the presence of biases in range measurement 
under non faulted conditions and has assumed a level of bias magnitude under fault - free 
condition called maximum bias magnitude such as [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007]: 
 
 50 𝑐𝑚 ≤ 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 2 𝑚 (3-26) 
 
3-3 Faulty case measurement model 
 
A fault is said to occur when a significantly large error in the range measurement (whether 
that error is due to an anomaly of the satellite itself or to environmental effects on the satellite 
ranging signal such as multipath or interference) may potentially cause an integrity failure 
[Lee, 2004].  
 
In order to properly design GNSS integrity monitoring systems and to properly evaluate their 
performance, it is necessary to study failures mode as well as their probability of occurrence. 
This is the objective of this section. 
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3-3-1 Satellite failure 
 
A satellite integrity fault can be defined as an error inconsistent with the fault free error 
distribution due to a fault condition when the satellite is marked “healthy” and which can lead 
to a position error larger than the maximum tolerable error for a given flight operation. 
 
3-3-1-1 Major satellite failures 
 
The GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) Performance Standard specifies two parameters 
regarding the satellite integrity: the definition of a major service failure and the specification 
of the maximum rate of such a satellite fault. 
 
A major service failure is defined to be a condition over a time interval during which a 
healthy GPS satellite‟s ranging signal error (excluding atmospheric and receiver error) 
exceeds the range error limit [GPS SPS, 2001]. The range error limit is the larger of: 
- 30 m 
- 4.42 times the URA  
 
The probability of occurrence of such an event is 3 per year for a 24 GPS satellites 
constellation. 
 
3-3-1-2 Smaller satellite failures 
 
However, for navigation with much tighter position protection limits, even small errors would 
be considered significant. 
 
Several analyses have been made concerning the use of GPS associated with WAAS for En 
route to LPV flight operations or associated with LAAS for Cat I approaches.  
 
GPS integrity related assumptions supporting the use of WAAS information are as follow 
[Van Dyke et al., 2003]: 
 
- Signal deformation and distortions (“Evil Waveforms”) 
The probability of signal deformation is assumed to be less than 10−4 per hour per 
satellite 
 
- Code Carrier divergence 
The probability of code carrier divergence (code minus carrier phase at the output of 
the SV antenna) greater than 6.1 𝑚 is assumed to be less than 10−4 per hour per 
satellite 
 
- Ephemeris error 
The onset of erroneous GPS ephemeris data is assumed to occur with a probability of 
10−4 per hour per satellite 
 
- Signal fault causing step errors, ramps errors or accelerations errors 
The probability of GPS signal fault causing of any one of the following is assumed to 
be less than 10−4 per hour per satellite for  
o A step (discrete jump) error larger than 3.6 m 
o A range acceleration error larger than 0.019 𝑚/𝑠2 
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3-3-1-3 Multiple satellite failure 
 
Multiple satellite failure can be caused by the simultaneous occurrence of independent failure 
modes or by a common mode of failure. 
According to [Van Dyke et al., 2003], it is assumed in WAAS assumptions that there is no 
common mode failure that causes more than one of the following signal faults: signal 
deformation, code /carrier divergence or step ramp error in the pseudorange residual. 
 
More generally, [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007] refers to a rate of common mode faults causing 
multiple integrity failure of 1.3 × 10−8/approaches. 
 
3-3-2 Interference 
 
Interference can be generally defined as any undesired signal that interferes with the reception 
of radio waves. Low power levels used in GNSS leave aircraft susceptible to unintentional 
interference in their frequency bands. Even if a large number of mitigation techniques have 
been investigated to improve the performance of the GNSS receivers, civil aviation system 
may remain vulnerable. 
 
The main interference sources to be accounted for in the ARNS are, for unintentional 
interferences: 
 
- CW interferences on all bands 
- Wideband interferences on all bands 
- Pulsed Interferences (DME/TACAN on L5, Radars on E5b, UWB) 
 
In this study, the effect of interference has been modelled in the fault free case as a drop of the 
equivalent 𝐶 𝑁0
  down to tracking threshold for all satellite. This section focuses on 
interference model on L1 as it is the most vulnerable band (narrower signal bandwidth). 
Pulsed interferences are not considered. 
 
Wideband and CW interference effects models are investigated in this section. The potential 
impact of a worst case interference i.e. a CW heating the high PRN code spectrum line will be 
analysed in chapter 6. 
 
Concerning intentional interference, one can refer to the study initiated by the FAA and 
conducted by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) in order 
to quantify the ability of GPS, GPS/WAAS, and GPS/LAAS to satisfy required navigation 
performance [Corrigan et al., 1999]. The study concludes that there is no credible spoofing 
threat and that, although real, jamming threats can be managed. 
 
Several models were already proposed to analyse the effect of interference on GNSS signal 
processing. Most of them model the effect of interference at correlator output as the effect of 
equivalent additional white noise at the receiver input. 
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3-3-2-1 Wideband interferences 
 
Wideband interferences are commonly supposed to be white noise with limited bandwidth. 
The code tracking error variance for large and narrow band interference is given in [Betz and 
Kolodziejski, 2001]: 
𝜍𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃
2 = 𝐵𝐿 1 − 0.5𝐵𝐿𝑇 × 
 
 
 
  𝐺 𝑓 𝐺𝑤 𝑓 sin
2 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓
𝐶   𝑓𝐺 𝑓 sin 𝜋𝑓𝐶𝑆 
𝐵
2 
−𝐵 2 
𝑑𝑓 
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  𝐺 𝑓 𝐺𝑤 𝑓 
𝐵
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−   𝐺 𝑓 𝐺𝑤 𝑓 
𝐵
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  (3-27) 
where 
 
LB  𝐻𝑧   the one sided bandwidth of the equivalent loop filter 
 𝑇 the data period 
 𝐺 the power spectrum density of the signal 
 𝐶 𝑁0  the signal to noise ratio 
 𝐶𝑆 the chip spacing 
 𝐵 the two sided bandwidth of the front end filter 
 𝐺𝑤  is the power spectrum density of the interference 
 
 
3-3-2-2 CW interferences 
 
A Carrier Wave interference is a sinusoidal waveform that can be continuous or pulsed. If this 
narrowband interference has a high power, it can be disastrous for the receiver, especially if it 
is centred in the GNSS frequency band. 
 
The general model of a CW interference is given by: 
 
 𝐽 = 𝐴𝐽  cos 2𝜋 𝑓𝐼 + ∆𝑓𝐽 𝑡 − 𝜃𝐽  (3-28) 
where 
 𝐴𝐽  is the amplitude of the CW, 
 ∆𝑓𝐽  is the frequency offset of the jammer with respect to the considered GNSS signal‟s 
carrier frequency, 
 𝜃𝐽  is the phase of the jammer. 
𝑓𝐼 + ∆𝑓𝐽  is the central frequency 
 
The power spectrum density of the noise and the interference will be: 
 
 
𝐺𝑤 𝑓 =
𝑁0
2
+
𝐴𝐽
2
4
 δ  𝑓 −  𝑓𝐼 + ∆𝑓𝐽   (3-29) 
 
As pointed out by many authors, the tracking error induced by the presence of interference 
cannot be always be modelled as the tracking error induced by an equivalent increased white 
noise. A distinction must be made depending on the bandwidth of the incoming interference. 
In fact these models are valid as long as the bandwidth of the interference is quite large 
compared to the inverse duration of the integration. Thus it is desired to complete these 
models for narrowband interference and in particular for the case where the receiver is 
affected by CW interference. 
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By analyzing the correlator output components, an expression of the code tracking error 
envelope in presence of CW interference is proposed [Martineau et al., 2007]: 
 
 
𝑀 =  
𝐴𝐽
𝛼𝐴
𝐶𝐶 𝑘0 
sin 𝜋 𝛿𝑓 𝑇𝐷 
𝜋 𝛿𝑓 𝑇𝐷
sin 𝜋𝑘0𝑓𝑅  𝐶𝑆   (3-30) 
where 
-  𝑀 is the absolute value of the maximum code tracking error induced by the CW in 
chip 
- 𝐶𝑆 is the Early-Late chip spacing in seconds 
- 
𝐴𝐽
𝐴
 is the relative amplitude of the CW compared to the useful GNSS signal 
- 𝐶𝐶 𝑘0  is the relative amplitude of the PRN code ray which is the closest to the 
interference 
- 𝛿𝑓, the difference between the CW frequency and the closest signal peak 
- 𝛼 is the slope of the spreading waveform autocorrelation function in 
𝐶𝑆
2  
The code tracking error oscillates within this envelope. 
 
Assuming that the code tracking error is uniformly distributed on −𝑀, 𝑀 , its variance will 
be: 
 𝜍2 = 𝑀
2
3  (3-31) 
Assuming that the code tracking error can be written 𝜀 = 𝑀 sin 𝜃 with 𝜃 uniformly 
distributed on 0,2𝜋 , its variance will be: 
 𝜍2 = 𝑀
2
2  (3-32) 
This last assumption is more realistic and is chosen. 
 
To predict this error variance, the Doppler shift has to be computed for each satellite-user 
couple in order to precisely know the difference between the CW frequency and the closest 
signal peak of the considered PRN. By this way the receiver error component due to CW 
interference is obtained and is to be added to the one due to noise obtained by usual formula. 
 
3-3-2-3 Conclusion 
 
When some interfering signal is superimposed to the received useful signal, this may have the 
following three impacts on the pseudo range measurements: 
- the measurements are affected by some additional noise 
- one or several measurements are affected by a bias (divergence of measurement) 
- some or all of the measurements are no longer available (loss of tracking) 
 
An RFI mask was adopted to define the RF environment for which the receiver must have 
compliant performance, but in any case, even with large power interference above the mask, 
the integrity performance of the receiver must be compliant with the specifications. This is 
why it is needed to take into account every interference effect in this model that will feed 
RAIM algorithms. 
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3-4 Temporal Aspects 
 
Actually, the pseudo range errors are strongly auto correlated and this aspect has especially to 
be taken account in any sequential pseudorange model. The way this temporal correlation is 
taken into account is addressed in this section. 
 
3-4-1 First order Markov process 
 
A first order Markov process is defined by: 
 
𝑥 𝑡 = −
1
𝑇
𝑥 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑡  (3-33) 
where 𝑤 (the innovation) is a white random process 
 
𝑥 is a system output whose transfer function is given by  
 
 
𝐻 𝑓 =
1
1
𝑇 + 𝑖2𝜋𝑓
 (3-34) 
 
Applying the Wiener-Lee relation, we get: 
 
𝑆𝑋 𝑓 =  𝐻 𝑓  
2𝑆𝑊 𝑓  
 
with 𝑆𝑊 𝑓 =
𝑁0
2
 
 
Therefore, 
 
𝑆𝑋 𝑓 =
𝑁0 2 
 2𝜋𝑓 2 +
1
𝑇2
 (3-35) 
 
and by computing the inverse Fourier transform we get the autocorrelation function: 
 
 
𝑅𝑋 𝜏 =
𝑁0𝑇
4
𝑒−
 𝜏 
𝑇  (3-36) 
 
𝑅𝑋 𝜏 = 𝑅𝑋 0 𝑒
−
 𝜏 
𝑇  
 
The correlation time 𝑇𝐶  is defined such as: 
 
 
𝑅𝑋 𝑇𝐶 =
1
𝑒
 𝑅𝑋 0  (3-37) 
 
Thus it can be seen that 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇 
 
The equivalent discreet first order Markov is such as [Fossard, 1983]: 
 
 𝑥 𝑘 + 1 = 𝑚𝑥 𝑘 + 𝑇 1 − 𝛼 𝑤 𝑘  (3-38) 
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where 𝑚 = 𝑒
−𝑇𝑒
𝑇  and 𝑛 =  𝑒
−𝑣
𝑇 
𝑇𝑒
0
d𝑣 = 𝑇  1 − 𝑒
−𝑇𝑒
𝑇   
 
The following approximation is often used: 
𝑒
−𝑇𝑒
𝑇 = 1 −
𝑇𝑒
𝑇
+
1
2!
 
𝑇𝑒
𝑇
 
2
+ ⋯ +
1
𝑛!
 −
𝑇𝑒
𝑇
 
𝑛
 
 
In the case where the correlation time is much greater than the sample period, the following 
approximation can be made: 
 
𝑥 𝑛 + 1 =  1 −
𝑇𝑒
𝑇
 𝑥 𝑛 + 𝑇𝑒𝑤 𝑛  (3-39) 
 
If 𝑇𝑒 = 1 𝑠,  
 
𝑥 𝑛 + 1 =  1 −
1
𝑇
 𝑥 𝑛 + 𝑤 𝑛  (3-40) 
 
3-4-2 Fault free case error measurement model 
 
The following simple autoregressive model can be proposed as a preliminary approximation 
for these correlated noises: 
 𝜉 𝑘 + 1 = 𝑎 𝜉 𝑘 +  1 − 𝑎2  𝑤 𝑘  (3-41) 
 
with for 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, 𝑤𝑘~𝑁 0, Σ  and 𝜉1~𝑁 0, Σ  
 Σ =  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
  
 
𝑎 is the autoregressive coefficient such as 
 
𝑎 = 1 −
1
𝑇𝐶
 (3-42) 
The term  1 − 𝑎2 is a normalization coefficient that allows the process 𝜉 to have the 
covariance matrix Σ. It does not influence the correlation time computation. 
 
The correlation time will depend on the source of the measurement error: 
 
- Receiver and multipath will be driven by the smoothing time constant of the receiver 
noise which is assumed to be on the order of two minutes. 
 
- Tropospheric error will be modelled using this first order Gauss Markov process with 
a 30 minutes correlation time [RTCA, 2006].  
 
- [RTCA, 2006] states that the satellite clock and ephemeris error shall be modelled 
using a first-order Gauss Markov process with a 2 hour correlation time. But a 
correlation time of approximately one hour, based on the average period of time 
satellites are visible to the user will be used. 
 
The pseudorange measurement error can then be represented as the sum of several first order 
Markov processes with error variances the same as the ones described in 3-2-1. 
 
 𝐸 𝑘 = 𝜉tropo  𝑘 + 𝜉noise /multipath  𝑘 +𝜉clock /eph  𝑘  (3-43) 
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3-4-3 Faulty case error measurement model 
 
A sudden frequency shift in the satellite clock will lead to a ramp in the pseudorange. Errors 
in the satellite clock correction parameters in the navigation message will have a similar 
impact.  
 
This is why a combined step ramp error that could include nominal bias, satellite failure and 
interference effect, will be used for the faulty case model. 
 
“Error couples” will be denoted  𝑏, 𝑏   with 𝑏 and 𝑏  constant such as the pseudorange 
additional error will be: 
 
 𝐷 𝑘 = 𝑏 + 𝑏  ∆𝑡 (3-44) 
 
where ∆𝑡 is the elapsed time since the onset of the failure 
 
In [RTCA, 2006], in the section addressing FDE off line test procedure, it is indicated that a 
GPS satellite malfunction shall be simulated as a ramp error in measured pseudorange with a 
slope of 5m/s. 
3-5 Synthesis 
 
The objective of this section is to give a complete model of pseudo range measurements, 
including interference effects and satellites failures. 
 
3-5-1 General model 
 
A general model of smoothed pseudorange measurement can be proposed such as: 
 
 𝑌 𝑘 = 𝑕 𝑋 𝑘  + 𝐸 𝑘  (3-45) 
where 𝐸 𝑘  error measurement 
 
𝐸 𝑘  can be view as the sum several components: 
 
- the ionosphere, the troposphere, the ephemeris, the clock errors  
- the receiver noise and the multipath error with a correlation time corresponding to the 
receiver smoothing time 
- a nominal additional bias 
- a possible additional error measurement due to the tracking of mixed useful signal and 
interference or due to a satellite failure which is supposed to be a combined step ramp 
error 
 
Nevertheless, a distinction has to be made between the fault free case and the faulty case. The 
model will also differ if it is an input for a sequential or a snapshot integrity monitoring 
algorithms. 
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3-5-2 Snapshot model 
 
The fault free case represents the nominal situation. In this case, the pseudorange error 
measurement uses to be represented as: 
 
 
𝐸~𝑁   
0
⋮
0
 ,  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
   (3-46) 
 
where 𝜍1
2 , … , 𝜍𝑁
2  are nominal error variances corresponding to UERE computation described 
in section 3-2-1 
 
A nominal bias on each measurement can be considered. In this case, the pseudorange error 
measurement is represented as: 
 
𝐸~𝑁   
𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑁
 ,  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
   (3-47) 
 
with the same nominal error variance computation 
 
This model has also to consider the faulty case, that is to say the potential case where one or 
several pseudo range measurement are simultaneously affected by errors from different 
sources that can be a satellite failure or an interference effect. 
 
Since the temporal aspects are not taken into account here, any additional fault is modeled as 
a bias. In presence of interference, the measurements can be affected by some additional noise 
which is represented by inflated error variance: 
 
 
𝐸~𝑁   
𝑏1
⋮
𝑏𝑁
 ,  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
   (3-48) 
 
In the absence of interference, the standard deviation 𝜍1, … , 𝜍𝑁  of the corresponding 
unsmoothed error will be taken as in section 3-2-1-1. In presence of wideband or narrowband 
interference, the standard deviation of the corresponding unsmoothed error will be taken as in 
section 3-3-2-2-1. In presence of CW interference, the corresponding unsmoothed error will 
be taken as a random variable with envelope as expressed in 3-3-2-2-1. 
 
3-5-3 Sequential Model 
 
The pseudorange measurement error can then be represented as the sum of several first order 
Markov processes and of a combined step ramp error that could include nominal bias, satellite 
failure and interference effect, such as: 
 
 𝐸 𝑘 = 𝜉tropo  𝑘 + 𝜉noise /multipath  𝑘 +𝜉clock /eph  𝑘 + 𝐷 𝑘  (3-49) 
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Chapître 4 
 
Techniques RAIM  
 
 
Le contrôle autonome d‟integrité fait réference à des méthodes uniquement basées sur la 
redondance des mesures satellitaires, éventuellement enrichies de celles d‟autres capteurs 
embarqués, devant déterminer si les conditions sont réunies pour occasionner une erreur de 
position dépassant une limite spécifiée. 
 
Cette technique repose en général en general sur deux fonctions : la fonction de détection dont 
le but est de détecter la présence d‟une erreur de position inacceptable et la fonction 
d‟exclusion dont le but est de déterminer et d‟exclure la source de cette erreur permettant ainsi 
à la navigation de se poursuivre sans interruption.  
 
Il existe deux grandes classes d‟algorithmes de contrôle autonome de l‟intégrité: les 
algorihtmes RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) qui utilise exclusivement les 
informations GNSS et les algorihtms AAIM (Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) qui 
utilise également des informations en provenance d‟autres capteurs embarqués Cette étude 
traite uniquement des techniques RAIM. 
 
La section 4.1 introduit quelques principes généraux. La section 4.1.1 traite du calcul de la 
position utilisateur au moyen de la methode des moindre-carrés. Le but de la section 4.1.2 est 
d‟identifier les biais sur les measures de pseudodistance conduisant à une erreur de position 
dangereuse. Cela consiste à calculer pour chaque mesure de pseudo distance disponible le 
plus petit biais qui conduira à dépasser la limite d‟alerte dans le domaine des positions. Ces 
plus petit biais correspondent aux pires situations de detection/exclusion et peuvent être utilisé 
dans la conception et l‟évaluation des algorithmes RAIM.  
 
La section 4.2 traite de la methode la plus classique c'est-à-dire celle des moindre carrées. Le 
RAIM moindre carrés est basé sur la comparaison entre un test statistique dépendant du 
vecteur de prediction d‟erreur et d‟un seuil donné. La somme des carrés des residus des 
mesures de pseudo distance forme ce test statitique. Le seuil est lui fixé en considérant le 
comportement statistique du test dans le cas « fault free ». Les niveaux de protection 
découlent du plus petit biais que l‟algorihtme est capable de détecter en satisfaisant les 
probabilities de fausse alarmes et de detection manqué exigées. Leur calcul s‟effectue en 
considérant le comportement statistique du test dans le cas « faulty » 
 
La section 4.3 traite de la méthode de séparation des solutions. Elle est basées sur la 
comparaison de l‟estimée de position qui utilise toutes les mesure satellitaires disponibles 
(filtre principal) et celles générées par chacun des sous-filtres utilisant toute les mesures à 
l‟exception d‟une seule. La separation entre chaque paire d'estimées (l‟estimée du filtre 
principal et celle de chaque sous filtre) forme un test statistique et chaque test statistique est 
comparé à son seuil de detection respectif qui est fixé de telle manière à respecter la 
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probabilité de fausse alarme requise. La manière dont les niveaux de protection associés sont 
obtenus est explicitée et une nouvelle methode est proposée. 
 
La section 4.4 est consacrée à la méthode du rapport de vraisemblance généralisée et plus 
particulièrement à la methode rapport de vraisemblance généralisée contraint. Il s‟agit d‟une 
méthode interessante car elle prend en compte directement le plus petit biais à detecter ainsi 
que le plus grand biais nominal sur chaque pseudo distance. Cependant cet algorithme 
nécessite differents paramètres d‟entrée en vue d‟être implémenté et utilisé comme un RAIM : 
un seuil auquel sera comparé le test statistique et qui doit être en accord avec le taux de fausse 
alerte requis. On doit également être capable de prédire ces performances au regard de la 
probabilté de détection manquée exigée. Ces différents aspects ont été adressés durant ce 
travail de doctorat et sont traités dans cette section. L‟implémentation séquentielle de cette 
méthode est également présentée ainsi que l‟adaptation qui en a été faite pour la détection de 
pannes de type échelon plus rampe. 
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Chapter 4 
 
RAIM Techniques 
 
 
4-1 General principles 
4-2 Least Square Residual Method 
4-3 Solution Separation Method 
4-4 Constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test 
4-5 Synthesis 
 
4-1 General principles 
 
4-1-1 Introduction 
 
Autonomous integrity monitoring refers to a situation where a receiver uses the redundancy of 
satellite measurements, possibly augmented by other sensors, to determine whether a fault 
condition exists that would cause it to have an unacceptable probability to experience a 
position error outside a specified bound. 
 
There are two general classes of integrity monitoring: 
 
- Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) which uses GNSS information 
exclusively. It refers to integrity monitoring using only satellite signals tracked by the 
receiver. 
 
- Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (AAIM) which uses information from 
additional on-board sensors (e.g. barometric altimeter, clock and inertial navigation 
system INS) 
 
This study only addresses RAIM techniques. 
 
RAIM algorithm design mainly consists in two distinct parts. First, of course we have to 
detect (or detect and exclude) faulty measurements (monitoring) but we also have to predict 
our ability to protect the user considering satellite geometry and an assumed measurement 
error model. 
 
As mentioned in part 2-5, the monitoring scheme generally consists of two functions: the fault 
detection and the fault exclusion. The goal of fault detection is to detect the presence of 
positioning failure. Upon detection, proper fault exclusion determines and excludes the source 
of the failure (without necessarily identifying the individual sources causing the problem) 
thereby allowing GNSS navigation to continue without interruption. 
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Most of the time, these functions are based on the comparison between a test statistic 
depending on the prediction error vector and a given threshold. It is a hypothesis test in which 
the test statistics computation is performed with the observable data. The decision threshold is 
set considering the statistical distribution of the test in the fault free case and a given false 
detection rate.  
 
Concerning the performance prediction, as the position error remains unknown for the user, 
statistical tools have to be used to check requirements compliance (to predict the availability). 
This can be performed by predicting the smallest bias the algorithm is able to detect 
respecting the missed alert and false alert requirements (protection levels computation) or by 
predicting the probability of missed detection of dangerous biases. 
 
This study focuses on three distinct classes of RAIM algorithms: the Least Square Residual 
(LSR) method, the Maximum Solution Separation (MSS) method and the constrained 
Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) test method. Monitoring and performance prediction 
processes are detailed for these three algorithms. 
 
Other promising techniques have been recently proposed such as NIORAIM method [Hwang 
and Brown, 2006] or the Multiple Hypothesis RAIM algorithm [Blanch et al., 2007] but are 
not studied here. It has been decided to focus on standard methods such as LSR and MSS and 
on a new one, the constrained GLR. This method seems very interesting because it is 
designed to detect only faults which lead to a positioning failure.  
 
4-1-2 Least Squares Position Solution 
 
The objective of this section is to detail least square user position estimation and the 
computation of measurement residual vector which is also called the prediction error vector. 
These computations constitute the starting point of every RAIM algorithms presented in this 
study. 
 
The measurement model is generally expressed as: 
 
 𝑌 𝑘 = 𝑕 𝑋 𝑘  + 𝐸 𝑘  (4-1) 
 
It can be seen that the measurements do not linearly depend on the true user position. This is 
why an iterative least squares estimation technique has to be implemented. This method uses 
the linearization of the measurement model around successive estimates of the receiver 
position. 
 
Let us denote 𝑋 0 𝑘  an initial estimate of 𝑋 𝑘 . This initial estimate can be determined using 
past measurements or can be provided by other navigation means. 
 
Denoting 𝑋 𝑘 = 𝑋 0 𝑘 + ∆𝑋 𝑘 , the measurement model can be rewritten as follows: 
 
 𝑌 𝑘 = 𝑕  𝑋 0 𝑘 + ∆𝑋 𝑘  + 𝐸 𝑘  (4-2) 
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This model is linearized around 𝑋 0 𝑘  : 
 
 
𝑌 𝑘 ≅ 𝑕  𝑋 0 𝑘  +
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑋
 𝑋 0 𝑘  × ∆𝑋 𝑘 + 𝐸 𝑘  (4-3) 
 
The first order derivative that appears in this last equation is an 𝑁 × 4  matrix that can be 
expressed as: 
 
𝐻 =
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑋
 𝑋 0 𝑘   (4-4) 
 
𝐻 =
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑥
1
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑦
1
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑧
1
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑏
1
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑥
𝑁
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑦
𝑁
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑧
𝑁
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑏
𝑁
 𝑋 0 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (4-5) 
It can be shown that these derivatives can be expressed as: 
 
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑥
𝑖
 𝑋 0 𝑘  =
𝑥 0 − 𝑥
𝑖 𝑘 
  𝑥 0 − 𝑥𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑦 0 − 𝑦𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑧 0 − 𝑧𝑖 𝑘  
2
 
  (4-6) 
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑦
𝑖
 𝑋 0 𝑘  =
𝑦 0 − 𝑦
𝑖 𝑘 
  𝑥 0 − 𝑥𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑦 0 − 𝑦𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑧 0 − 𝑧𝑖 𝑘  
2
 
  (4-7) 
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑧
𝑖
 𝑋 0 𝑘  =
𝑧 0 − 𝑧
𝑖 𝑘 
  𝑥 0 − 𝑥𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑦 0 − 𝑦𝑖 𝑘  
2
+  𝑧 0 − 𝑧𝑖 𝑘  
2
 
  (4-8) 
 
 
𝜕𝑕
𝜕𝑏
𝑖
 𝑋 0 𝑘  = 1 (4-9) 
 
The linearized model can also be rewritten as: 
 
𝑌 𝑘 − 𝑕  𝑋 0 𝑘  = 𝐻 × ∆𝑋 𝑘 + 𝐸 𝑘  
Or 
 ∆𝑌 𝑘 = 𝐻 × ∆𝑋 𝑘 + 𝐸 𝑘  (4-10) 
 
Denoting ∆𝑌 𝑘 = 𝑌 𝑘 − 𝑕  𝑋 0 𝑘  , ∆𝑌 𝑘  represents the deviation between the 
measurements made and the predicted noiseless measurements that the receiver would have 
made if its position and clock delay were 𝑋 0 𝑘 . 
 
Considering this new linear model between ∆𝑌 𝑘  and ∆𝑋 𝑘 , a least squares estimate of 
∆𝑋 𝑘  can be computed. This estimate is: 
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 ∆𝑋  𝑘 =  𝐻𝑡H −1𝐻𝑡 × ∆𝑌 𝑘  (4-11) 
 
Let us denote that if the measurement error covariance matrix is known, then the weighted 
least squares estimate is: 
 
 ∆𝑋  𝑘 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 × ∆𝑌 𝑘  (4-12) 
 
where Σ = cov 𝐸 𝑘  . 
 
This last estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator that is to say the one that reaches the 
Cramer-Rao lower bound [Söderström, 1989]. 
 
The quantity ∆𝑋  𝑘  is an estimate of ∆𝑋 𝑘 , which is defined as the deviation between the 
initial estimate 𝑋 0 𝑘  and 𝑋 𝑘 . 
 
It is then possible to implement an iterative algorithm starting from an initial estimate 𝑋 0 𝑘  
and improving progressively this estimate through the comparison between the measurements 
and the predicted measurements for each estimated position. The iterative algorithm can be 
implemented to stop if ∆𝑋  𝑘  is a vector that has a small norm. 
 
The way the positioning error can be expressed as a function of the measurement error is 
detailed as follow (omitting the dependence on time): 
 
∆𝑋 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 × ∆𝑌 
 
∆𝑋 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 ×  𝐻 ∆𝑋 + 𝐸  
then 
∆𝑋 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐻 ∆𝑋 +  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 
 
As  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐻 = 𝐼𝑁, 
 
∆𝑋 = ∆𝑋 +  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 
Then 
 ∆𝑋 − ∆𝑋 = − 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 (4-13) 
 
where ∆𝑋 − ∆𝑋 =  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 −  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 = 𝑋 − 𝑋  is the positioning error 
 𝐸 is the measurement error 
 
The measurement residual represents the deviation between the measurements made and the 
predicted noiseless measurements that the receiver would have made if its position and clock 
delay were 𝑋  and if there was no noise. It can be expressed such as: 
 
∆𝑌 = 𝑌 − 𝑕 𝑋   
 
∆𝑌 = 𝑕 𝑋 + 𝐸 𝑘 − 𝑕 𝑋   
                          = 𝑕 𝑋0 + ∆𝑋 + 𝐸 − 𝑕 𝑋0 + ∆𝑋   
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By linearizing around 𝑋0, 
 
∆𝑌 = 𝐻∆𝑋 − 𝐻∆𝑋 + 𝐸 = 𝐻 ∆𝑋 − ∆𝑋  + 𝐸 
 
∆𝑌 = − 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 + 𝐸 
Therefore, 
 
 Δ𝑌 =  𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 𝐸 (4-14) 
 
which is the well-known relationship between the measurement residual and the measurement 
error. 
 
At the end of the iterative process, 𝑋  and 𝑋 0 are very close and this why we can denote: 
 
 ∆𝑌 = 𝑌 − 𝑕 𝑋  = 𝑌 − 𝑕 𝑋 0  (4-15) 
 
It can be noticed that there is a linear relationship between the measurement residual and the 
measurement error which is very interesting for RAIM algorithms. 
 
4-1-3 Pseudorange bias that leads to a positioning failure 
 
The integrity monitoring requires that the navigation system detects the presence of an 
unacceptably large position error for a given mode of flight, and if possible, isolates and 
removes the source of unacceptably large position error from the navigation solution, thereby 
allowing navigation to return to normal performance without an interruption in service. 
 
Therefore, only faults that lead to a positioning failure (horizontal or vertical) need to be 
detected. 
 
The goal of this subsection is to identify pseudorange biases that lead to a positioning failure, 
that is say to compute for each available pseudorange, the smallest bias on this pseudorange 
that will lead to a positioning failure. These smallest biases correspond to the worst case 
detection/exclusion situation, they can be used to design RAIM algorithm and/or to estimate 
their statistical properties. 
 
This concept has been introduced in [Nikiforov, 2005] as an input parameter of the 
constrained GLR test.  
 
A pseudorange error   is considered as a horizontal positioning failure if its impact violates 
the integrity risk, that is to say if: 
 
  1 − 𝑃𝑓 𝑃0  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋 𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑃𝛾  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋 𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿 > 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡  
(4-16) 
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Figure 13 - Horizontal positioning failure 
 
As it is depicted on the previous figure, each individual satellite fault (additional pseudorange 
bias) produces a fault direction in the horizontal plane [Nikiforov, 2005]. The main question 
is: how far from the true position the ellipse‟s centre can be moved along the corresponding 
fault direction in order to consider that this bias lead to a positioning failure?  
 
That will depend on the mutual orientation of this “ellipse of uncertainty” and the fault 
direction. The computation, which has to be done for each pseudorange, is detailed in 
appendix A. 
 
A pseudorange error   is considered as a vertical positioning failure if its impact violates the 
integrity risk such as: 
  1 − 𝑃𝑓 𝑃0  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑃𝛾  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 > 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡  
(4-17) 
 
where  𝑃𝑓  is the probability of failure of one satellite 
 𝑃0 corresponds to the fault free case 
 𝑃𝛾  corresponds to the faulty case 
 
This case, which is simpler than the horizontal one, is illustrated on the following figure and 
the computation for each pseudorange of the smallest additional bias that will lead to a 
positioning failure has been particularly investigated during this PhD and is detailed in 
appendix A. 
 81 
 
 
Figure 14 - Vertical positioning failure 
These critical biases values are to be computed for a given user position at a given moment by 
(for a given sample): 
 
- Computing the probability to exceed the alert limit in the fault free case   
 𝑃0  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋 𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  and 𝑃0  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿  
 
- For each available pseudorange measurement, computing the smallest additional bias 𝑏𝑖  
that leads to a probability 𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋
 
𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  or 𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿  such as: 
 
 1 − 𝑃𝑓 𝑃0  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋 𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝐻 − 𝑋
 
𝐻 > 𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡  
 
 1 − 𝑃𝑓 𝑃0  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡  
 
The computations of the probabilities 𝑃0 and 𝑃𝑏𝑖  do not depend on any detection algorithm. 
But it can be seen that they depend on the failure probability of occurrence.  
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4-2 Least Square Residual Method 
 
The classical LSR RAIM method is based on the comparison between a test statistic 
depending on the prediction error vector and a given threshold 
 
4-2-1 Implemented detection function 
 
Let‟s consider the measurement residual ΔY (also called the prediction error vector) which can 
be expressed thanks to a linear relationship the measurement error vector E, its covariance 
matrix Σ and the observation matrix 𝐻: 
 
 Δ𝑌 =  𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡H −1𝐻𝑡 𝐸 (4-18) 
 
or for the weighted least square solution: 
 
 Δ𝑌 =  𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 𝐸 (4-19) 
 
Those statistics are observable whereas the positioning error of the least square solution is 
not. A scalar measurement is then defined such as: 
 
 𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ∆𝑌𝑡 . ∆𝑌 =  ∆𝑌 2 (4-20) 
or 
 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ∆𝑌𝑡Σ−1∆𝑌 (4-21) 
 
Let‟s denote 
 
 
𝑠2 =
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝜍2
 (4-22) 
or 
 𝑠2 = 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 (4-23) 
 
In both cases, 𝑠2 represents the sum of the squares of the range residual errors normalized by 
the standard deviation of the measurement errors. 
 
The LSR RAIM test is defined by [Parkinson and Axelrad, 1988]: 
 
 
𝑇 =  
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑁 − 4
 (4-24) 
 
and the weighted LSR RAIM test is defined by [Walter and Enge, 1995]: 
 
 𝑇 =  𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 (4-25) 
 
In both cases, the detection threshold is obtained by considering the test statistic in the fault 
free case  
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If the measurement error E is noise only such as: 
 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑗  𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
 with 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖
2  or 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍2  (4-26) 
 
Therefore, 𝑠2 is chi-squared distributed with N-4 degrees of freedom, 𝑠2~𝜒𝑁−4
2 , that is to say: 
 
 ∃𝜉𝑖  , 𝑠
2 = 𝜉1
2 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑁−4 
2  𝑖𝑖𝑑, 𝜉𝑖~𝑁 0,1  (4-27) 
 
The probability of false alarm is used to determine the normalised detection threshold 𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎  
such as: 
 𝑃 𝑠2 > 𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎  = 𝑃𝑓𝑎  (4-28) 
 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎 =  𝑓𝜒𝑁−42  𝑥 
∞
𝑎𝑃𝑓 𝑎
d𝑥 (4-29) 
where 
 
𝑓𝜒𝜆 ,𝑁−4
2  𝑥 =
𝑒−𝑥 2 𝑥
 𝑁−4 
2
−1
2 𝑁−4 2 Γ  
𝑁 − 4
2  
 (4-30) 
 
Thus, a fault is detected if the chi-squared variable is abnormally large above the assumed 
noise level. 
 
Figure 15 - Fault free LSR statistical test distribution 
Normalized decision threshold 𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎  
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Finally, the threshold that it is compared to our criteria is for the LSR RAIM: 
 
 
𝑕 =  
𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎 𝜍2
 𝑁 − 4 
 (4-31) 
and for the weighted LSR method: 
 𝑕 =  𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎  (4-32) 
 
The LSR test 𝛿 is given by the following equation: 
 
 
𝛿 =  
ℋ0  if 𝑇 ≤ 𝑕
ℋ1   if 𝑇 > 𝑕
  (4-33) 
 
4-2-2 Protection levels computation 
 
The protection levels derive from the smallest bias the algorithm is able to detect satisfying 
the false alarm and the missed detection requirement. 
 
Let„s consider that the measurement error E is noise and a bias b on one satellite j such as: 
 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑗  𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏
⋮
0 
 
 
 
 
 (4-34) 
 
In this case, 𝑠2 is chi-squared distributed with N-4 degrees of freedom and non-centrality 
parameter 𝜆 such as 𝑠2~𝜒𝜆 ,𝑁−4
2 . This means that 𝑠2 can be written like this: 
 
 ∃𝜉𝑖  , 𝑠
2 = 𝜉1
2 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑁−4 
2  𝑖𝑖𝑑, 𝜉𝑖~𝑁 𝜇𝑖 , 1  (4-35) 
 
 
𝜆 =  𝜇𝑖
2
𝑁−4
𝑖=1
 (4-36) 
 
The non central chi-square probability density function is given by: 
 
 
𝑓𝜒𝜆 ,𝑁−4
2  𝑥 =
𝑒− 𝑥+𝜆 2 𝑥
 𝑁−4 
2
−1
2 𝑁−4 2 
  
𝑥𝑗  𝜆𝑗
Γ  
𝑁 − 4
2 + 𝑗 . 2
2𝑗 . 𝑗!
∞
𝑗 =0
 (4-37) 
 
The non centrality parameter 𝜆  is computed in order to satisfy the Pmd requirement such as: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =  𝑓𝜒𝜆 ,𝑁−4
2  𝑥 
𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎
0
d𝑥 (4-38) 
 
The obtained non centrality parameter 𝜆  is the smallest that can be detected by the test. It 
does not depend of any pseudorange. 
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Figure 16 - Fault free and faulty LSR statistical test distribution 
The relation between the smallest detectable bias on the pseudorange j and the test statistic is 
simplified as: 
 𝜍2𝜆 = 𝑏 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗  𝑏 =  1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗  𝑏
2 (4-39) 
 
where  𝐵 = 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
 𝜆 is the smallest detectable non-centrality parameter previously obtained 
 
The smallest detectable measurement bias b on satellite j can be then expressed as: 
 
𝑏𝑗 = 𝜍 
𝜆
1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
 (4-40) 
 
The relationship between the position error and the measurement error is: 
 
 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋  𝑘 = −𝐴 × 𝐸 𝑘  (4-41) 
 
with 𝐴 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
 
Therefore the impact of the bias 𝑏𝑗  in position domain is obtained by: 
 
Δ𝑋 = 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋  𝑘 = 𝐴 ×
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏𝑗
⋮
0  
 
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
…
…
𝐴𝑁,𝑗
𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
…
…
⋯ 𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗 …
⋯ 𝐴𝑇,𝑗 … 
 
 
 
 
×
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏𝑗
⋮
0  
 
 
 
 
 
Then, 
∆𝑋𝐻 =  ∆𝑋𝑁
2 + ∆𝑋E
2 =  𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
2 × 𝑏𝑗  
𝜆 
Normalized decision threshold 𝑎𝑃𝑓𝑎  
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∆𝑋V = 𝐴𝑉,𝑗 × 𝑏𝑗  
 
Denoting, 
 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝜍 ×  𝜆 (4-42) 
 
∆𝑋H =
 𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑗
2
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
× 𝑝bias  
 
∆𝑋V =
 AV,j 
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
× pbias  
 
Denoting, 
 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 =
𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
 , 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 =
 𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑗
2
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
 
(4-43) 
 
The protection levels are computed referring to the worst satellite:
  
 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max
𝑗
 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗   (4-44) 
 
 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max
𝑗
 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗   (4-45) 
And 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 = 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 × 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠  (4-46) 
 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 × 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠  (4-47) 
 
A proposed LSR RAIM method that takes into account nominal biases on pseudorange 
measurement is detailed in appendix B. 
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4-3 Maximum Solution Separation Method 
 
4-3-1 Introduction 
 
The maximum solution separation method is based on the observed separation between the 
position estimate generated by the full-set filter (using all the satellite measurements) and that 
generated by each one of the subset filters (each using all but one of the satellite 
measurements). Its principle is described in [Brown and McBurney, 1988]. 
 
The separation 𝑑𝑖  between each pair of the estimates (the full filter estimate and each sub- 
filter estimate) forms a test statistic and each test statistic is compared to its respective 
detection threshold 𝐷𝑖  which is determined to meet the maximum allowable rate requirement. 
 
The full LSR position estimate is:  
 
 ∆𝑋  𝑘 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 × ∆Y k  (4-48) 
with Σ = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝐸  
 
Let‟s denote this full solution ∆𝑋 0 and for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  the corresponding sub solution is 
denoted ∆𝑋 𝑖  . 
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , the discriminator 𝑑𝑖  is defined as: 
 
 𝑑𝑖 𝑘 = 𝑋 0 𝑘 − 𝑋 𝑖 𝑘 = ∆𝑋 0 − ∆𝑋 𝑖 (4-49) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 - Solution Separation method principle 
  
𝑋 0 
𝑋 𝑖  
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑋 0 − 𝑋 𝑖 = ∆𝑋 0 − ∆𝑋 𝑖 
∆𝑌 
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Figure 18 - Full and partial solutions 
 
4-3-2 Detection function 
 
Let 𝑋 𝑘  be the true user position at the instant k. 
Let 𝑋 0 𝑘  be the full filter LSR user position estimation at the instant k. 
 
As detailed in 4-1-2, the relationship between the position error and the measurement error 
can be expressed such as: 
 
Δ𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = − 𝐻
𝑡Σ−1𝐻 −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 × 𝐸 𝑘  
 
that is to say, 
 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = −𝐴0 × 𝐸 𝑘  (4-50) 
 
with 𝐴0 =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
 
For 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑁 , let 𝑋 𝑖 𝑘  be the LSR user position estimation at the instant k do not considering 
the pseudo range obtained from the satellite 𝑖. 
 
The solution separation discriminators are 4 × 1 vectors linearly depending of the error 
measurement such as:  
 𝑑𝑖 𝑘 = 𝑋 0 𝑘 − 𝑋 𝑖 𝑘 =  𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴0 × 𝐸 𝑘  (4-51) 
 
Their covariance matrix is given by  
 
 𝑑𝑃𝑖 𝑘 =  𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴0 Σ 𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴0 
𝑡  (4-52) 
 
Thus the method provides N criteria which are the separation 𝑑𝑖  and their horizontal and 
vertical component (𝑑𝑖 ,H  and 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉) have to be compared with their respective thresholds 𝐷𝑖  
and 𝑉𝑖 . The detection test is given by the following equation:  
∆𝑋 0 
∆𝑋 𝑖 
true position 
𝑋 
partial solution 
estimation 𝑋 𝑖  
full solution 
estimation 𝑋 0 
𝑋 0 − 𝑋 i = ∆𝑋 0 − ∆𝑋 𝑖  
Separation vector 
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𝛿 =  
ℋ0  if ∀𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  𝑑𝑖 ,H ≤ 𝐷𝑖  and   𝑑𝑖,𝑉 ≤ 𝑉𝑖
ℋ𝑘   if ∃𝑘 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  𝑑𝑘 ,H > 𝐷𝑘    or  𝑑𝑘 ,𝑉 > 𝑉𝑘
  (4-53) 
 
where for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 𝐷𝑖  and 𝑉𝑖  are thresholds whose computation is detailed in the next 
sections. 
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , thresholds have to cope with the corresponding false alert rate. To set them let 
us consider the statistic behaviour of the criteria in the fault free case. Thus, we have: 
 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑖 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
  (4-54) 
with for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖
2  
cov 𝐸 = Σ 
 
The horizontal and the vertical criteria components, 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 and 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , are going to 
be considered separately. They are directly expressed in the local coordinate frame because of 
the expression of the observation matrices 𝐻0 and 𝐻𝑖 . 
 
4-3-2-1 Computation of the horizontal thresholds 
 
𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  is a bi-dimensional random variable following a Gaussian distribution in the fault-free 
case such as 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻~𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻  and the general expression of the probability density 
function of the variable 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  is given by: 
 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝑑𝑒𝑡 d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 
exp  −
1
2
Xt . d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻
−1. X  
(4-55) 
 
where 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 = 𝑑𝑃𝑖 1: 2,1: 2  and 𝑑𝑃𝑖 =  𝐴 − 𝐴𝑖 Σ 𝐴 − 𝐴𝑖 
𝑡  
 
Since 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 is not diagonal, the components of 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 are not mutually independent and the 
separations on the North and East axes are correlated. But as 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 is a positive definite 
matrix, it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an 
orthonormal basis ℬ𝑖 =  𝑒 1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖   that is composed of eigenvectors 𝑒  1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖  corresponding 
with the eigenvalues 𝜆1,𝑖 and 𝜆2,𝑖of 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 and we have: 
 
 d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 = P⊥,i . ∆i . P⊥,i
t (4-56) 
where, 
∆i= diag 𝜆1,𝑖  ,  𝜆2,𝑖 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 
P⊥,i is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑒 1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖 . 
 
In particular P⊥,i is orthogonal: P⊥,i
−1 = P⊥,i
t. 
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Let 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ be the projection of 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 in the orthonormal basis ℬ𝑖 =  𝑒 1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖   such as: 
 
 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ = P⊥,i
t𝑑𝑖,𝐻 (4-57) 
 
𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ is a 2-dimensional Gaussian vector whose covariance matrix is the diagonal matrix ∆i 
𝑑𝑖 ,⊥~𝑁   
0
0
 , ∆i . In particular, the components of 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ are mutually independent and the 
general expression of the probability density function of variable 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥  is given by: 
 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,⊥  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝜆1,𝑖  𝜆2,𝑖
exp  −
1
2
Xt . ∆i
−1. X  (4-58) 
 
Let 𝜆𝑖  be the dominant eigenvalue and 𝜆𝑖 ′ the other eigenvalue. For simplification, without 
loss of generality, we will assume that 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆1,𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖
′ = 𝜆2,𝑖. 
 
The set of points ℇ𝑎 ,𝑖 =  𝑋 ∈ ℝ
2: Xt . ∆i
−1. X = 𝑎2  is an ellipse whose semi-major axis is 
oriented along 𝑒 1,𝑖  and whose semi-minor axis is oriented along 𝑒 2,𝑖 . This ellipse defines an 
equipotential curve of the probability density function: 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 𝑋 ∈ ℇ𝑎 ,𝑖 =
1
2𝜋 𝜆1,𝑖  𝜆2,𝑖
e−
𝑎2
2  
 
The probability that the point corresponding to 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ belongs to the region 𝐷𝑎 ,𝑖 delimited by 
ℇ𝑎 ,𝑖  is: 
𝑃 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥  ∈ 𝐷𝑎 ,𝑖 =  𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,⊥  𝑋 d𝑋
𝐷𝑎 ,𝑖
 
The analytical expression of this ellipse is in the coordinate frame  𝑂, 𝑒 1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖  : 
 
𝑋1
2
𝜆1,𝑖
+
𝑋2
2
𝜆2,𝑖
= 𝑎2 
 
O  is the centre of this ellipse, it is at full-solution position. The length of the semi-major axis 
is 𝑎 𝜆1,𝑖  and the length of the semi-minor axis is 𝑎 𝜆2,𝑖. 
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Figure 19 - Fault free ellipse 
The partial horizontal threshold could have been obtained using: 
 
𝑃  𝑑𝑖,𝐻 ≤ 𝑎 = 1 − 𝑝 
or  
𝑃   𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 
2
≤ 𝑎2 = 1 − 𝑝 
 
where 𝑝 ∈  0,1  corresponds to the allocated 𝑃𝑓𝑎  
 
Or it would have better to work with a normalized relationship: 
 
P 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥
t . ∆i
−1. 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ ≤ 𝑏
2 = 1 − 𝑝 
𝑃  
𝑑𝑖 ,⊥
2 1 
𝜆1,𝑖
+
𝑑𝑖 ,⊥
2 2 
𝜆2,𝑖
 = 1 − 𝑝
 
 
But in fact  𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1   is set as an approximation of  𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ =  𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  and for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
 
  𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 ≅  𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1   (4-59) 
 
Considering both sides of the distribution and the fact that any of the N tests may cause a false 
alarm with the same probability, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , the threshold 𝐷𝑖  is calculated as: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
= 𝑃  𝑑𝑖,⊥ 1  ≥ 𝐷𝑖  
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
= 𝑃   
𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1 
 𝜆𝑖
 ≥
𝐷𝑖
 𝜆𝑖
  
with 
 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1 
 𝜆𝑖
~𝑁 0,1  (4-60) 
 
Therefore, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , as in [Brenner, 1996], 
ie ,1
ie ,2
𝑎 𝜆1,𝑖  
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𝐷𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖  𝑄
−1  
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
  (4-61) 
where  
𝑄 𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋
 𝑒
−𝑡2
2 𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑥
  
𝜆𝑖  is the largest eingenvalue of the covariance matrix 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 = 𝑑𝑃𝑖 1: 2,1: 2  
 
4-3-2-2 Computation of the vertical thresholds 
 
𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  is a random variable following a Gaussian distribution in the fault-free case such as: 
 
 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑉,𝑖
2  (4-62) 
where 𝜍𝑉,𝑖
2 = 𝑑𝑃𝑖 3,3  
 
Thus, for the vertical part of the detection, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  the threshold 𝑉𝑖  are obtained such as: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
= 𝑃  𝑑𝑖 ,V ≥ 𝑉𝑖  
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
=
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑉,𝑖
  exp  
−𝑡2
2𝜍𝑉,𝑖2
 d𝑡 +
−𝑉𝑖
−∞
 exp  
−𝑡2
2𝜍𝑉,𝑖2
 𝑑𝑡
+∞
𝑉𝑖
  
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
=
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑉,𝑖
 exp  
−𝑡2
2𝜍𝑉,𝑖2
 𝑑𝑡
+∞
𝑉𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
=
1
 2𝜋
 𝑒
−𝑢2
2 𝑑𝑢
∞
𝑉𝑖
𝜍𝑉 ,𝑖 
 
 
Therefore, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 
 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝜍𝑉,𝑖  𝑄
−1  
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
  (4-63) 
where  
𝑄 𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋
 𝑒
−𝑡2
2 𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑥
  
 
4-3-2-3 Conclusion 
 
Finally, the test for detecting one range failure is given by the following equation:  
 
𝛿 =  
ℋ0  if ∀𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1  ≤ 𝐷𝑖  and   𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉 ≤ 𝑉𝑖
ℋ𝑘   if ∃𝑘 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  𝑑𝑘 ,⊥ 1  > 𝐷𝑘    or  𝑑𝑘 ,𝑉 > 𝑉𝑘
  
with for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  
 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝜍𝑉,𝑖  𝑄
−1  
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
  and 𝐷𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖  𝑄
−1  
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
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4-3-3 Protection levels computation 
 
The objective in this section is to detail the MSS protection level computation. As the position 
error remains unknown for the user, statistic bounds have to be used to check requirements 
compliance. Several approaches are presented: 
 
The first one is an existing method whose consists in finding a bound of the horizontal error 
consistent with the required probability of missed detection and the required probability of 
false alarm (section 4-3-3-1). 
 
The second class of approach which has been proposed during this PhD consists in predicting 
the smallest bias on each pseudorange that will be detected by the algorithm with the required 
allocated probability of missed detection. Then this bias will be projected in the position 
domain and will give the protection level (section 4-3-3-2). 
 
4-3-3-1 Existing horizontal protection level computation 
 
Our goal is to compute a statistical bound called horizontal protection level that will be such 
as: 
P   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ HPL /∃ a non detected bias on a pseudorange = 𝑃𝑚𝑑  
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , let‟s assume that there is a bias 𝑏 on the pseudorange 𝑖 and that it is not 
detected by the corresponding criteria. That means that  𝑋 𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ 𝐷𝑖 . 
 
As 𝑋 − 𝑋 0 = 𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 + 𝑋 𝑖 − 𝑋 0 , 
 
  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤  𝑋 − 𝑋
 
𝑖 𝐻 +  𝑋
 
𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 (4-71) 
 
Thus, 
  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤  𝑋 − 𝑋
 
𝑖 𝐻 + 𝐷𝑖  (4-72) 
 
The method consists now in over bounding the term  𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 𝐻. 
 
Since the faulty measurement has been removed from 𝑋 𝑖  computation, the vector 𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 
corresponds to a fault free case situation. 
 
So let‟s consider the distribution of this vector ∆𝑋 𝑖 = 𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 is the position error resulting 
from the sub solution that does not take into account the 𝑖𝑡𝑕  pseudo range. 
 
 ∆𝑋 𝑖 = −𝐴𝑖 × 𝐸 (4-73) 
 
The behaviour of its horizontal component, denoted ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻, is studied here. 
 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 is a bi-dimensional random variable following a Gaussian distribution such as
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻~𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻   
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Since 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 is not diagonal, the components of ∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝐻 are not mutually independent and the 
separations on the North and East axes are correlated. But as 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, 
it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an 
orthonormal basis 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑢  1,𝑖 , 𝑢  2,𝑖  that is composed of eigenvectors 𝑢  1,𝑖  and 𝑢  2,𝑖  
corresponding with the eigenvalues 𝜇1,𝑖  and 𝜇2,𝑖   of 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 and we have: 
 
 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 = Π⊥,i . Mi . Π⊥,i 
t (4-75) 
where, 
Mi = diag 𝜇1,𝑖 , 𝜇2,𝑖 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 
Π⊥,i  is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑢  1,𝑖  and 𝑢  2,𝑖In 
particular Π⊥,i  is orthogonal  Π⊥,i 
−1 = Π⊥,i 
t. 
 
Let ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ be the projection of ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 in the orthonormal basis 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑢  1,𝑖 , 𝑢  2,𝑖  such as: 
 
 ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ = Π⊥,i 
t∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 (4-76) 
 
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ is a 2-dimensional Gaussian vector whose covariance matrix is the diagonal matrix Mi, 
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥~𝑁   
0
0
 , Mi  or ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥~𝑁   
0
0
 ,  
𝜇1,𝑖 0
0 𝜇2,𝑖
  .  
 
In particular, the components of ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ are mutually independent and  ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ =  ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻  
 
Let‟s denote 
 𝑠𝑖
2 = ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥
t
. Mi
−1 . ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ (4-77) 
 
that is to say, 
 
𝑠𝑖
2 =
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 1 
2
𝜇1,𝑖2
+
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 2 
2
𝜇2,𝑖2
 (4-78) 
 
𝑠𝑖
2 is chi-squared distributed with 2 degrees of freedom, 𝑠𝑖
2~𝜒2
2, and we can easily find 𝛿 
such as: 
 𝑃 𝑠𝑖
2 ≤ 𝛿 = 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  (4-79) 
1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑 =  𝑓𝜒22 𝑥 
𝛿
−∞
d𝑥 
Let‟s denote 
 𝛿 = 𝐹𝜒22
−1 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑   (4-80) 
 
Our goal is to bound  ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ =  ∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝐻 =  ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ 1 2 + ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 2 2 . 
 
Assuming that  𝜇1,𝑖 = max 𝜇1,𝑖 , 𝜇2,𝑖 , we have 
 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 1 2 + ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 2 2 ≤  ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 1 2 +
𝜇1,𝑖
𝜇2,𝑖
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 2 2 ≤  𝜇1,𝑖 
∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ 1 2
𝜇1,𝑖
+
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 2 2
𝜇2,𝑖
 
Then, 
 ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ ≤  𝜇1,𝑖  .  𝑠𝑖
2  
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As  
𝑃 𝑠𝑖
2 ≤ 𝛿 = 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  
 
𝑃   𝜇1,𝑖  .  𝑠𝑖
2  ≤  𝜇1,𝑖  . 𝛿  = 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  
Let‟s denote 
 𝛿𝑖 =  𝜇1,𝑖  . 𝛿  (4-81) 
 
𝑃  ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ ≤ 𝛿𝑖 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  
 
Therefore, 
𝑃  
 𝑋 − 𝑋 0 ≤ 𝛿𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖 ∃ non detected
 bias on the ith pseudorange   
 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  
 
And a class of horizontal protection levels can be defined as proposed in [Escher, 2003]: 
 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑖𝜖 1,𝑁 
 𝛿𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖  (4-82) 
where 𝐷𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖  𝑄
−1  
𝑃𝑓𝑎
2𝑁
  
𝑄 𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋
 𝑒
−𝑡2
2 𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑥
  
𝜆𝑖  is the largest eingenvalue of the covariance matrix 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 
𝛿𝑖= 𝜇1,𝑖   .  𝛿 
𝜇1,𝑖  is the largest eingenvalue of the covariance matrix 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 
 
It is demonstrated in appendix C that 𝛿 is equal to −2 ln 𝑃𝑚𝑑   
 
In [Vanderwerf, 2001], the proposed value corresponding to our 𝛿𝑖  is: 
 
 𝑎𝑖 =  𝜇1,𝑖  . 𝑄
−1 𝑃𝑚𝑑   (4-83) 
 
This approach leads to smaller values and this is why we keep the theoretical expression: 
 
 
𝛿𝑖 =  𝜇1,𝑖  .  𝐹𝜒22
−1 1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑  =  𝜇1,𝑖  .  −2 ln 𝑃𝑚𝑑   (4-84) 
 
This horizontal protection level computation is illustrated on the following figure. The 
decomposition  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤  𝑋 − 𝑋
 
𝑖 𝐻 +  𝑋
 
𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 is represented in red. The inequality 
 𝑋 𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ 𝐷𝑖  is represented by the green circle; the inequality  ∆𝑋
 
𝑖 𝐻 ≤ 𝛿𝑖  is 
represented by the blue ellipse. The final error over bounding corresponding to the protection 
level is represented by the red circle. 
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Figure 20 - Existing protection level computation illustration 
Nevertheless, some situation can be less favorable as it is illustrated on the following figure. 
This is why some new methods for horizontal protection level computation are proposed in 
the next section. 
 
 
Figure 21 - Existing protection level computation illustration (other configuration) 
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4-3-3-2 Proposed horizontal protection level computation 
 
Another method to compute protection levels has been proposed during this PhD and is 
detailed in his section. It consists in predicting the smallest bias on each pseudorange that will 
be detected by the algorithm with the required allocated probability of missed detection and to 
project this bias in the position domain to obtain the protection level. 
 
The objective of this method is to avoid the following operation: 
 
 𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤  𝑋 − 𝑋
 
𝑖 𝐻 +  𝑋
 
𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 
 
when the positioning error is over bound.  
 
4-3-3-2-1 Faulty case horizontal criteria density function 
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , let‟s assume that there is a bias 𝑏 on the pseudorange i. The impact on the 
corresponding criteria 𝑑𝑖  is such as: 
 
 𝑑𝑖 𝑘 = 𝑋  𝑘 − 𝑋 𝑖 𝑘 =  𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴 × 𝐸 𝑘  (4-85) 
with 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑖 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏
⋮
0 
 
 
 
 
 (4-86) 
 
As in the fault free case, 𝑑𝑖  is projected in the local reference frame and we first focus on its 
horizontal component 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻. 
 
In this case, 𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 is a two dimensions vector which follows a Gaussian bi-dimensional law 
with a mean  𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 corresponding to the projection of 𝑏 in the horizontal plane and with a 
covariance matrix 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻: 
 
𝑏𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴 
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏
⋮
0 
 
 
 
 
 and 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 = 𝑏𝑖 1: 2  (4-87) 
 
Its density function is: 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝑑𝑒𝑡 d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 
exp  −
1
2
 X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 
t
. d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻
−1.  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻   
  (4-88) 
where X is expressed in the North East local frame such as 𝑋 =  
𝑥𝑁
𝑥𝐸
  
 
As in the fault free case 𝑑𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, it is diagonalizable and its 
eigenvalues 𝜆1,𝑖 and 𝜆2,𝑖  are all positive such as: 
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 d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 = P⊥,i . ∆i . P⊥,i
t (4-89) 
where 
∆i= diag 𝜆1,𝑖  ,  𝜆2,𝑖 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 
P⊥,i is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑒 1,𝑖 , 𝑒 2,𝑖 . In particular P⊥,i is 
orthogonal: P⊥,i
−1 = P⊥,i
t 
 
Then, det d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻 = 𝜆1,𝑖  𝜆2,𝑖 and d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻
−1 = P⊥,i . ∆i
−1. P⊥,i
t 
 
 X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 
t
. d𝑃𝑖 ,𝐻
−1.  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻     =  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 
t
. P⊥,i . ∆i
−1. P⊥,i
t .  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻  
      =  P⊥,i
t X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻  
t
. ∆i
−1.  P⊥,i
t .  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻   
 
Denoting 𝑋⊥ = P⊥,i
t . 𝑋 and Ω = P⊥,i
t . 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻, 𝑋⊥ is the vector X expressed in the new local frame 
and   is the vector 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻 in the new local frame. 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ ,𝑏 𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝜆1,𝑖  𝜆2,𝑖
exp  −
1
2
 
 x⊥ − Ω1 
2
λ1,i
+
 y⊥ − Ω2 
2
λ2,i
   
  (4-90) 
 
As it has been done it the fault free case,  𝑑𝑖,⊥ 1   is set as an approximation of  𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻  and for 
𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 
𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 ≅ 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1  
 
And we have: 
 
 𝑑𝑖 ,⊥ 1 ~𝑁 Ω𝑖 ,1, λ1,i  (4-91) 
 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖,⊥ ,𝑏 𝑥 =
1
2𝜋 𝜆1,𝑖
exp  −
1
2
 x⊥ − Ω1 
2
λ1,i
  (4-92) 
 
 
 
Figure 22 - Faulty situation 
 
𝐷𝑖  
Ω2 
Ω1 
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4-3-3-2-2 Bounding the horizontal positioning error 
 
Let‟s consider two probabilities 𝑝0 and 𝑝1 such as 𝑝0 ∈  0,1  and 𝑝0 ∈  0,1  
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , we can find the bias 𝑏𝑖on the pseudorange i that will be detected with the 
probability 1 − 𝑝1 by the corresponding criteria. 
 
This bias can be obtained thanks to an iterative process. For the successive values of 𝑏𝑖 , we 
compute Ω𝑖 ,1 such as : 
 
 
Ωi,1
Ωi,2
Ωi,3
 = 𝑃𝑖 ,⊥
𝑡 × 𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
𝑡 ×  𝐴 − 𝐴𝑖 × 𝐸 (4-93) 
 
with 𝐴 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1, 𝐸 =  0 … 0 𝑏𝑖 0 … 0 
t  
 
and we compute: 
 
𝑝 =  
1
2𝜋 𝜆𝑖
𝑒
−
1
2 
𝑥−Ω𝑖,1
 𝜆𝑖
 
2
𝑑𝑥
𝐷𝑖
−𝐷𝑖
 (4-94) 
 
At the end of the process, we have the amplitude of the bias 𝑏𝑖on the pseudorange such as: 
 
 𝑃  𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 ≤ 𝐷𝑖 𝑏𝑖  = 𝑝1 (4-95) 
 
 
Figure 23 - Fault free and faulty statistical test distribution 
Ωi,1 
𝐷𝑖  −𝐷𝑖  
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On the other hand, we can look at the impact of a bias of amplitude 𝑏𝑖  on the pseudorange i on 
the full filter position estimation and find a bound δ0,𝑖  such as: 
 
 𝑃   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ δ0,𝑖 ∃ a bias of size 𝑏𝑖
 on the  ith pseudorange = 𝑝0 (4-96) 
 
The method is described in appendix C. 
 
Therefore, for every 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  
 
 𝑃   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ δ0,i ∃  𝑏𝑖
  × 𝑃  𝑑𝑖 ,𝐻 ≤ 𝐷𝑖 𝑏𝑖  = 𝑝0𝑝1 (4-97) 
 
And a class of horizontal protection levels can be proposed such as: 
 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑖𝜖  1,𝑁 
 δ0,i  (4-98) 
 
The setting of 𝑝0 and 𝑝1, such as 𝑝0𝑝1 = 𝑃𝑚𝑑 , constitutes a tuning parameter of our protection 
level computation. 
 
4-3-3-3 Vertical protection level computation 
 
As for the horizontal case, vertical protection level can be computed as follow. 
 
In the faulty case, 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  is a one dimension vector which follows a Gaussian law with a 
mean  𝑏𝑖 ,𝑉 = 𝑏𝑖 3  corresponding to the projection of 𝑏 on the vertical local axe and with a 
variance 𝜍𝑉,𝑖
2 = 𝑑𝑃𝑖 3,3 . 
 
Its density function is: 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑉,𝑖
exp  −
 x − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝑣 
2
2𝜍𝑉,𝑖2
  (4-99) 
 
For 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , let‟s assume that there is a bias 𝑏 on the pseudorange 𝑖 and that it is not 
detected by the corresponding criteria. That means that: 
 
  𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉 =  𝑋 𝑉,𝑖 − 𝑋 𝑉,0 ≤ 𝑉𝑖  (4-100) 
 
As  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 = 𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 + 𝑋 𝑖 − 𝑋 0 , 
 
  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 V ≤  𝑋 − 𝑋
 
𝑖 V +  𝑋
 
𝑖 − 𝑋 0 𝑉  (4-101) 
 
Denoting 𝑋𝑉 = 𝑋 3  
 
 𝑋 − 𝑋 0 V ≤  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉,𝑖 +  𝑋 𝑉,𝑖 − 𝑋 𝑉,0  
Finally, 
  𝑋 − 𝑋 0 V ≤  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉,𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖  (4-102) 
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Since the faulty measurement has been removed from 𝑋 𝑖  computation, the vector 𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 
corresponds to a fault free case situation. 
 
The behaviour of its horizontal component, denoted ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑉 = 𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉,𝑖   , is studied here. 
 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑉  is a random variable following a Gaussian distribution such as
 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑉~𝑁 0, 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉
2  and 
its probability density function is given by: 
 
𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝑉  𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉
exp  −
1
2
 
𝑥
𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉
 
2
  (4-103) 
 
Thus  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉,𝑖   can be easily bounded. A bound 𝛾𝑖  is obtained such as 
 
1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉
 exp  −
1
2
 
𝑡
𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉
 
2
 𝑑𝑡
𝛾𝑖
−𝛾𝑖
 (4-104) 
 
A class of vertical protection levels can be defined as: 
 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑖𝜖  1,𝑁 
 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖  (4-105) 
 
This is a first method that derives from the existing HPL computation. Another method can be 
proposed. 
 
Figure 24 - Fault free and faulty statistical vertical test distribution 
 
𝑏𝑖 ,𝑣 
−𝑉𝑖  
𝑉𝑖  
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As explained in section 4-3-3-1, for the faulty case, 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  is a one dimension vector which 
follows a Gaussian law with a mean  𝑏𝑖 ,𝑉 = 𝑏𝑖 3  corresponding to the projection of 𝑏 on the 
vertical local axe and with a variance 𝜍𝑖 ,𝑉
2 = 𝑑𝑃𝑖 3,3 . 
 
Its density function is: 
 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉  𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑖 ,𝑉
exp  −
 𝑥 − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝑣 
2
2𝜍𝑖 ,𝑉2
  (4-106) 
 
The bias b on the pseudorange i that can be detect with the probability 1 − 𝑝1 can be easily 
computed by solving the equation: 
 
𝑝1 =  
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑖,𝑉
𝑒
−
1
2 
 𝑥−𝑏𝑖,𝑣 
2
𝜍𝑖,𝑉2 𝑑𝑥
𝑉𝑖
−𝑉𝑖
 (4-107) 
 
Then, we can over bound the vertical positioning error in presence of such biases as it has 
been proposed for the horizontal case. It consists in finding a bound γ0,𝑖  such as: 
 
 𝑃   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝑉 ≤ γ0,𝑖 ∃ a bias of size 𝑏𝑖
 on the  ith pseudorange = 𝑝0 
(4-108) 
 
The method is described in appendix C. 
 
Therefore, for every 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  
 
 𝑃   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ γ0,i ∃  𝑏𝑖
  × 𝑃  𝑑𝑖 ,𝑉 ≤ 𝑉𝑖 𝑏𝑖  = 𝑝0𝑝1 (4-109) 
 
And a class of vertical protection levels can be proposed such as: 
 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑖𝜖 1,𝑁 
 γ0,i  (4-110) 
 
The setting of 𝑝0 and 𝑝1, such as 𝑝0𝑝1 = 𝑃𝑚𝑑 , constitutes a tuning parameter of our protection 
level computation. 
 
4-3-4 Conclusion 
 
The maximum solution separation method which is based on the observed separation between 
the position estimate generated by the full-set filter (using all the satellite measurements) and 
that generated by each one of the subset filters (each using all but one of the satellite 
measurements), has been described. 
 
The test for detecting one range failure is based on the comparison of N horizontal sub criteria 
and N vertical sub criteria with their respective thresholds which are compliant with the 
required false alert probability. 
 
The classical way of computing protection level has been described and a proposed method 
has been introduced. They are based on the same detection function but can lead to different 
availabilities. 
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4-4 Constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
The use of constrained generalized likelihood ration test as a RAIM algorithm has been 
proposed in [Nikiforov, 2005]. This algorithm is designed to detect only faults which lead to a 
positioning failure. It is supposed to be stable against insignificant additional pseudorange 
biases with bounded impacts on the aircraft position and simultaneously more sensitive with 
respect to the dangerous biases producing positioning failures. 
 
4-4-1 Parity vector 
 
As detailed in chapter 3, the navigation equation gives us 𝑌 𝑘 = 𝑕 𝑋 𝑘  + 𝐸 𝑘 . 
 
In this part of the study, the measurement error E is supposed to be noise only such as:  
 
 
                         𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑗  𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
 with 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖
2  (4-111) 
 
or it can be noise and a bias b on one satellite l such as: 
 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑙 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏
⋮
0 
 
 
 
 
 (4-112) 
 
𝐸 can be denoted such as: 
 𝐸 = 𝜉 + 𝐵 (4-113) 
 
where 𝜉~𝑁 0, Σ  and Σ =  
𝜍1
2 0
⋱
0 𝜍𝑁
2
  
 
The navigation equation linearization leads to: 
 
 Δ𝑌 = 𝐻Δ𝑋 + 𝐸 (4-114) 
 
Let‟s consider the matrix Σ−1 2 =  
1
ς1 
⋱
1
ςN 
 : 
 
The previous equation becomes: 
 
 Δ𝑌norm = Σ
−1 2 Δ𝑌 = Σ−1 2 𝐻Δ𝑋 + Σ−1 2 𝐸 = 𝐻norm Δ𝑋 + 𝐸norm  (4-115) 
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Now the goal is to obtain a statistic which is independent from Δ𝑋.  
 
As mentioned in [Sturza, 1988], for a given 𝑁 × 4 measurement matrix 𝐻norm  with rank 4, it 
is possible to find an  𝑁 − 4 × 𝑁 matrix 𝑊 such as: 
 
 𝑊𝐻norm = 0 (4-116) 
 
This matrix 𝑊 satisfies the following conditions: 
 
 rank 𝑊 = 𝑁 − 4 (4-117) 
 
 𝑊𝑊𝑡 = 𝐼𝑁−4 (4-118) 
 
The  𝑁 − 4 × 1 parity vector Z is then defined by: 
 
 𝑍 = 𝑊Δ𝑌norm  (4-119) 
 
Since 𝑊 satisfies the following condition 𝑊𝐻norm = 0, transformation by 𝑊 removes the 
interference of the parameter ∆𝑋 such as: 
 
𝑍 = 𝑊Δ𝑌norm = W𝐸norm  
 
Let‟s denote 
 𝑃 = 𝑊𝑡𝑊 (4-120) 
 
𝑃 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix with rank 𝑁 − 4 and is idempotent: 
 
 𝑃2 = 𝑃 (4-121) 
 
The 𝑃 matrix can be directly calculated from 𝐻norm  such as [Sturza, 1988]: 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 − 𝐻norm  𝐻norm
𝑡Hnorm  
−1
𝐻𝑡  (4-122) 
or  
 𝑃 =  𝐼 − Σ−1/2𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1/2  (4-123) 
 
The matrix 𝑊 =  
𝑤1
⋮
𝑤𝑁−4
  is composed of the eigenvectors 𝑤1, ...., 𝑤𝑁−4 of the 𝑃 matrix 
[Nikiforov, 2005]. 
 
4-4-2 Snapshot Constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test  
 
The statistical test will be applied on this parity vector Z. The corresponding 
detection/exclusion algorithm is designed assuming that only a single failure can occur at the 
same time. Therefore, in the faulty case, if for example there is an additional bias on the 
measurement 𝑙, the parity vector Z will be expressed as follow: 
 
 𝑍 = 𝑊𝜉𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝑊𝐵l,norm  (4-124) 
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where for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 𝐵l,norm =
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙 
0
⋮
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and 𝜉norm ~𝑁 0, 𝐼𝑛  
 
The test will have to choose between different hypothesis: 
 
 - ℋ0 =  ℋ𝑖 ,0
𝑁
𝑖=1               (4-125) 
 
 where ℋ𝑖 ,0 =  𝑍 ∼ 𝑁 𝑊𝐵i,norm , 𝐼𝑁−4 ,  𝑣𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 , for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁          (4-126) 
 
 - ℋ𝑙 =  𝑍 ∼ 𝑁 𝑊𝐵l,norm , 𝐼𝑁−4 ,  𝑣𝑙 ≥ 𝑏𝑙 , for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁          (4-127) 
 
where the parameters 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  define the selectivity of the test with respect to 
each pseudo range bias 𝑣𝑖  such as for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
 
- 𝑏𝑖 is the smallest bias on the channel 𝑖 that leads to a positioning failure 
 
- 𝑎𝑖  the smallest bias that have to be consider or the largest bias that can be considered 
as nominal  
 
The constrained GLR test principle is illustrated by the following equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 ℋ0         if max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑓𝑙 𝑍 
𝑓0 𝑍 
≤ 𝑇
ℋ𝑙    if arg max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑓𝑙 𝑍 
𝑓0 𝑍 
≥ 𝑇
  (4-128) 
 
where a decision variable is constructed and tested against a threshold 𝑇. 
 
To have a geometric interpretation of the decision rule, the former equation is re-written this 
way: 
 
𝛿 =
 
 
 
 
 ℋ0  if max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 − min
 𝑣𝑙 ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
 ≤ 𝑕 
ℋ𝑙  if argmax
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 − min
 𝑣𝑙 ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
 > 𝑕  
  (4-129) 
where: 
- 𝑑 𝑍, ℋ𝑖 ,0   = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 is the distance from the observation 𝑍 to the partial 
null hypothesis ℋ𝑖 ,0   
- 𝑑 𝑍, ℋ0   = min𝑖∈ 1,𝑁  min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 = min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑑 𝑍, ℋ𝑖 ,0    is the distance from 
𝑍 to ℋ0   
- 𝑑 𝑍, ℋ𝑙    = min
 𝑣𝑙 ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
, for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁  are the distance from 𝑍 to each 
alternatives hypothesis ℋ𝑙    
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Figure 25 - Geometric interpretation of the decision rule  
 
In order to choose between the alternatives ℋ𝑙    for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁  and the null hypothesis ℋ0  , the 
differences 𝑑 𝑍, ℋ0   − 𝑑 𝑍, ℋ𝑙    are computed and the index that maximizes them is 
observed. 
 
This is why two functions are defined for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
 
- 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 which represents the  probability that there is no fault 
or no significant fault on the pseudo range i. 
 
- 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≥𝑏𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 which represents the probability that there is a bias on 
the channel i that will lead to a positioning failure. 
 
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
=  𝑍 2 − 2
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍 +  𝑊𝑖 
2
𝑣𝑖
2
𝜍𝑖2
 
 
The function 𝑔𝑖 𝑥 = 𝑥
2  𝑊𝑖 
2
𝜍𝑖
2
− 2𝑥
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
𝜍𝑖
+  𝑍 2 reaches its minimum for: 
 
𝑣 𝑖 =
𝜍𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
 𝑊𝑖 2
 (4-130) 
 
Therefore,  if  𝑣 𝑖  ≤ 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
= 𝑔𝑖 𝑣 𝑖         (4-131) 
and   if  𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
= 𝑔𝑖 𝑎𝑖         (4-132) 
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𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 =
 
 
 
 
 𝑣 𝑖
2  𝑊𝑖 
2
𝜍𝑖2
− 2𝑣 𝑖
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
𝜍𝑖
+  𝑍 2  if  𝑣 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
 𝑎𝑖
2
 𝑊𝑖 
2
𝜍𝑖2
− 2𝑎𝑖
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
𝜍𝑖
+  𝑍 2 if  𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑎𝑖
  
Finally, 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 =
 
 
 
 
  𝑍 2 −
 𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍 
2
 𝑊𝑖 2
                       if  𝑣 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
 𝑍 2 − 2𝑎𝑖
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
𝜍𝑖
+  𝑎𝑖
2
 𝑊𝑖 
2
𝜍𝑖2
 if  𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑎𝑖
  
 
As  𝑊𝑡𝑊 = 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 ,  
 𝑊𝑖 
2 = 𝑝𝑖𝑖  
and as  𝑊𝑡𝑍 = 𝑃𝐸norm = ∆𝑌norm ,  
𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍 = ∆𝑌norm  𝑖 =
∆𝑌𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
 
Using the least square residual vector to represent these values, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
 
 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 =
 
 
 
 
  𝑍 2 −
∆𝑌𝑖
2
𝜍𝑖2𝑝𝑖𝑖
                       if  𝑣 𝑖  ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
 𝑍 2 − 2𝑎𝑖
 ∆𝑌𝑖 
𝜍𝑖2
+  𝑎𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 if  𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑎𝑖
  (4-133) 
 
Similarly,  if  𝑣 𝑙  ≥ 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 = min
 𝑣𝑙  ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
= 𝑔𝑙 𝑣 𝑙   
and  if  𝑣 𝑙  < 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 = min
 𝑣𝑙  ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
= 𝑔𝑙 𝑏𝑙  
 
 
𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 =
 
 
 
 
  𝑍 2 −
∆𝑌𝑙
2
𝜍𝑙2𝑝𝑙𝑙
                       if  𝑣 𝑙 ≥ 𝑏𝑙  
 𝑍 2 − 2𝑏𝑙
 ∆𝑌𝑙 
𝜍𝑙2
+ 𝑏𝑙
2 𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝜍𝑙2
if  𝑣 𝑙 < 𝑏𝑙
  (4-134) 
 
where for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 ,  𝑣 𝑖 =
𝜍𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
 𝑊𝑖 
2 =
∆𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑖𝑖
 
 
The detection/exclusion function is based on the decision rule given by equation: 
 
 
δ =  
ℋ0     if max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 − 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙  ≤ 𝑕 
ℋ𝑙  if argmax
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 − 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙  > 𝑕  
  (4-135) 
 
This algorithm needs several parameters to be implemented and used as a RAIM algorithm:  
- the threshold 𝑕 that will be compare to the statistic test and that need to be compliant 
with the required probability of false alert 
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- the vector a of size 𝑁 × 1 representing the smallest bias to detect on each pseudo 
range 
- the vector b of size 𝑁 × 1 representing the largest nominal bias on each pseudo range 
 
The Snapshot Constrained GLR test is given by [Nikiforov, 2005]: 
 
 𝑇 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑆0  ∆𝑌, 𝑖 − 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙   (4-136) 
 
where 𝑆0 refers to the fault free situation such as: 
 
 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 =
 
 
 
 
 −
∆𝑌𝑖
2
𝜍𝑖2𝑝𝑖𝑖
                       if  𝑣 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
−2𝑎𝑖
 ∆𝑌𝑖 
𝜍𝑖2
+  𝑎𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 if  𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑎𝑖
  (4-137) 
 
and 𝑆1 refers to the faulty situation such as: 
 
 
𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 =
 
 
 
 
 −
∆𝑌𝑙
2
𝜍𝑙2𝑝𝑙𝑙
                       if  𝑣 𝑙  ≥ 𝑏𝑙  
−2𝑏𝑙
 ∆𝑌𝑙 
𝜍𝑙2
+  𝑏𝑙
2 𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝜍𝑙2
if  𝑣 𝑙  < 𝑏𝑙
  (4-138) 
where for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 : 
 
Δ𝑌i is the ith component of the LS residual such as: 
 
 Δ𝑌 =  𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 𝐸 (4-139) 
 
 Δ𝑌 = 𝑃𝐸 (4-140) 
 
𝐸 is the measurement error vector 
𝑏𝑖  is the smallest bias ont he pseudorange i that leads to a positioning failure 
𝑎𝑖  is the smallest error that have to be considered 
𝜍𝑖  is the variance of the error 𝐸𝑖  
𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃 𝑖, 𝑖  and 𝑃 =  𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1  
𝑣 𝑖 =
𝜍𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑡𝑍
 𝑊𝑖 2
=
∆𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑖𝑖
 
 
It can be seen that  𝑍 2 has been removed from the equation since it disappears with the 
subtraction of 𝑆0 and  𝑆1. 
 
This test has to be compared to a threshold 𝑕 which has to be set in order to satisfy the false 
alarm probability. Its computation has been investigated during this Ph.D. 
 
We are going to first study the case where ∀𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 , 𝑎𝑖=0. 
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4-4-2-1 Snapshot Constrained GLR test implementation: without considering 
nominal biases 
 
In this case 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = 0 and our test becomes:  
 
 𝑇 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙   (4-141) 
 
4-4-2-1-1 Setting the threshold that satisfies the Pfa 
 
It is first necessary to define a false alarm situation. There is a false alarm when there is no 
dangerous error on each available pseudo range and the test exceeds the threshold. 
 
The first part of the test process for a given situation consists in comparing for 𝑙𝜖 1, 𝑛 , 
𝑣 𝑙 =
∆𝑌𝑙
𝑝𝑙𝑙
 with the corresponding critical bias 𝑏𝑙  . 
 
Let‟s define for 𝑙𝜖 1, 𝑛 , 𝑓𝑙 ∆𝑌 = −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 . The function 𝑓𝑙  is such as: 
 
for 𝑙𝜖 1, 𝑛 , for 𝑥 𝜖 ℝ,  
 
𝑓𝑙 𝑥 =
 
 
 
 
   
𝑥2
𝜍𝑙2𝑝𝑙𝑙
                       if  𝑥 ≥ 𝑏𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑙   
2𝑏𝑙
 𝑥 
𝜍𝑙2
−  𝑏𝑙
2 𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝜍𝑙2
   if  𝑥 < 𝑏𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑙  
  (4-142) 
 
The test can be thus written such as:  
 
 𝑇 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 𝑓𝑙 ∆𝑌𝑙   (4-143) 
 
where for 𝑙 𝜖 1, 𝑁 ,  Δ𝑌l  is a Gaussian random variable 
   𝑏𝑙 , 𝜍𝑙 , 𝑝𝑙𝑙  are known 
 
For every positive number 𝑕, 
 
𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕 = 𝑃  max
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌  ≥ 𝑕 ≤  𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕 
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (4-144) 
 
Our goal is to find the threshold 𝑕0 such as: 
 
 
 𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕0 = 𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (4-145) 
 
This threshold will satisfy: 
 𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 ≤ 𝑃𝑓𝑎  (4-146) 
 
First let us consider the statistical behavior of 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌  for 𝑖 𝜖 1, 𝑁 . A false alarm situation 
addresses the fault free case such as: 
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∀𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 , 𝐸 𝑖 ~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖  
We have 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝐸 =  
𝜍1
2 0
⋱
0 𝜍𝑛
2
  
 
As ∆𝑌 = 𝑃𝐸 , denoting  𝐶 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 ∆𝑌 , 
𝐶 = 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝐸 𝑃𝑡  
 
and for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 , ∆𝑌 𝑖 ~𝑁 0, 𝐶𝑖𝑖  with 𝐶𝑖𝑖such as: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝑝𝑖𝑘𝜍𝑘𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑝𝑘𝑖  (4-147) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26 - Function 𝒇𝒍 ∆𝒀  
The function 𝑓𝑖  is even and it is increasing for 𝑥 ≥ 0. Therefore, for every positive number 𝑕 
we can define 𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖  such as: 
 
- 𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖 ≥ 0 
- 𝑓i 𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖 = 𝑕 
 
For 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 ,  
𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕 =
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑖𝑖
  𝑒𝑥𝑝  −
1
2
𝑥2
𝐶𝑖𝑖
 𝑑𝑥
−𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖
−∞
+  𝑒𝑥𝑝  −
1
2
𝑥2
𝐶𝑖𝑖
 𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖
  
 𝑦 = 𝑓𝑙 𝑥  
 𝑏𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑙   − 𝑏𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑙   
 111 
 
 
𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕 =
2
 2𝜋𝐶𝑖𝑖
  𝑒𝑥𝑝 −
1
2
𝑥2
𝐶𝑖𝑖
 𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑥𝑕 ,𝑖
  (4-148) 
 
Our goal is to find the threshold 𝑕0 such as: 
 𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕0 = 𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
or such as 
 
 
2
 2𝜋𝐶𝑖𝑖
  𝑒𝑥𝑝  −
1
2
𝑥2
𝐶𝑖𝑖
 𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑥𝑕0,𝑖
 = 𝑃𝑓𝑎
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (4-149) 
 
This threshold 𝑕0 is easily computed numerically and satisfies the required probability of 
false alarm 𝑃𝑓𝑎 . 
 
4-4-2-1-2 Predicting the probability of missed detection 
 
One major aspect of RAIM design is that we have to predict the algorithm ability to protect 
the user for the intended operation considering satellite geometry and an assumed level of 
noise. As the position error remains unknown for the user, statistic tools have to be used to 
check requirements compliance and to predict the availability. A first method consists in 
computing the smallest bias the algorithm is able to detect respecting the missed alert and 
false alert requirements, in projecting it on the worst satellite, in deducing the smallest 
position error for which this algorithm guaranties to protect the user respecting the 
requirements. These levels will be then compared to their corresponding alert limit. This is the 
principle of LSR method. A second method has been developed during this Ph.D. for the 
constrained GLR method. It consists in computing for a given geometry and an assumed level 
of noise the smallest bias on each pseudorange that will lead to a positioning failure, then in 
predicting the probability of missed detection of these biases, and finally comparing it to the 
required Pmd. The objective of this section is to present the Pmd prediction. 
 
There is a missed detection situation when the test 𝑇 is smaller than the threshold 𝑕0 and 
when there is an error. This bias or this error has to be dangerous, that is to say larger that the 
corresponding critical bias, and remained undetected to be considered as a missed detection. 
 
Referring to the concept of smallest biases that lead to a positioning failure mentioned in 
section 4-2, errors that have to be detected, and thus errors that have to be considered in 
probability of missed detection computation, are such that: 
 
∃𝑘 ∈  1, 𝑁   such as 𝐸 𝑘 > 𝑏𝑘  or 𝐸 𝑘 = 𝑏 + 𝜉𝑘  with 𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑘  
 
Considering that
 
this error on the pseudo range is present (or has a known probability of 
occurrence), only conditional probabilities will be mentioned in this section: 
 
Let‟s assume that ∃𝑘 ∈  1, 𝑁   such as 𝐸 𝑘 = 𝑏𝑘 + 𝜉𝑘  where 𝑏𝑘  is the single critical bias 
corresponding to the pseudorange k. The probability that the snapshot constrained GLR test 
do not detect this bias is first evaluated. 
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As 𝑇 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙  , 
𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 = 𝑃  max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙  ≥ 𝑕0  
And for every 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 
 
𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 = 𝑃  max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙  ≥ 𝑕0 ≥ 𝑃  −𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑖  ≥ 𝑕0  
  (4-150) 
Or using the functions 𝑓𝑖  for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  , such as: 
𝑓𝑖 𝑥 =
 
 
 
 
   
𝑥2
𝜍𝑖2𝑝𝑖𝑖
                       if  𝑥 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝑖   
2𝑏𝑖
 𝑥 
𝜍𝑖2
−  𝑏𝑖
2 𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
   if  𝑥 < 𝑏𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝑖  
  
 
for every 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 
 𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 ≥ 𝑃 𝑓𝑖 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕0  (4-151) 
 
and particularly for the faulty measurement 𝑘, 
 
 𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 ≥ 𝑃 𝑓𝑘 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕0  (4-152) 
 
We are in a faulty situation such as: 
 
∀𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘, 𝐸 𝑖 ~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖   
 𝐸 𝑘 ~𝑁 𝑏𝑘 , 𝜍𝑘  
 
As ∆𝑌 = 𝑃𝐸, ∆𝑌𝑘  is a Gaussian variable such as: 
 
∆𝑌𝑘~𝑁 𝑚𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘𝑘   
with 
𝐶𝑘𝑘 =  𝑝𝑘𝑗 𝜍𝑗𝑗
𝑁
𝑗 =1 𝑝𝑗𝑘  (as in the fault free case) 
𝑚𝑘 = 𝑏𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑘  
 
Therefore,  
𝑃 𝑓𝑘 ∆𝑌 ≥ 𝑕0 =
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑘𝑘
  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 d𝑢
−𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
−∞
+  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 
+∞
𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
  
Finally, 
𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 ≥
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑘𝑘
  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 d𝑢
−𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
−∞
+  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 
+∞
𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
  
 
As 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 1 − 𝑃 𝑇 ≥ 𝑕0 , 
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𝑃𝑚𝑑 ≤ 1 −
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑘𝑘
  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 d𝑢
−𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
−∞
+  exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 
+∞
𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
d𝑢  
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 ≤  
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑘𝑘
exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 d𝑢
𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
−𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
 (4-153) 
 
Let‟s denote 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝑏𝑘 , 𝑘 =  
1
 2𝜋𝐶𝑘𝑘
exp  −
 𝑢 − 𝑚𝑘 
2
2𝐶𝑘𝑘
 d𝑢
𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
−𝑥𝑕0,𝑘
 (4-154) 
 
Therefore, for each available measurement the probability 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝑏𝑘 , 𝑘  will be computed 
where 𝑏𝑘  is the smallest single bias on the pseudorange k that leads to a positioning failure. 
 
The final guaranteed 𝑃𝑚𝑑  could correspond to the worst case that is to say to: 
 
 max
𝑘∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝑏𝑘 , 𝑘  (4-155) 
 
4-4-2-2 Snapshot Constrained GLR test implementation: considering nominal 
biases 
 
In this case 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 ≠ 0 and the test cannot be systematically simplified and we have: 
 
 𝑇 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑆0  ∆𝑌, 𝑖 − 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙   (4-156) 
 
where 𝑆0 refers to the fault free situation such as: 
 
 
𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 =
 
 
 
 
 −
∆𝑌𝑖
2
𝜍𝑖2𝑝𝑖𝑖
                       if  𝑣 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
−2𝑎𝑖
 ∆𝑌𝑖 
𝜍𝑖2
+  𝑎𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 if  𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑎𝑖
  (4-157) 
 
and 𝑆1 refers to the faulty situation such as: 
 
 
𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 =
 
 
 
 
 −
∆𝑌𝑙
2
𝜍𝑙2𝑝𝑙𝑙
                       if  𝑣 𝑙  ≥ 𝑏𝑙  
−2𝑏𝑙
 ∆𝑌𝑙 
𝜍𝑙2
+  𝑏𝑙
2 𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝜍𝑙2
if  𝑣 𝑙  < 𝑏𝑙
  (4-158) 
 
For the same threshold 𝑕0, the probability of false alarm will be smaller if the test takes into 
account the existence of nominal bias in the fault free case. This is why, for a conservative 
approach, it is still possible to consider the former threshold. Nevertheless a more precise 
threshold that satisfies the Pfa needs to be computed numerically as well as the predicted 
probability of missed detection. 
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4-4-3 Sequential Constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test  
 
A sequential RAIM algorithm based on the Constrained GLR test can also be implemented. 
 
In this case, the pseudo range correlation is directly integrated in the constrained GLR 
algorithm through an AR model and the last m observations 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚  are considered. 
 
The test is given by the following equation: 
 
𝑇 =
 
 
 
 
 ℋ0  if max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑓𝑙 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚 
𝑓0 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚  
≤ 𝑕
ℋ𝑙   if arg max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑓𝑙 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚  
𝑓0 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚  
≥ 𝑕
  (4-159) 
 
Thus a sequential pseudorange measurement error model is taken into account, as presented in 
section 3-4-3. The additional measurement error E can be denoted such as: 
 
 𝐸 = 𝜉 + 𝐵 (4-160) 
 
The additive pseudo range noise 𝜉 is represented by the following first autoregressive model: 
 
 𝜉𝑘+1 = 𝜉𝑘 +  1 − 𝑎2𝜁𝑘  (4-161) 
 
with for 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, 𝜁𝑘~𝑁 0, Σ  and 𝜉1~𝑁 0, Σ  
 Σ =  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
  
 
Here again, the algorithm is designed assuming that only a single failure can occur at the 
same time. Therefore, in the faulty case, only one additional bias (step profile) on one 
measurement is taking into account. More complex failure profiles are addressed in section 4-
4-4. 
 
Thanks to the matrix 𝑁 = Σ−1 2 =  
1
ς1 
⋱
1
ςN 
 , the pseudo range error measurement 
is normalized 𝑁𝐸 = 𝐸norm as well as its auto correlated noise component: 𝜉norm = 𝑁𝜉: 
 
 𝜉𝑘+1,norm = 𝜉𝑘 ,norm +  1 − 𝑎2𝑤𝑘 ,norm  (4-162) 
 
with  𝑤𝑘 ,norm ~𝑁 0, In , 𝜉1,norm ~𝑁 0, In   
 
The successive parity vector are built. In the faulty case, if for example there is an additional 
bias on the measurement 𝑙, the parity vector 𝑍𝑘  will be expressed as follow: 
 
𝑍𝑘 = 𝑊𝜉𝑘 ,norm + 𝑊𝐵l,norm  
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where for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁 , 𝐵l,norm =
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙 
0
⋮
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to have a geometric interpretation of the decision rule, 
- 𝑍1~𝑁 𝑊𝐵norm , In−4  is compared with 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 , for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛  
-  for 2k  the random variable 
1
 1−𝑎2
 𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1  is compared with 
 1−𝑎 
 1−𝑎2
𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 , for 
𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛 . 
 
Thus considering the m last observations, the following expression has to be minimised: 
 
 𝑍1 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
+
1
1 − 𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 −  1 − 𝑎 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
m
k=2
 
with respect to 𝑣𝑖 . 
 
Here again two functions are defined for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
- 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍1 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
+
1
1−𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 −  1 − 𝑎 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
m
k=2  which 
represents the  probability that there is no fault or no significant fault on the pseudo range i. 
- 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑙  ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍1 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
+
1
1−𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 −  1 − 𝑎 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
m
k=2  
 which represents the probability that there is a bias on the channel l that will lead to a 
positioning failure. 
 
Let us define the function: 
𝑔𝑖 𝑥 =  𝑍1 
2 +
1
1 − 𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 
2
m
k=2
− 2  𝑍1 +
1 − 𝑎
1 − 𝑎2
 𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1
m
k=2
 
t
𝑊𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝑥
+  1 +
 1 − 𝑎 2
1 − 𝑎2
 m − 1  
 𝑊𝑖 
2
𝜍𝑖2
𝑥2 
 
This function reaches its minimum for : 
 
 
𝑣𝑖 =
𝜍𝑖 𝑍1 +  1 − 𝑎  𝑍𝑘
m−1
k=2 + Zm  
t𝑊𝑖
 𝑊𝑖 2 2𝑎 + m 1 − 𝑎  
 (4-163) 
 
 
Therefore,  if  𝑣 𝑖  ≤ 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝑖 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 𝑣 𝑖   
and   if  𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝑖 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 𝑎𝑖  
 
Using the least square residual vector to represent these values, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
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𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = 
 
 
 
 
 −
 ∆𝑌𝑖,1 +  1 − 𝑎  ∆𝑌𝑖 ,k
m−1
k=2 + ∆𝑌𝑖 ,m  
2
𝜍𝑖2𝑝𝑖𝑖 2𝑎 + m 1 − 𝑎   1 + 𝑎 
                                                                      if  𝑣 𝑖  ≤ 𝑎𝑖  
−2𝑎𝑖
 ∆𝑌𝑖,1 +  1 − 𝑎  ∆𝑌𝑖 ,k
m−1
k=2 + ∆𝑌𝑖 ,m  
𝜍𝑖2 1 + 𝑎 
+  𝑎𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 1 +
 1 − 𝑎 2
1 − 𝑎2
 m − 1   if  𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑎𝑖
  
  (4-164) 
 
Similarly,  if  𝑣 𝑙  ≥ 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 = min
 𝑣𝑙  ≥𝑏𝑙
𝑔𝑙 𝑣𝑙 = 𝑔𝑙 𝑣 𝑙   
and  if  𝑣 𝑙  < 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 = min
 𝑣𝑙  ≥𝑏𝑙
𝑔𝑙 𝑣𝑙 = 𝑔𝑙 𝑏𝑙  
 
𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑙 = 
 
 
 
 
 −
 ∆𝑌𝑙 ,1 +  1 − 𝑎  ∆𝑌𝑙 ,k
m−1
k=2 + ∆𝑌𝑙 ,m  
2
𝜍𝑙2𝑝𝑙𝑙 2𝑎 + m 1 − 𝑎   1 + 𝑎 
                                                                      if  𝑣 𝑙 ≥ 𝑏𝑙  
−2𝑏𝑙
 ∆𝑌𝑙,1 +  1 − 𝑎  ∆𝑌𝑙 ,k
m−1
k=2 + ∆𝑌𝑙 ,m  
𝜍𝑙2
+  𝑏𝑙
2 𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝜍𝑙2
 1 +
 1 − 𝑎 2
1 − 𝑎2
 m − 1  if  𝑣 𝑙 < 𝑏𝑙
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where for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛  
𝑣𝑖 =
∆𝑌𝑖1 +  1 − 𝑎  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑘
m−1
k=2 + ∆𝑌𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑖𝑖 2𝑎 + m 1 − 𝑎  
 
Let‟s define the following function: 
 
 
𝑔 𝑡, 𝑙 =  min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑆0  ∆𝑌𝑡 , … , ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑚+1, 𝑖 − 𝑆1 ∆𝑌𝑡 , … , ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑚+1, 𝑙  
+
 (4-166) 
 
The statistical test for this algorithm will be: 
 
 
𝑇 𝑡 = max
𝑙∈ 1,𝑁 
 𝑔 𝑡, 𝑙 − max
𝑗 ∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑗≠𝑙
𝑔 𝑡, 𝑗   (4-167) 
 
𝑚 is chosen such that the satellites in view at the epochs 𝑡 − 𝑚 + 1, … , 𝑡 are the same and our 
technique comes down to work with a weighted mean of the last m observations: 
 
 
Z =
𝑍1 +  1 − 𝑎  𝑍𝑘
m−1
k=2 + Zm
2𝑎 + m 1 − 𝑎 
 (4-168) 
 
and its associated distances for ni ,...,1 : 
- 𝑑 𝑍 , ℋ𝑖 ,0   = min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
is the distance from the observation 𝑍 to the partial 
null hypothesis ℋ𝑖 ,0   
- 𝑑 𝑍 , ℋ0   = min𝑖∈ 1,𝑁  min
 𝑣𝑖 ≤𝑎𝑖
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
 = min
𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 
𝑑 𝑍 , ℋ𝑖 ,0    is the distance from 
𝑍  to ℋ0   
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- 𝑑 𝑍 , ℋ𝑙    = min
 𝑣𝑙 ≥𝑏𝑙
 𝑍 − 𝑊𝑙
𝑣𝑙
𝜍𝑙
 
2
, for 𝑙 ∈  1, 𝑁  are the distance from 𝑍  to each 
alternatives hypothesis ℋ𝑙    
 
A threshold that satisfies the Pfa as well as the predicted probability of missed detection are 
computed numerically. 
 
4-4-4 Adaptation of the Sequential Constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio 
Test to step + ramp failure detection 
 
The objective here is to target more complex fault profiles that is to say, the case where faults 
depend on two parameters: the initial position (amplitude of the step) and the speed (rate of 
the slope). 
 
For each pseudo range “error couples” will be denoted  𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖  with 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑣 𝑖  constant. 
 
The criterion will be designed in the same way as previously, that is to say comparing a 
weighted mean of parity vectors with several hypothetic increasing errors on different 
channels. 
 
In order to have a geometric interpretation of the decision rule, 
- 𝑍1~𝑁 𝑊𝐵norm , In−4  is compared with 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 , for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛  
-  for 𝑘 ≥ 2 the random variable 
1
 1−𝑎2
 𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1  is compared with
 
 1−𝑎 
 1−𝑎2𝑖
𝑊𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 𝑣𝑖 +  𝑘 − 1 𝑣𝑖   , for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑛  
 
Thus considering the m last observations, the following expression has to be minimised: 
 
 𝑍1 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
+
1
1 − 𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 −   1 − 𝑎 𝑣𝑖 +   1 − 𝑎 𝑘 + 2𝑎 − 1 𝑣 𝑖 
𝑊𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2m
k=2
 
  (4-169) 
 
with respect to 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑣𝑖  
 
As for the previous constrained GLR implementation, two functions are defined for 𝑖 ∈
 1, 𝑁 , 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖  representing the probability that there is no fault or no significant fault on the 
pseudo range i and 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑖  representing the probability that there is a bias on the channel i 
that will lead to a positioning failure. 
 
This technique is more complicated since a recursive function of two variables has to 
minimize under more complex constraints. Its implementation is detailed in appendix D. 
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4-5 Synthesis 
 
Three distinct classes of RAIM have been addressed in this chapter.  
 
The Least Square Residual method in which the sum of the squares of the pseudorange 
residuals plays the role of the basic observable has been first recalled. 
 
The Maximum Solution Separation method has been discussed and an improved way of 
computing the associated protection level has been proposed. This MSS technique is based on 
the observation of the separation between the position estimate generated by a full-set filter 
(using all the satellite measurements) and that generated by each one of the subset filters (each 
using all but one of the satellite measurements). Nominal biases have not been taken into 
account in MSS RAIM design. 
 
Finally, a new method based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio test has been introduced 
and several implementations have been described. First a snapshot one that does not take into 
account nominal biases and for which an analytical threshold expression that satisfies a given 
probability of false alarm and a predictive probability of missed detection have been 
presented. A snapshot implementation that takes into account potential nominal has also been 
proposed. Finally, two sequential techniques have been described: one designed to detect step 
error and another one design to detect step plus ramp failure. 
 
The way these different methods will be implemented in order to take into account both civil 
aviation requirement and threat model is detailed in the next chapter. 
 
It is quite difficult to implement sequential methods and especially to obtain a representative 
evaluation of their worldwide availability performance. This is mainly due to the great 
number of various parameters and to simulation time. Detection performance has been 
evaluated through representative situations but no analytical method to predict availability has 
been developed. Therefore, it has been decided to not present simulation results relative to 
sequential methods in this document. 
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Chapître 5 
 
Implementation des algorithmes RAIM 
 
 
Le but de ce chapître est de présenter les hypothèses principales qui ont été faite afin 
d‟évaluer les performances des algorithmes RAIM. 
 
La section 5.1 décrit la grille utilisateur. Il s‟agit d‟une grille espacée de 5° en latitude et de 5° 
en longitude représentant un total de 2520 positions. 
 
Certaines simulations impliquent la constellation GPS seule, d‟autres la constellation Galileo 
seule et certaines considererent les deux systèmes. Afin d‟avoir des geometries satellitaires 
representatives, les durées de simutlation doivent correspondre aux périodes orbitales des 
constellations considérées. Ces considérations sont adressées dans la section 5.2. 
 
La section 5.3 traitent des mesures satellitaires disponibles, c'est-à-dire la manière dont elles 
sont obtenues et leur nombre moyen. L‟obtention de la position des satellites de navigation et 
les angles de masquage choisis sont ainsi présentés. 
 
Le nombre d‟inconnues à considérer dans l‟estimation de la position uitlisateur est adressé 
dans la section 5.4. En effet cette étude se base sur une combinaison de GPS et de Galileo au 
niveau des mesures de pseudodistance. Or même si le décalage d‟horloge entre les systèmes 
Galileo et GPS sera diffusé dans le message de navigation, cette valeur pourrait être critique. 
C‟est pourquoi il peut être utile de présenter ces résultats de simulations basées sur 
l‟hypothèse selon laquelle l‟utilisateur doit résoudre le décalage entre son horloge récepteur et 
le temps du système GPS ainsi que le décalage entre son horloge récepteur et le temps du 
système Galileo; la manière dont cela est réalisé est alors explicitée. 
 
La détermination de la probabilité de fausse alarme maximale pour chaque opération est 
détaillée dans la section 5.5. Le raisonnement est en parti basé sur le temps de corrélation eds 
mesures. 
 
Au même titre que la probabilité de fausse alerte, la probabilité de detection manquée 
constitue une entrée majeure des algorithmes RAIM. Ce paramètre découle du risque 
d‟integrité mais depend également de la probabilité d‟occurence des pannes satellite. Dans la 
mesure où ce calcul fait référence au modèle de menace, il doit être particulièrement détaillé. 
C‟est l‟objet de la section 5.6. 
 
La section 5.7 décris la manière dont sera évaluée la disponibilité des fonctions de détection et 
d‟exclusion des différents algorithmes implémentés. 
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Chapter 5 
 
RAIM Implementation 
 
 
5-1 User grid  
5-2 Simulation period 
5-3 Available satellite measurements 
5-4 Number of unknowns for position solution estimation 
5-5 Probability of false alert 
5-6 Probability of missed detection 
5-7 Fault detection and exclusion availability 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present major assumptions that have been made for RAIM 
performance evaluation whose results are presented in chapter 6. In particular, some methods 
to obtain the inner probability values that RAIM algorithms need to use are detailed. 
 
5-1 User grid 
 
A worldwide evaluation of RAIM performance will be conducted and thus a user grid needs 
to be defined. It has been decided for this study to use a grid with a latitude step of 5° and a 
longitude step of 5°. This represents a total amount of 2520 user positions. 
 
5-2 Simulation period 
 
Some simulations will imply both Galileo and GPS satellites. In order to have representative 
satellite geometries, the simulation period has to correspond to both constellation orbital 
periods. 
 
According to ESA, Galileo satellites will have orbit altitude of 23 222 kilometers resulting in 
a ground track repeat cycle of ten days during which each satellite has completed seventeen 
revolutions. Nevertheless, each Galileo satellite has an approximate orbit revolution period of 
14 hours and 7 minutes which corresponds to five revolutions in three days.  
 
The nominal orbital period of all vehicles in the GPS constellation is 12 sidereal hours that is 
to say that each GPS satellite has an orbital period of 11 hours and 58 minutes, at an altitude 
of 20 183 kilometers. Therefore, three days also approximately correspond to six GPS 
satellites periods. 
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This is why a simulation time of three days has been chosen for dual constellation whereas a 
simulation time of one day has been chosen for single constellation studies. 
 
The frequency of the simulation test will depend on simulation time. 
 
A first class of value will be evaluated every 4 minutes which correspond for three days 
simulation duration to 1080 values for each user point. Thus, that will provide an amount of  
2 721 600 values for the 2520 points of the user grid. 
 
A second class of value will be evaluated every minute which correspond for one day 
simulation duration to 1440 values for each user point. That will provide an amount of  
3 628 800 values for the 2520 points the user grid. 
 
5-3 Available satellite measurements 
 
5-3-1 Satellites position computation 
 
The future Galileo space segment will comprise 30 satellites in a Walker constellation with 
three orbital planes at 56° nominal inclination. Each plane will contain nine operational 
satellites, equally spaced, 40° apart, plus one spare satellite to replace any of the operational 
satellites in case of failures. 
 
The nominal GPS system constellation has 24 satellites in six 55° orbital planes, with four 
satellites in each plane, with room for spares.  
 
In practice GPS signal carries with it data from the satellite that the user receiver needs to 
solve its position, its velocity. Because of many perturbations to the ideal purely elliptical 
Kepler orbit such as lunar, solar gravitational attraction, solar flux…, the GPS orbit is 
modeled as a modified elliptical orbit with correction terms to account for these perturbations. 
These ephemeris parameters are changed periodically to give a best fit to the actual satellite 
orbit. By demodulating and extracting the navigation data, the user can calculate the satellite 
position as a function of time. Ephemeris parameters and elements of ephemeris model 
equations are given in [Spilker, 1996]. 
 
Another type of data is transmitted through GPS signal providing a truncated and reduced 
precision set of the ephemeris parameters: the almanac data, which are much less accurate 
than the detailed ephemeris data. However the almanac data are valid for longer period of 
time and do not require frequent update. The almanac parameters are given in [Spilker, 1996]. 
The algorithm for computing the satellite position from this set of parameters is the same as 
ephemeris one. The only difference is that where the almanac does not include a parameter, 
this parameter is set to zero. 
 
Almanac data which are usually used for satellite selection and as aids to acquisition, will be 
used for satellite position computation in simulations. To be more precise, a 27 satellites 
Galileo constellation [Eurocae, 2006] and an optimized 24 satellites GPS constellation 
[RTCA, 2006] will be considered for these simulations and the satellite position computation 
will be made thanks to corresponding almanac data. 
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5-3-2 Mask Angles 
 
As indicated in the Galileo Integrity Concept [ESA, 2005], the user elevation angle above 
which SISA is guaranteed is 10°. Even if this study does not concern Galileo ground integrity 
channel, this SISA value has been consider for UERE provision. This is why a 10° degree 
mask will be used for Galileo satellite visibility computation. 
 
As specified in [GPS SPS, 2001], GPS performance are given for a receiver which tracks all 
satellites in view above a 5° mask angle. This is why a 5° degree mask will be used for GPS 
satellite visibility computation. 
 
5-3-3 Average number of visible satellites 
 
Those assumptions lead to a given set of visible satellites. Actually a greater number of GPS 
satellites can be expected in future and therefore, the following results are quite conservative. 
 
It can be seen on the following figure that, considering the GPS and Galileo constellations 
described above, an average number of 17 satellites will be available. 
 
Figure 27 - Average number visible satellites over 3 days considering 24 sat GPS and 27 
sat Galileo constellations 
The same computation has been conducted only considering 24 satellite GPS constellation, 
then only considering 27 Galileo constellation (with a 5° masking angle and 10° masking 
angle). 
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Figure 28 - Average number of satellites over 3 days considering 24 satellites GPS 
constellation 
 
 
Figure 29 - Average number of satellites over 3 days considering 27 satellites Galileo 
constellation (mask angle 10°)  
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Figure 30 - Average number of satellites over 3 days considering 27 satellites Galileo 
constellation (mask angle 5°)  
5-4 Number of unknowns for position solution estimation 
 
This study has focused on combining GPS and Galileo at the pseudorange level. Even if 
United States and European Union have agreed to provide the GPS to Galileo Time Offset 
GGTO through each system‟s navigation signals, the determination of this offset is thought 
not to be part of a safety-critical chain [Hahn and Powers, 2005]. This is why it is useful to 
provide some simulation results based on the assumption that the user solves for the offset 
between the GNSS receiver clock and GPS system time, and between the GNSS receiver 
clock and Galileo system time.  
 
This operation consists in adding an additional column to the observation matrix such that the 
first time column contains ones in row corresponding to GPS satellites and zeros in Galileo 
rows and vice versa for the second time column. 
 
 
𝐻 =
 
 
 
 
 
 
⋮
cos 𝐸𝑖 cos 𝐴𝑖 
⋮
cos 𝐸𝑖 sin 𝐴𝑖 
⋮ ⋮
⋮
sin 𝐸𝑖 
1 0
⋮ ⋮
⋮ 1 0
⋮ ⋮ 
cos 𝐸𝑗  cos 𝐴𝑗  
⋮
cos 𝐸𝑗  sin 𝐴𝑗  
⋮
⋮ 0 1
sin 𝐸𝑗  
⋮
⋮ ⋮
0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5-1) 
 
This fifth unknown variable is thus taken into account in the navigation solution computation. 
Indeed, the following user position vector has to be estimated: 
 
 𝑋 𝑘 =   𝑥 𝑘   𝑦 𝑘   𝑧 𝑘   𝑏𝐺𝑃𝑆 𝑘   𝑏Galileo  𝑘    (5-2) 
where  
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𝑥 𝑘 , 𝑦 𝑘 , 𝑧 𝑘  are the three user coordinates in the WGS84 reference frame  
𝑏𝐺𝑃𝑆 𝑘  is the time offset between the GNSS receiver clock and GPS system time 
𝑏Galileo  𝑘  is the time offset between the GNSS receiver clock and Galileo system time 
 
This fifth unknown variable is also taken into account in some RAIM equations by means of 
the observation matrix and more particularly for the LSR RAIM, by considering that the sum 
of the squares of the pseudorange residuals is chi-squared distributed with N-5 degrees of 
freedom, instead of N-4. 
 
5-5 Probability of false alert 
 
5-5-1 Requirements analysis 
 
Concerning Non Precision Approaches, DO 229C [RTCA, 2001] states a Maximum 
Allowable False Alert rate for En-route to NPA of 10−5per hour. It is said that assuming a 
correlation time of 120 seconds, leads to a Maximum Allowable False Alert rate of 3.33 ×
10−7per test. This value of 3.33 × 10−7per test is straightly given in DO229D [RTCA, 2006] 
without explanation. 
 
Concerning Approaches with Vertical Guidance, DO 229C states a Maximum Allowable 
False Alert rate for APV of 2 × 10−5per approach, one approach duration being 150 s. It is 
said that assuming a correlation time of 75 seconds leads to a Max Allowable False Alert rate 
of 10−5per test. DO229D now gives 1.6 × 10−5per test without explanation. It can be seen 
that this last value corresponds to an assumed correlation time of two minutes.  
 
In fact, a correlation time of two minutes allows to consider two minutes independent sample 
intervals and to realize 30 independent tests within the time of one hour or 1.25 independent 
tests within the time of 150 s. Under this assumption, the NPA requirement of 10−5per hour 
becomes 3.33 × 10−7per test (30 independent tests per hour and global false alarm allocation 
divided by 30 for each test). 
 
In fact, the correlation time is a major issue here. In the past, for GPS, Selective Availability 
SA was the most likely cause of false alerts and its effects were assumed to have a correlation 
time of two minutes. Without SA, in single frequency operations, the ionosphere has become 
the largest error source. But as we assume dual frequency operation in an ionosphere free 
combination, the residual ionospheric error will be zero in our study. 
 
According to [Van Dyke, 2000], two correlation time values can be considered.  
 
First, it can be considered that an ionospheric error large enough to cause an alert should be 
considered as a true alert. Under this assumption, the ionosphere contribution to the 
correlation time is not considered anymore for false alarm discussion and the correlation time 
is then driven by the receiver noise. The smoothing time constant of the receiver noise is 
assumed to be of the order of two minutes. 
 
The second philosophy is that the correlation time is approximately one hour, based on the 
average length of time satellites are visible to the user [Kovach et al, 1995]. This would lead 
to consider only one independent sample per hour. For example for NPA operations, it would 
allow to set RAIM decision threshold based on a false alert probability of 10−5per sample 
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rather than the false alert probability of 10−5/(30 samples per hour)/hour, that is to say 
3.33 × 10−7 per sample. This would improve RAIM availability but this proposition has not 
been adopted by RTCA SC 159. 
 
5-5-2 Conclusion 
 
For this study, a correlation time of two minutes will be considered. As it is the maximum 
allowable false alert rate per sample that constitutes an input for RAIM algorithms threshold 
computation, the following values will be used: 
 
 
Operations 
 
Maximum Allowable False 
Alert rate 
Maximum Allowable False 
Alert rate (per sample) 
En-route to 
Non precision approach 
 
10−5per hour 
 
[RTCA, 2001] 
 
3.33 × 10−7 per test 
 
[RTCA, 2001], [RTCA, 2006] 
Approach with Vertical Guidance 
 
2 × 10−5per approach 
 
[RTCA, 2001] 
 
1.6 × 10−5per test 
 
[RTCA, 2006] 
LPV 200 
 
2 × 10−5per approach 
 
1.6 × 10−5per test 
 
 
Table 11 - Maximum allowable false alert rate 
For simplification reasons, it has been decided to adopt the same false alert probability model 
for LPV200 and APV simulation. It can be mentioned that [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007] 
suggested to derive this requirement from the ICAO continuity risk requirement, setting the 
allowable false alert probability per sample to 4 × 10−6. 
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5-6 Probability of missed detection 
 
As recalled in section 2-5-2, a missed detection is defined to occur when a positioning failure 
is not detected. Positioning failures that are not annunciated as an alert within the time to alert 
are defined to be missed alert; they can be due to missed detection or to wrong exclusion 
[RTCA, 2006]. Missed alert and missed detection events will be merged for the rest of the 
study. 
 
As the probability of false alarm, the targeted probability of missed detection constitutes a 
major input of RAIM algorithm. This parameter derives from the integrity risk but also 
depends on the probability of satellite failure. Thus it refers to the threat model and 
particularly needs to be detailed. 
 
5-6-1 Existing results 
 
Some requirements are given for En-route, terminal and LNAV operations in [RTCA, 2006]. 
It is specified that the probability of missed alert shall be less than or equal to 0.001 for every 
geometry and every navigation mode, regardless of which satellite is causing the positioning 
failure. If this requirement is not met for a given geometry, the detection function is defined to 
be unavailable for that geometry. 
 
This requirement comes from the corresponding integrity risk and the probability of satellite 
failure. Indeed, for these phases of flight the required integrity risk is 1 × 10−7/h (see section 
2-4-1) and the only feared events used to be the major service failure (see section 3-3-1-1) 
because of the wide acceptance regions. 
 
According to the GPS signal specification [GPS SPS, 2001], 3 major failures are allowed per 
year and per constellation approximately which corresponds for a constellation of 24 satellites 
to an individual major satellite failure such as: 
 
 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5/𝑕 (5-4) 
 
Let‟s us denote 𝑝 the individual major satellite failure probability and N the number of 
satellite in view from the user, then the probability of having k simultaneous failures among N 
satellites in view is: 
 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,N,k = 𝐶𝑁
𝑘𝑝𝑘 1 − 𝑝 𝑁−𝑘  (5-3) 
 
If an average of 8 GPS satellites are in view, the global probability of having a major satellite 
failure is: 
 𝑃major  satellite  failure = 8𝑝 1 − 𝑝 
7 ≅ 1.14 × 10−4/𝑕 (5-5) 
 
Usually, this probability is approximated by: 
 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ≅ 10
−4/𝑕 
 
And the probability of missed detection is the result of: 
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𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑃major  satellite  failure
=
10−7/𝑕
10−4/𝑕
= 10−3 (5-6) 
 
This result is only valid for En-route to NPA operations, only assuming single satellite failure 
from major service failure category and only considering GPS constellation. 
 
[RTCA, 2006] states that there is not missed alert probability requirement for APV 
operations. 
 
5-6-2 Dual constellation consideration 
 
5-6-2-1 Smallest single bias that leads to a positioning failure 
 
To correctly address this issue, it is first necessary to know the minimal amplitude of a single 
pseudorange failure that leads to an unacceptable positioning error for the intended operation 
and thus the minimal bias amplitude that needs to be detected by RAIM algorithms. 
 
The computation of the critical bias is presented in section 4-1-3 and is detailed in appendix 
A. It does not depend on any detection algorithm. But the amplitude of the smallest dangerous 
single bias on a pseudorange will depend on the failure probability of occurrence. Indeed, the 
lower a failure occurrence rate is, the higher its amplitude can be. 
 
The two following figures represent the average and minimal values of smallest biases that 
lead to a positioning failure for APVI and LPV 200 requirements. The objective of this 
preliminary study is to evaluate the amplitude of every critical bias as a function of their 
occurrence rate. 
 
These values have been computed for different satellite failure probabilities of occurrence and 
are represented as a function of the integrity risk-probability of satellite failure occurrence 
ratio. A 24-satellite GPS constellation and a 27-satellite Galileo constellation have been 
considered over a 3 days period. The user grid described in section 5.1 has been used. The 
nominal error has been generated using the smoothed iono free UERE described in section 
3.2.1 with an URA of 0.85 m. 
 
We compute for each pseudorange the smallest bias that leads to a horizontal positioning 
failure and the smallest bias that leads to a vertical positioning failure. For each pseudorange, 
the minimum of these two biases is the smallest bias that leads to a positioning failure. In 
most of the cases, this smallest bias leads to a vertical positioning failure. 
 
It can be seen that in both cases (APVI and LPV 200 operations) and for a large scale of 
probability of occurrence, the amplitude of smallest critical biases belongs to the major 
service failure category. As defined in 3-3-1-1, a major service failure refers to a situation 
during which a healthy GPS satellite‟s ranging signal error exceeds the larger of 30 m and 
4.42 times the URA. 
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Figure 31 - Smallest bias that leads to a positioning failure - APVI operations – dual 
constellation (GPS + Galileo) 
 
Figure 32 - Smallest bias that leads to a positioning failure - LPV200 operations – dual 
constellation (GPS + Galileo) 
 
It can be noticed that there is very minimal sensitivity of the smallest bias to the probability of 
occurrence. An explanation of this phenomenon can be given. 
 
The method consists in projecting biases on a pseudorange in the position domain. For 
simplification reasons, we can focus on the vertical case. The smallest bias that will lead to a 
vertical positioning is such as: 
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 1 − 𝑃𝑓 𝑃0  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡  
 
This expression can be simplified because positioning failure due to fault free condition are 
very rare: 𝑃0  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋 𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 ≅ 0 
 
Therefore the smallest bias 𝑏𝑖  on the pseudorange i that will lead to a vertical positioning is 
such as:  
𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 =
𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑓
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 - Positioning failure 
 
It can be seen that there is a factor 10
4 
between the orange and the blue distributions but only 
3 meters between their mean that represents only 10% of the global error. There is not much 
difference between the mean of the distribution that lead to 𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 = 10
−5 
and the one that leads to 𝑃𝑏𝑖  𝑋𝑉 − 𝑋
 
𝑉 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 = 10
−1  
 
Therefore, there is not much difference between the biases that lead to these two distributions 
only 3 meters in the position domain and 10 - 15 meters in the range domain. This is due to 
the small UERE standard deviation compared to the alert limit. 
 
5-6-2-2 Associated probability of missed detection computation 
 
Thus, for single failure study, only Major Service Failure events are considered as failures 
that have to be detected by RAIM. Although they could participate to misleading information, 
faulty measurements due to local effects such as CW interference or ionosphere disturbance 
are not taken into account in required Pmd computation as their rate of occurrence cannot be 
quantified. This assumption leads to the following process. 
 
Let‟s us denote 𝑝 the individual major satellite failure probability and N the number of 
satellite in view, then the probability of having k simultaneous failures among N satellites is: 
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 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,N,k = 𝐶𝑁
𝑘𝑝𝑘 1 − 𝑝 𝑁−𝑘  (5-7) 
 
As previously detailed, for GPS current constellation, three major failures per year lead to 
 
 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5/𝑕 (5-8) 
 
It is assumed that a future GPS or Galileo satellite will have the same probability of failure 
than a current GPS satellite, even if better performance could be expected from GPS III 
constellation. 
 
For a dual constellation, if 17 satellites are in view, the probability of one satellite failure 
becomes: 
 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,17,1 = 2.43 × 10
−4/𝑕 (5-9) 
 
Only considering the single failure case, the probability of missed detection 𝑃𝑚𝑑  shall be 
lower than the integrity risk requirement divided by the probability of failure of one satellite 
among the all satellites in view.  
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,N,1
 (5-10) 
 
Thus, for En-route to Non precision approach, considering only major service failure such as 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,17,1 = 2.43 × 10
−4/𝑕 , the obtained probability of missed detection is: 
 
 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 4.13 × 10
−4 (5-11) 
 
As the integrity risk is specified for an approach duration for APV and LPV operation, one 
method to obtain the probability of one satellite failure per approach could have been to 
divide the hourly rate by 24 (as 24 × 150 = 3600 ).  
 
But in the determination of the probability of encountering a major failure, the outage 
duration time is a major parameter.  
 
The GPS specified time to remove the faulty satellite when a major service failure has 
occurred is 6 hours and actual performance is typically one hour. 
 
[Lee and McLaughlin, 2007] suggested that a failure duration can be of 45 minutes, even if 
shorter delays can be expected from GPS III and Galileo system. [Walter, 2008] indicate that 
the GPS III specification is still 6 hours and that it may be lowered but likely not below 1 
hour. 
 
A failure duration of one hour can lead to convert this integrity failure rate for one satellite 
𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5 per hour in 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5  per approach for example. As if an approach 
duration was artificially set to one hour, because a failure that had occurred one hour before 
could still have an impact. 
 
For this study, it will be considered that a failure duration is one hour which leads to convert 
this integrity failure rate for one satellite 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5/𝑕  in 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5  per 
approach and thus: 
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 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,17,1 = 2.43 × 10
−4/approach (5-12) 
 
For APV operations, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2 × 10
−7 per approach: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
2 × 10−7
2.43 × 10−4
= 8.23 × 10−4 (5-13) 
 
If it is finally decided to set the LPV 200 integrity risk requirement to 1 × 10−7 per approach, 
the corresponding probability of missed detection will be: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1 × 10−7
2.43 × 10−4
= 4.12 × 10−4 (5-14) 
 
5-6-2-3 Multiple failures consideration 
 
This situation cannot be considered in the same way. Single failure assumption allowed us to 
compute for every pseudo range the smallest additional bias that will lead the global solution 
estimation to be outside the required containment region. 
 
It is still possible for multiple failures case to add simultaneously several biases on different 
pseudorange and observe the consequence on the position error. But even in the dual failure 
case, it is not possible to determine for a given pseudorange couple, the two most critical 
associated biases. It is thus quite difficult to fully address this problem. 
 
Fortunately, multiple failures are very rare. For instance GEA has adopted a rate of common 
mode faults causing multiple satellite integrity failures equal to 1.3 × 10−8/approaches and a 
rate of two or more independent faults of about 0.45 × 10−8/approaches, representing a total 
of 1.75 × 10−8/approaches for multiple faults [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007] 
 
It is thus possible not to try to detect these multiple failures and therefore to set the probability 
of detecting an integrity failure cause by multiple faults to zero (corresponding 𝑃𝑚𝑑  equal to 
one) such as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃 satellite  failure ,N,1 × 𝑃𝑚𝑑 + 𝑃 multiple  satellite  failures ,N  (5-15) 
 
Therefore, the multiple failure case is derived from the single failure case by allocating a 
smaller integrity risk. 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑃 multiple  satellite  failures ,N
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,N,1
 (5-16) 
 
The probability of occurrence of multiple faults can be decomposed as: 
 
- the common mode fault probability of occurrence assumed to be equal to 1.3 ×
10−8/approaches 
 
- the probability of occurrence of two or more independent faults.  
 
If 17 satellites are in view, with  𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5  per approach, we have for the more 
independent faults: 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,17,2 = 𝐶17
2 𝑝2 1 − 𝑝 15  = 2.78 × 10−8 per approach 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,17,3 = 𝐶17
3 𝑝3 1 − 𝑝 14  = 1.99 × 10−12 per approach which is negligible 
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Therefore, the probability of occurrence of multiple faults will be set as: 
𝑃 multiple  satellite  failures ,17 = 4.08 × 10
−8 per approach 
 
For APV operations, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2 × 10
−7 per approach: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1.59 × 10−7
2.43 × 10−4
= 6.56 × 10−4 (5-17) 
 
For LPV 200, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1 × 10
−7 per approach, the corresponding probability of missed 
detection will be: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
0.59 × 10−7
2.43 × 10−4
= 2.43 × 10−4 (5-18) 
 
5-6-2-4 Conclusion 
 
Dual constellation APV LPV 200 
Single failure case 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 8.23 × 10
−4
 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 4.12 × 10
−4 
Multiple failures case 
(single failure detection) 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 6.56 × 10
−4
 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 2.43 × 10
−4
 
 
Table 12 - Required probabilities of missed detection 
 
5-6-3 Single constellation consideration 
 
The same computation has to be done when only constellation (GPS or Galileo) is considered. 
Indeed, the reduction in the number of available measurement can increase the impact a of 
single satellite bias on the global positioning error. If smallest biases that lead to a positioning 
failure do not systematically belong to the major service failure, other failure occurrence rate 
have to be considered in the required probability of missed detection computation. 
 
5-6-3-1 Smallest single bias that leads to a positioning failure 
 
Considering only one constellation (GPS or Galileo), the average amplitude of the smallest 
single critical bias falls to approximately 70 meters. For some unfavorable satellites - user 
geometries, a bias with an amplitude of 10 meters on the worst satellite pseudorange 
measurement can lead to a positioning failure for LPV200 operations. This is represented on 
the following figure. 
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Figure 34 - Smallest bias that leads to a positioning failure - LPV200 operations - single 
constellation (GPS) 
Nevertheless, this amplitude does exceed 4.42 times the expected URA, which is assumed to 
equal to 0.85 m in this study. 
 
If one critical satellite was out, this amplitude might become much smaller (down to 5 
meters). 
 
5-6-3-2 Associated probability of missed detection computation 
 
We can therefore consider that a 10 meter failure belongs to the major service failure 
category. Therefore, for single constellation RAIM performance evaluation, only Major 
Service Failure events are considered as failures that have to be detected, as it has been done 
for dual constellation. 
 
For a single constellation, if 8 satellites are in view, the probability of one satellite failure uses 
to be: 
 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,1 = 10
−4/𝑕 (5-19) 
 
But as previously detailed in section 5-6-1, the assumption of 3 major service leads to 
consider 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5/𝑕 as an individual satellite failure rate and we get: 
 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,1 = 1.14 × 10
−4/𝑕 
 
As it has been previously detailed for dual constellation consideration, considering that a 
failure duration can be one hour, we get 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5/approach and: 
 
 𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,1 = 1.14 × 10
−4/approach (5-20) 
 
Only considering the single failure case, the probability of missed detection is given by: 
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𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,1
 (5-10) 
 
For APV operations, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2 × 10
−7 per approach: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
2 × 10−7
1.14 × 10−4
= 1.70 × 10−3 (5-13) 
 
If it is finally decided to set the LPV 200 integrity risk requirement to 1 × 10−7 per approach, 
the corresponding probability of missed detection will be: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1 × 10−7
1.14 × 10−4
= 8.74 × 10−4 (5-14) 
 
5-6-3-3 Multiple failures consideration 
 
The probability of occurrence of multiple faults can be decomposed as: 
 
- the common mode fault probability of occurrence assumed to be equal to 1.3 ×
10−8/approaches 
 
- the probability of occurrence of two or more independent faults. If 8 satellites are in 
view with  𝑝 ≅ 1.43 × 10−5  per approach: 
 
𝑃major  satell ite  failure ,8,2 = 𝐶8
2𝑝2 1 − 𝑝 6  = 5.72 × 10−9 per approach 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,3 = 𝐶8
3𝑝3 1 − 𝑝 5  = 1.64 × 10−13   per approach which is negligible 
 
Therefore assuming that 8 satellites are in view, the probability of occurrence of multiple 
faults will be set as 1.9 × 10−8 per approach 
 
As for dual constellation, the multiple failure case is derived from the single failure case by 
allocating a smaller integrity risk. 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑃 multiple  satellite  failures ,N
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,N,1
 (5-16) 
 
For APV operations, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2 × 10
−7 per approach: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1.81 × 10−7
1.14 × 10−4
= 1.60 × 10−3 (5-21) 
 
For LPV 200, if 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1 × 10
−7 per approach, the corresponding probability of missed 
detection will be: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
0.81 × 10−7
1.14 × 10−4
= 7.10 × 10−4 (5-22) 
 
Or we could consider that this type of fault does not really belong to major service failure 
category. But, as it has been seen in section 3-3-1-2, the rate of occurrence of small satellite 
failure is more difficult to evaluate. For example, the failure rate of a step error larger than 3.6 
meters could be taken into account. It is assumed to be less than 10−4 per hour per satellite in 
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GPS integrity related assumptions listed in [Van Dyke et al., 2003]. This consideration would 
allow us to be more conservative. 
 
The same process could be then conducted leading to an individual satellite failure rate of 
10−4  per approach instead of the rate of 1.43 × 10−5  per approach previously used.  
 
Then, the probability of occurrence of multiple faults could be decomposed as: 
 
- the common mode fault probability of occurrence assumed to be equal to 1.3 ×
10−8/approaches 
 
- the probability of occurrence of two or more independent faults. If 8 satellites are in 
view with  𝑝 ≅ 1 × 10−4  per approach: 
 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,2 = 𝐶8
2𝑝2 1 − 𝑝 6  = 2.80 × 10−7 per approach 
𝑃major  satellite  failure ,8,3 = 𝐶8
3𝑝3 1 − 𝑝 5  = 5.60 × 10−11  per approach which is negligible 
 
Therefore assuming that 8 satellites are in view, the probability of occurrence of multiple 
faults will be set to 2.93 × 10−7 per approach.  
 
This probability of occurrence is larger than APV integrity risk requirement. Under this 
assumption, the multiple failure missed detection probability cannot be set to 1 anymore (as it 
has been done in section 5-6-2-3). Indeed, multiple failures are not rare enough and it is not 
possible anymore to choose to not detect them. 
 
5-6-3-4 Conclusion 
 
For this study, it will be considered that the probability of dangerous failure is 𝑝 ≅ 1.43 ×
10−5/𝑕 (major service failure category) even when only on constellation is considered (GPS 
or Galileo). Indeed, every bias that leads to a positioning failure exceeds 4.42 times the URA. 
The same assumption is made in [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007] where only future GPS 
constellation is considered. 
 
Single constellation 
(8 satellites in view) 
APV LPV 200 
Single failure case 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 1.7 × 10
−3 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 8.74 × 10
−4
 
Multiple failures case 
(single failure detection) 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 1.60 × 10
−3 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 7.10 × 10
−4 
 
Table 13 - Required probabilities of missed detection 
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5-7 Fault detection, identification and exclusion availability 
 
As mentioned in section 2-5, fault detection and exclusion consists of two distinct parts:  
 
- The fault detection part detects the presence of an unacceptably large position for a 
given mode of flight. 
- Upon the detection, the fault exclusion follows and excludes the source of the 
unacceptably large position error, thereby allowing navigation to return to normal 
performance without an interruption of service. 
 
Integrity monitoring algorithms generally involve these two functions. Their definitions are 
further used in chapter 6 where simulations results are presented. 
 
5-7-1 Fault detection 
 
The detection function is defined to be available when the constellation of satellites provides a 
geometry for which the missed alert and false alert requirement can be met on all satellites 
being used for the applicable alert limit and time to alert. When the constellation is inadequate 
to meet these requirements, the fault detection is defined to be unavailable [RTCA, 2006]. 
 
[RTCA, 2006] defines the availability of detection for a specific location, time, constellation 
and horizontal alert limit as: 
 
Detection Availability 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation, 𝐻𝐴𝐿 =  𝐷 𝑖 
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (5-23) 
 
where  N is the number of satellite being used by the equipment 
𝐷 𝑖 = 1 if Pr(detection given error in ith satellite causing positioning error equal to 
HAL) ≥ the detection requirement and Pr(false alert) ≤ false alert requirement  
𝐷 𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
 
This definition can be extended to approaches with vertical guidance operations such as: 
 
 
Detection Availability 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation, 𝐻𝐴𝐿, 𝑉𝐴𝐿 =  𝐷 𝑖 
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (5-24) 
 
where  N is the number of satellite being used by the equipment 
𝐷 𝑖 = 1 if Pr(detection given error in 𝑖𝑡𝑕  satellite causing an horizontal positioning 
error equal to HAL or a vertical positioning error equal to VAL) ≥ the detection requirement 
and Pr(false alert) ≤ false alert requirement  
𝐷 𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
 
In practice, for a given phase of flight the availability of the FD functions is determined by 
comparing the computed protection levels with the corresponding alert limit requirement such 
as: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿  and 𝑉𝑃𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation ≤ 𝑉𝐴𝐿: available (5-25) 
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 𝐻𝑃𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  or 𝑉𝑃𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation > 𝑉𝐴𝐿: unavailable (5-26) 
 
LSR and MSS fault detection availability are computed this way. It is not the case of the GLR 
RAIM where the predicted probability of missed detection is computed to obtain the 
algorithm availability. 
 
 
 
Figure 35 - Fault Detection function availability illustration for phases of flight with 
vertical guidance [Escher, 2003] 
 
5-7-2 Fault exclusion 
 
Similarly the exclusion function is defined to be available when the constellation of satellites 
provides a geometry for which the FDE algorithm can meet the failed exclusion requirement 
and prevent the indication of a positioning failure or a loss of integrity monitoring function. 
 
As for the detection function, the horizontal and vertical exclusion level may be computed in 
order to check the exclusion function availability. These levels serve as decision levels for the 
whole fault and exclusion algorithm availability. 
 
The Horizontal Exclusion Level (HEL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plan, with its 
center being at the true position, that describes the horizontal region where the missed alert 
and failed exclusion requirement are met for the chosen set of satellites when autonomous 
fault detection and exclusion is used.  
 
The Vertical Exclusion Level (VEL) can be defined as the half the length of a segment on the 
vertical axis with its center being at the true position, that describes the region where the 
missed alert and failed exclusion requirement are met for the chosen set of satellites when 
autonomous fault detection and exclusion is used. 
 
Availability of the FDE functions can be determined by comparing the computed exclusion 
levels with the corresponding alert limit requirement such as: 
 
 𝐻𝐸𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿  and 𝑉𝐸𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation ≤ 𝑉𝐴𝐿: available (5-27) 
 
 𝐻𝐸𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation > 𝐻𝐴𝐿  or 𝑉𝐸𝐿 𝑋, 𝑡, constellation > 𝑉𝐴𝐿: unavailable (5-28) 
 
In this study, LSR RAIM exclusion function availability will be obtained by computing 
detection function availability assuming one satellite has failed.  
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The failed satellite is chosen to have the largest effect on availability. Our criterion to choose 
the most important satellite (the one with the best geometry) is the vertical slope: 
 
 
Failed satellite = arg min
𝑖
 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗  = arg min
𝑖
 
𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
  (5-29) 
 
where  𝐵 = 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
 𝐴 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 =
 
 
 
 
 
…
…
𝐴𝑁,𝑗
𝐴𝐸,𝑗
…
…
⋯ 𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗 …
⋯ 𝐴𝑇 ,𝑗 … 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
5-7-3 Fault identification 
 
A Fault Detection and Identification function is implemented for the GLR RAIM.  
 
Indeed this test does not only raise an alert when a failure has been detected: the faulty 
measurement is also identified within the same operation. In fact, FDI function availability is 
evaluated through the predicted Pmd computation. 
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Chapître 6 
 
Analyse des performances RAIM  
 
 
L‟objectif de ce chapître est de présenter les résultats de simulations qui ont été conduits afin 
d‟évaluer la capacité des algorithmes RAIM à fournir le contrôle d‟integrité pour les 
approches à guidage vertical.  
 
La section 6-1 présente les resultats d‟études preliminaires. Ainsi la section 6.1.1 constitue 
une illustration du comportement des differents tests étudiés face à diverses amplitudes 
d‟erreurs. L‟effet des interferences sur les mesures de pseudodistance est étudié dans la 
section 6.1.2.  
 
Les performances de l‟algorithme des moindres carrés sont adressées dans la section 6.2. Les 
résultats présentés concernent les approches à guidage vertical de type APV I et LPV200 et 
considère la constellation GPS seule, la constellation Galileo seule puis les deux 
constellations. 
 
La section 6.3 traite des performances de la méthode de séparation des solutions alors que la 
section 6.4 adresse celles de l‟algorithme RAIM basée sur le test du rapport de vraisemblance 
généralisé. 
 
La section 6.5 constitue une synthèse de ces résultats. Toutes les hypothèses de simulations y 
sont rappelées et les performances de chacun des algorithmes étudiés y sont rassemblées sous 
forme de tableau. 
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Chapter 6 
 
RAIM Performance Analysis 
 
6-1 Preliminary studies 
6-2 LSR RAIM Performance 
6-3 MSS RAIM Performance 
6-4 GLR RAIM Performance 
6-5 Synthesis 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present results of the simulations that have been conducted 
to evaluate RAIM ability to provide integrity monitoring for vertically guided approaches. 
Some preliminary studies are first presented in order to illustrate the different implemented 
tests reactions to several amplitudes of error and also to address the interferences issue. 
 
This evaluation consists in predicting RAIM algorithm performance and to compare it to the 
corresponding requirements that is to say in predicting protection levels compared to alert 
limit or in predicting the probability of missed detection of critical failures. This is performed 
without injecting any failure. This chapter also includes limited tests to illustrate the detection 
capability. 
 
6-1 Preliminary studies 
 
6-1-1 Tests performance illustration 
 
Three classes of RAIM test have been presented in chapter 4: the Least Square Residual, the 
Maximum Solution Separation and the Generalized Likelihood Ratio methods. It has been 
seen that their detection thresholds are designed to cope with the required false alert rate. To 
set them, criteria statistics is considered under fault free case assumption. 
 
An issue would be: do RAIM algorithms have to detect biases that are above the assumed 
level of noise but that do not lead to a positioning failure? Indeed, as detailed in section 5-6-2-
1, average critical biases that lead to a positioning failure are around 150 meters for LPV 200 
and 180 meters for APV1. Section 3-2-2 proposes to include in the pseudorange measurement 
fault free case model some nominal biases with an amplitude of up to 2 meters. Thus, a large 
gap remains between nominal biases and dangerous biases. 
 
For instance, if a RAIM algorithm detects a bias on a given pseudorange that corresponds to 
50 % of the smallest critical bias: 
 
- it is not a false alarm from classical RAIM design point of view since this failure 
really departs from the assumed level of noise 
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- it could be considered as a false alarm since this bias does not correspond to a 
positioning failure 
- this bias reflects a satellite bad health , it may be a good thing to detect it before it may 
become really dangerous 
 
On that subject, it may be interesting to detect a ramp failure that would become dangerous in 
a few seconds as suggested in section 4-4-4. 
 
The question of detecting errors that do not lead to a positioning failure remains open. 
Nevertheless, it could be interesting to evaluate the reactions of the different algorithms that 
have been studied in this thesis. 
 
Simulations presented in this section 6-1-1 have been conducted for a given user position, at a 
given moment. The objective of these simulations is only to provide an illustration of the 
different implemented tests reactions to several amplitudes of error and the number of 
selected cases is not sufficient to draw conclusions relative to civil aviation requirements.  
 
A bias with various possible amplitudes has been injected on the worst pseudorange. In fact, 
the smallest additional single bias on this pseudorange that leads to a positioning failure has 
been computed for LPV 200 requirement (see section 4-1-3) and the injected biases amplitude 
is expressed as a percentage of this critical bias amplitude. Thus, pseudorange error 
measurement has been modeled as some noise plus a bias on this worst pseudorange l such as: 
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where 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖
2   
 𝜍1
2, … , 𝜍𝑁
2  are nominal error variances corresponding to UERE computation described 
in section 3-2-1 (𝑈𝑅𝐴 = 0.85 𝑚) 
 𝛼 =  0, 0.1, 0.5, 1  
 𝑏𝑙  smallest additional single bias on pseudorange 𝑙 that leads to a positioning failure 
 
Figure 36 shows the impact of these biases on the positioning error for 1000 noise 
realizations.  
 
It can be seen that in the case 𝛼 = 1 (in black) the chosen satellite primarily affects the 
vertical position error and not the horizontal. It can also be noticed that in this case, 1 in 1000 
position fixes is above the VAL which approximately corresponds to the ratio 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃 satellite  failure . This illustration confirms that this amplitude of bias on this pseudorange 
would lead to a positioning failure with a probability equal to the integrity risk. 
 
The following figure also illustrates that a bias on the chosen pseudorange that corresponds to 
the half of the smallest critical bias could lead to non negligible error in the positioning 
domain (in green). 
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Figure 36 - Positioning error when injecting a bias with various possible amplitudes on 
the worst satellite pseudorange measurement, 1000 noise realizations in each of the four 
cases 
Three RAIM algorithms‟ reactions to these errors are represented on the following figures: 
LSR ones (fig. 37), MSS ones (fig. 38) and snapshot constrained GLR ones (fig. 39). The 
objective of these figures is only to provide a rough illustration of what happens. They do not 
intend to be exhaustive. Concerning MSS RAIM method, only the vertical sub - test 
corresponding to the faulty pseudorange is represented. 
 
As illustrated on the following figures, for fault free case simulations, detection threshold is 
systematically above the criteria (in blue) for the three considered algorithms. 
 
Whereas, GLR and LSR tests seem to never detect the presence of the additional bias 0,1 × 𝐵 
(in red), the MSS vertical criteria corresponding to the faulty measurement detects this type of 
failure approximately half of the time. It shows the great sensitivity of the MSS test. 
 
As GLR test is explicitly designed to detect single pseudorange failure larger than 
corresponding critical bias, it systematically does not detect the presence of the additional bias 
0,1 × 𝐵 (in red) and most of the time, it does not detect additional bias 0,5 × 𝐵(in green). 
Thus, GLR test presents some interesting properties, since, strictly speaking, those failures are 
not dangerous. Moreover, this method also offers the possibility to take into account some 
nominal biases in its fault free case model. Thus it has great potential for protecting the user 
from false alarm situations. 
( m ) 
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Figure 37 - LSR test performance for LPV 200 requirements when injecting a bias with 
various possible amplitudes on the worst satellite pseudorange measurement (1000 noise 
realizations in each of the four cases) 
 
Figure 38 - MSS vertical sub - test performance for LPV 200 requirements when 
injecting a bias with various possible amplitudes on the worst satellite pseudorange 
measurement (1000 noise realizations in each of the four cases) 
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Figure 39 - GLR test performance for LPV 200 requirements when injecting a bias with 
various possible amplitudes on the worst satellite pseudorange measurement (1000 noise 
realizations in each of the four cases) 
 
6-1-2 Interference effects 
 
A complete model of pseudo range measurements that includes interference effects has been 
proposed in chapter 3. But as mentioned in chapter 5, faulty measurements due to local effects 
such as CW interference have a rate of occurrence that it is not clearly quantified. 
 
RAIM algorithms are usually designed to detect biases that are mainly due to satellite clock 
failure, not to detect pseudorange error variance jumps, which are the main effect of 
interference. Fortunately, an interference will not easily lead to an integrity failure. For 
instance, a CW interference centered in the GNSS frequency band will significantly increase 
the variance of only a few pseudorange measurement errors. But globally, the average 
pseudorange measurement error variance will not change a lot and the impact on the 
positioning error will be limited. 
 
This is illustrated on the following figures. For a given user position and for 1440 different 
satellites geometries, the error variance of each available pseudorange measurement have 
been computed assuming:  
 
- a nominal level of noise (𝑈𝑅𝐴 = 0.5 𝑚) as in section 3-2-1-6 
 
- a nominal level of noise plus a CW on the worst Galileo spectrum line(𝑓𝐽 = 839 𝑘𝐻𝑧) 
with a power of −156.5 𝑑𝐵𝑊 (corresponding to GPS interference mask), as in section 
3-3-2-2-2 
 
- a nominal level of noise plus a CW on the worst Galileo spectrum line with a power of 
−136.5 𝑑𝐵𝑊 (20 dB above this interference mask), as in section 3-3-2-2-2 
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PRN with a code tracking error envelope value superior to the loss of lock threshold (set to 40 
meters) have been removed from the computation. The maximum, minimum and mean values 
of the 1440 available sets of UERE standard deviation have been represented.  
 
Figure 40 - UERE standard deviation in presence of nominal noise only 
 
Figure 41 - UERE standard deviation in presence of nominal noise + a CW interference 
on the worst Galileo spectrum line, power -156.5 dBW 
It can be noticed that the presence of a CW within the interference mask has no significant 
impact on UERE standard deviation (figure 41) comparing to the reference simulation (figure 
40). This is due to the fact that worst case 𝐶 𝑁0  have been taken into account for the nominal 
noise computation (see section 3-2-1-1-2). 
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Figure 42 - UERE standard deviation in presence of nominal noise + a CW interference 
on the worst Galileo spectrum line, power -136.5 dBW 
Even for a powerful CW, the UERE standard deviation of the most affected pseudorange 
measurement does not exceed 5 meters (figure 42). The real issue for integrity monitoring is 
that, in presence of powerful interference, biases that lead to a positioning failure could be 
smaller and thus can be more difficult to detect. Therefore, RAIM performance to detect 
satellite failures could be degraded in presence of interference. Nevertheless, even if its rate of 
occurrence cannot be precisely quantified, this type of situation is very rare since it supposes 
simultaneous occurrence of an interference and a satellite failure. 
 
This is why in this study it is considered that interference is equivalent to an increased 
receiver noise. This effect has been systematically modelled in the fault free case as a drop of 
the equivalent 𝐶 𝑁0
  down to tracking threshold for all satellites. 
 
6-1-3 RAIM performance analysis simulation parameters 
 
RAIM performance evaluation has been conducted thanks to Matlab simulations. Major 
assumptions that have been made for this evaluation have been previously detailed in chapter 
5. Some simulations parameters will remain the same for all simulations that will be presented 
in this chapter. They are recalled in the following table: 
 
One major aspect is that RAIM algorithms availability has been evaluated only by predicting 
protection levels or by predicting critical biases probability of missed detection (we haven‟t 
try to detect any failure).  
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Performance evaluation 
User grid, user speed As in section 5-2 (2520 points), no velocity 
Period and frequency of the test As in section 5-2 
Specification interpretation: probability of false alarm, 
probability of missed detection 
As in sections 5-5 and 5-6 
Expected performance bounds APVI LPV200 
HAL/VAL 40 m/ 50 m 40 m/ 35 m 
Pmd As in section 5-6: multiple failure case 
Pfa 1.6 × 10−5 per sample 
Internal RAIM parameters: 
Mask angles 5 ° for GPS and 10° for Galileo 
Number of considered reference frames One WGS84 
Signals used L1/L5 for GPS 
E1/E5b for Galileo 
Standard deviation as a function of the elevation angle As in section 3-2-1-6  𝑈𝑅𝐴 = 0.85  𝑚  
Receiver smoothing time 100 seconds 
Threat model As in section 5-6-3 
 
Table 14 - Simulations parameters 
 
 
6-2 LSR RAIM Performance 
 
The Least Square Residual method in which the sum of the squares of the pseudorange 
residuals plays the role of the basic observable has been presented in section 4-2. 
 
The goal of this section is to evaluate LSR algorithm ability to provide integrity monitoring 
during approaches with vertical guidance operations. 
 
Performance evaluation 
Type of RAIM algorithm LSR 
Criterion used for availability computation  HPL and VPL 
HEL and VEL 
Type of implemented function: fault detection, fault 
detection and identification or fault detection and 
exclusion 
FD and FDE 
Expected performance bounds APV 1 LPV 200 
Internal RAIM parameters: 
Satellite Constellation GPS + Galileo, GPS, Galileo 
Number of unknowns for position solution estimation 4 and 5 
Consideration of nominal biases  No 
 
Table 15 - LSR simulations parameters 
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6-2-1 LSR RAIM performance evaluation considering dual constellation (GPS + 
Galileo) 
 
Both horizontal and vertical protection levels have been computed for our user grid 
considering GPS and Galileo constellation. For both APV1 and LPV 200 inputs, the obtained 
protection level values are very much lower than the corresponding alert limit.  
 
This leads to a LSR detection function availability of 100 % for each point of our user grid for 
both APV1 and LPV 200 operations.  
 
The same evaluation has been conducted for the corresponding exclusion function and the 
obtained exclusion level values are very much lower than the corresponding alert limit, 
leading to a LSR detection / exclusion function availability of 100% for each point of the user 
grid. 
 
As an illustration of great LSR RAIM performance, the average HPL, VPL, HEL and VEL 
values for each point of our user grid are represented on the following figures for LPV200 
operations. 
 
 
Figure 43 - LSR RAIM – LPV200 operations considering 24 sat GPS constellation + 27 
sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure): average HPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation 
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Figure 44 - LSR RAIM – LPV200 operations considering 24 sat GPS constellation + 27 
sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure): average VPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation  
 
 
Figure 45 - LSR RAIM – LPV200 operations considering 24 sat GPS constellation + 27 
sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure): average HEL (in meters) over 3 days simulation 
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Figure 46 - LSR RAIM – LPV200 operations considering 24 sat GPS constellation + 27 
sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure): average VEL (in meters) over 3 days simulation 
 
As it has been seen in chapter 3, RAIM performance improvement is due to two main factors: 
 
- augmentation in the number of measurement 
- reduction of the nominal pseudorange measurement error due to the use of iono-free 
measurements, an improved tracking accuracy, a better clock and ephemeris information. 
 
This is why it could be interesting to also evaluate RAIM ability to provide integrity 
monitoring in approaches with vertical guidance operations considering only one 
constellation. 
 
6-2-2 LSR RAIM performance evaluation considering only GPS constellation 
 
Results presented in this section are quite pessimistic since a 24-satellites constellation has 
been considered. 
 
Thus, both horizontal and vertical protection levels have been computed for each point of the 
user grid considering only GPS constellation and LSR RAIM detection function mean 
availability is represented on figure 47 for APV1 operations and on figure 48 for LPV200 
ones. 
Chapter n°6: RAIM Performance Analysis 
 
154 
 
 
Figure 47 - LSR RAIM – Detection function mean availability for APV1 operations over 
1 day simulation considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
 
Figure 48 - LSR RAIM – Detection function mean availability for LPV 200 operations 
over 1 day simulation considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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Figure 49 - LSR RAIM - Exclusion function mean availability for APV1 operations over 
1 day simulation considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
 
Figure 50 - ExclusionLPV200 operations over 1 day simulation considering 24 sat GPS 
constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting 
only single failure) 
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6-2-3 LSR RAIM performance evaluation considering only Galileo constellation  
 
The same study has been conducted only considering 27 satellite Galileo constellation. An 
availability of 100% has been obtained for APV 1 operation for each point of the user grid for 
LSR RAIM detection function. LSR RAIM detection function mean availability is 
represented on the following figure for LPV200 operation. 
 
 
Figure 51 - LSR RAIM – Detection function mean availability for LPV200 operations 
over 1 day simulation considering 27 sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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Figure 52 - LSR RAIM – Exclusion function mean availability for APV1 operations over 
1 day simulation considering 27 sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
 
Figure 53 - LSR RAIM – Exclusion function mean availability LPV200 operations over 
1 day simulation considering 27 sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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6-3 MSS RAIM Performance 
 
This Maximum Separation Solution technique is based on the observation of the separation 
between the position estimate generated by a full-set filter (using all the satellite 
measurements) and that generated by each one of the subset filters (each using all but one of 
the satellite measurements). 
 
As detailed in section 4-3, some protection levels computation improvements have been 
proposed for MSS RAIM. This is why performance is evaluated here computing two types of 
protections levels (classical ones and proposed ones). 
 
Performance evaluation 
Type of RAIM algorithm MSS 
Criterion used for availability computation  HPL and VPL 
Type of implemented function: fault detection, fault 
detection and identification or fault detection and 
exclusion 
FDI 
Expected performance bounds APV 1 LPV 200 
Internal RAIM parameters: 
Satellite Constellation GPS + Galileo, GPS, Galileo 
Number of unknowns for position solution 4 and 5 
Consideration of nominal biases. No 
 
Table 16 - MSS simulations parameters 
 
6-3-1 MSS RAIM performance evaluation considering dual constellation (GPS + 
Galileo) 
 
As it has been done for LSR RAIM, both horizontal and vertical MSS protection levels have 
been computed for the user grid considering GPS and Galileo constellation. For both APV1 
and LPV 200 inputs, the obtained protection values are very much lower than the 
corresponding alert limit. This leads to an availability of 100% for each point of our user grid 
for both APVI and LPV 200 operations. 
 
As an illustration the average HPL and VPL values for each point of the user grid are 
represented on the following figures for LPV200 operations. It can be seen that the proposed 
method to compute protection levels leads to smaller values, as expected. This indicates that 
our proposed method to compute protection levels would lead to better RAIM availabilities in 
more stringent situations. 
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Figure 54 - MSS RAIM – LPV200 operations considering 24 sat GPS const. + 27 sat 
Galileo const. and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting 
only single failure): average HPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation (class.method) 
 
 
Figure 55 - MSS RAIM - LPVI operations considering 24 sat GPS const. + 27 sat Galileo 
const. and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only 
single failure): average VPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation (class.method) 
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Figure 56 - MSS RAIM - APVI operations considering 24 sat GPS const. + 27 sat Galileo 
const. and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only 
single failure): average HPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation(prop.method) 
 
 
Figure 57 - MSS RAIM - APVI operations considering 24 sat GPS const. + 27 sat Galileo 
const. and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only 
single failure): average VPL (in meters) over 3 days simulation (prop.method) 
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6-3-2 MSS RAIM performance evaluation considering only GPS constellation 
 
As it has been done for LSR RAIM simulations, MSS performance has been also evaluated 
only considering 24 satellites GPS constellation.  
 
Obtained results show that MSS RAIM has globally a better availability than LSR RAIM. It is 
to be noticed that classical method and proposed one provide approximately the same 
availability for APVI operations. The proposed method to compute protection levels leads to 
better MSS RAIM availability for more stringent operations such as LPV200. 
 
 
Figure 58 - MSS RAIM - Mean availability for APV1 operations over 1 day simulation 
considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming 
multiple failures (detecting only single failure) (classical method) 
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Figure 59 - MSS RAIM - Mean availability for APV1 operations over 1 day simulation 
considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming 
multiple failures (detecting only single failure) (proposed method) 
 
Figure 60 - MSS RAIM - Mean availability for LPV200 operations over 1 day simulation 
considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming 
multiple failures (detecting only single failure) (classical method) 
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Figure 61 - MSS RAIM - Mean availability for LPV200 operations over 1 day simulation 
considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming 
multiple failures (detecting only single failure) (proposed method) 
 
6-3-3 MSS RAIM performance evaluation considering only Galileo constellation 
 
The same study has been conducted only considering 27 satellite Galileo constellation and an 
availability of 100% has been obtained for APV 1 and LPV 200 operations for each point of 
the user grid.  
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6-4 GLR RAIM Performance 
 
Previous studies have shown that the sequential constrained GLR based RAIM has no serious 
advantage over the snapshot one to detect stepwise fault [Nikiforov, 2005]. This is mainly due 
to the large pseudorange measurements correlation time. Moreover, sequential constrained 
GLR RAIM performance cannot be predicted easily. Monte Carlo simulations are necessary 
to evaluate the algorithm ability to detect dangerous biases and thus to protect the user. Future 
implementation problems are not solved for the moment. 
 
This is why only snapshot constrained GLR RAIM performance evaluation will be presented 
in this section. 
 
Performance evaluation 
Type of RAIM algorithm Snapshot constrained GLR 
Criterion used for availability computation  Predicted probability of missed detection 
Type of implemented function: fault detection, fault 
detection and identification or fault detection and 
exclusion 
FDI  
Expected performance bounds APV 1 LPV 200 
Internal RAIM parameters: 
Satellite Constellation GPS + Galileo, GPS, Galileo 
Number of unknowns for position solution 4 and 5 
Consideration of nominal biases No 
 
Table 17 - GLR simulations parameters 
 
6-4-1 Snapshot constrained GLR RAIM performance evaluation considering 
dual constellation (GPS + Galileo) 
 
Snapshot constrained GLR performance can‟t be evaluated the same way as LSR and MSS 
algorithms since protection levels computation has not been proposed. Nevertheless, the 
probability of missed detection can be predicted. 
 
Thus APV1 and LPV 200 simulations have been performed considering GPS and Galileo 
constellation showing an availability of 100% for each point of the user grid for both 
operations. Indeed the obtained probabilities of missed detection were very much lower than 
the required one for each point of the user grid. 
 
6-4-2 Snapshot constrained GLR RAIM performance evaluation considering 
GPS constellation only 
 
As it has been done for other RAIM algorithms, GLR performance has been also evaluated 
considering 24 satellites GPS constellation only. The obtained average availabilities for APV1 
and LPV 200 operations are represented on the following figures. 
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Figure 62 - GLR RAIM - Mean availability for APV1 operations over 1 day simulation 
considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming 
multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
 
Figure 63 - GLR RAIM - Mean availability for LPV200 operations over 1 day 
simulation considering 24 sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, 
assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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6-4-3 Snapshot constrained GLR RAIM performance evaluation considering 
Galileo constellation only 
 
The same study has been conducted only considering 27 satellite Galileo constellation. 
 
An availability of 100% has been obtained for APV 1 operations for each point of the user 
grid  
 
Mean availabilities obtained for LPV 200 operations are represented below. 
 
 
Figure 64 - GLR RAIM - Mean availability for LPV200 operations over 1 day 
simulation considering 27 sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, 
assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
6-5 Synthesis 
 
The objective of the first part of this chapter was to illustrate the performance of different 
RAIM algorithms when injecting a bias with various possible amplitudes. The great 
robustness of the GLR test toward errors that do not lead to a positioning failure is to be 
noticed.  
 
An illustration of the effect of CW interference on the accuracy of pseudorange measurement 
has also been given, and their effect on the performance of RAIM has been discussed. It has 
been seen that a CW interference centered in the GNSS frequency band has a limited impact 
on the positioning error. In fact, a single interference will not easily lead to an integrity 
failure. The real issue for integrity monitoring is that, in presence of powerful interference 
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(more than 20 dB above the mask), biases that lead to a positioning failure can be smaller and 
thus can be more difficult to detect. In this situation, which is very rare since it suppose 
simultaneous occurrence of a powerful interference and a satellite failure, RAIM performance 
to detect dangerous biases could be degraded. 
 
Then, numerous Matlab simulations have been conducted to evaluate RAIM ability to provide 
integrity monitoring during approaches with vertical guidance operations.  
 
Main assumptions that have been made for these evaluations are detailed and explained in 
chapter 5 and are listed below: 
 
- A user grid with a latitude step and a longitude step of 5° representing a total amount 
of 2520 positions has been considered (see section 5-1). 
 
- Values have been evaluated every 4 minutes over 3 days simulations for dual 
constellation simulations and every minute over 1 day simulation for single 
constellation simulations (see section 5-2). 
 
- A 10° mask angle has been used for Galileo satellites and a 5° mask angle has been 
used for GPS ones (see section 5-3-2). 
 
- A 24 satellites GPS constellation and a 27 Galileo satellite have been considered (see 
section 5-3-1). 
 
- Signals used were L1/L5 for GPS and E1/E5b for Galileo (see section 3-2-1). 
 
- Multiple failures have been into account by allocating a smaller integrity risk to the 
required probability of missed detection computation (see section 5-6). 
 
- Detection function availability has been obtained by comparing computed protection 
levels with alert limit requirement for LSR and MSS RAIM. For GLR algorithm, it has 
been obtained by comparing predicted probability of missed detection with required 
one (see 5-7-1). 
 
- Detection/Exclusion function availability have been obtained by computing detection 
function availability assuming that the most important satellite has failed (see section 
5-7-2) 
 
- Nominal biases have not been taken into account (see section 6-1-3) 
 
- For dual constellation simulations, four and five unknowns have been taken into 
account in the navigation solution and in RAIM equations (see section 5-4) 
 
Main simulation results obtained in this chapter are summarized in the following tables. 
 
4 unknowns LSR 
MSS 
GLR Proposed 
method 
Classical 
method 
APV I 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
LPV200  100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 18 - FD RAIM mean availability worldwide over 3 days simulations considering 
24 sat GPS + 27 sat Galileo constellations (4 unknowns) and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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5 unknowns LSR 
MSS 
GLR Proposed 
method 
Classical 
method 
APV I 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
LPV200  100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 19 - FD RAIM mean availability worldwide over 3 days simulations considering 
24 sat GPS + 27 sat Galileo constellations (5 unknowns) and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
 
 
LSR 
MSS 
GLR Proposed 
method 
Classical 
method 
APV I 96.67 % 99.44 % 99.22 % 99.21 % 
LPV200  87.87 % 97.05 % 95.53 % 94.75 % 
 
Table 20 - FD RAIM mean availability worldwide over 1 day simulations considering 24 
sat GPS constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure) 
 
 
LSR 
MSS 
GLR Proposed 
method 
Classical 
method 
APV I 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
LPV200  99.52 % 100 % 100 % 99.98 % 
 
Table 21 - FD RAIM mean availability worldwide over 1 day simulations considering 27 
sat Galileo constellation and dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure) 
 
 
Dual 
Constellation 
4 unknowns 
Dual 
Constellation 
5 unknowns 
24 sat GPS 
constellation 
27 sat Galileo 
constellation 
APV I 100 % 100 % 91.76 % 88.25 % 
LPV200  100 % 100 % 80.91 % 81.43 % 
 
Table 22 - LSR FDE RAIM mean availability worldwide over 3 days simulations 
considering 24 sat GPS + 27 sat Galileo constellations and dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure) 
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It can be seen that considering 5 unknowns instead of 4, in position estimation and in RAIM 
algorithm design, do not degrade dual constellation GPS/Galileo RAIM availability. This is 
due to the great number of available measurements. 
 
The main result is that considering both GPS and Galileo constellations, with dual frequency 
measurements, assuming multiple failures (detecting only single failure), the three studied 
RAIM techniques can provide integrity monitoring for both APV I and LPV200 (VAL=35m) 
operations. 
 
Single constellation performance is not as good as the one obtained for dual constellation, 
especially when only a 24-satellite constellation is considered. In particular, LSR failure 
detection/exclusion function mean availability seems to be not sufficient to consider 24-sat 
GPS + RAIM or 27-sat Galileo + RAIM as a sole means of navigation for approaches with 
vertical guidance operations. 
 
A 10 meter Vertical Alert Limit could be proposed for LPV200 operations. Considering such 
a stringent requirement, it would not be possible to only consider major service failure events 
in our threat model. Therefore, we cannot just compare the obtained LPV 200 VPL values 
with a 10 meter VAL to predict RAIM availability. Setting LPV200 VAL to 10 meters would 
cause more important change in RAIM design. This is why this study does not address 
LPV200 (VAL=10 m) RAIM performance evaluation. 
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Chapître 7 
 
Conclusions et travaux futurs 
 
 
Ce chapître présente les conclusions des études des chapitres précédents et suggére quelques 
perspectives pour de futures études. 
 
Un modèle complet de mesure de pseudodistance, incluant les effets des interferences et les 
pannes satellitaires a été proposé. Le calcul de la variance de l‟erreur de pseudo distance au 
niveau utilisateur a été développé et la contribution du bruit récepteur particulièrement 
détaillée. On a pu ainsi constater que l‟amélioration de la qualité des mesures (bi fréquences, 
signaux de positionnement améliorés…) a fait diminuer de manière significative la variance 
de l‟erreur de mesure au niveau utilisateur (UERE). Un écart type d‟environ 1 mètre a en effet 
été obtenu. Dans la mesure où l‟UERE est un paramètre préponderant en ce qui concerne la 
qualité du positionnement et les performances du controle d‟intégrité, une grande disponibilité 
pouvait être attendue pour les approches à guidage vertical. Le modèle avec panne a considéré 
les pannes satellitaires ainsi que les phénomenes d‟interference. En particulier, l‟effet des 
interférences large bande et CW a été étudié. 
 
Le concept de plus petit biais sur une mesure de pseudodistance conduisant à une erreur de 
position a été développé. Il est basé sur le fait que le contrôle d‟intégrité exige que le système 
de navigation détecte la présence d‟erreurdont la taille est inacceptable pour la phasede vol 
envisagée. Par conséquent, seules les fautes conduisant à une erreur de position (horizontale 
ou verticale) supérieure à la limite d‟alerte correspondant ont besoin d‟être détectée. 
 
Trois types d‟algorithme RAIM ont été étudiés dans cette thèse. La méthode des moindres 
carrés où la sommes des carrés des résidus des pseudodistances constitue le test statistique. La 
méthode de séparation des solutions basée sur la comparaison de l‟estimée de position 
obtenue en utilisant toutes les mesure satellitaires disponibles (filtre principal) et celles 
générées par chacun des sous filtres utilisant toute les mesures à l‟exception d‟une seule a été 
présentée et une nouvelle methode de calcul des niveaux de protection est proposée. Une 
nouvelle méthode basée sur le test du rapport de vraisemblance généralisée et plus 
particulièrement sur le test du rapport de vraisemblance généralisée contraint a été 
développée. Plusieurs de ses implémentations ont été présentées. Tout d‟abord une méthode 
snapshot ne prenant pas en compte les biais nominaux mais pour laquelle l‟expression 
analytique d‟un seuil satisfaisant le taux de fausse alerte requis et une prédiction de la 
probabilité de détection manquée sont proposées.Une implémentation prenant en compte les 
biais nominaux ainsi que deux implémentations séquentielles (dont une adaptation pour la 
détection de pannes de type échelon plus rampe) ont également été présentées. 
 
La manière dont les exigences aviation civile et le modèle d‟erreur sont interprétés afin de 
constituer les paramètres d‟entrée des algorithmes RAIM a été discutée. Une revue détaillée 
des hypothèses qui ont été faite afin d‟évaluer les performances des algorithmes RAIM a 
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également été effectuée. La manière dont les probabilités de fausse alarme et de detection 
manquée requises sont calculées a particulièrement été détaillée. 
 
Il a été montré que dans le cas d‟une panne unique en considérant les constellations GPS et 
Galileo l‟amplitude des biais sur les mesures de pseudodistance conduisant à une erreur de 
positionnement appartient systèmatiquement à la catégorie « major service failure » que ce 
soit pour l‟APV I ou LPV200. Ainsi même si les phasesde vol visées sont caractérisées par de 
plus petits niveaux d‟alerte (horizontaux ou verticaux) comparés aux approches de non 
précision, cet effet est compensé par le grand nombre de mesures de pseudodistance 
disponibles. Cela a pour effet de sérieusement diminuer l‟impact de la panne d‟un satellite sur 
l‟erreur globale de position. Ainsi seule les « major service failures » ont été prises en compte 
dans le cas d‟une panne unique. 
 
Le cas de pannes multiples a été également été traité dans cette thèse. Il a été décidé de tirer 
parti de la rareté de ces pannes multiples. Il est en effet possible de ne pas chercher à les 
détecter en fixant la probabilité de détecter une perte d‟intégrité due à une panne multiple à 
zero (𝑃𝑚𝑑  correspondante égale à un). Cela entraine des probabilités de détection manquée 
pour les pannes uniques plus faibles mais permet l‟utilisation des differents algorihtmes 
conçus pour la détection de pannes uniques. 
 
Les disponibilités des algorithmes RAIM basés sur les méthodes LSR, MSS et GLR ont été 
calculées pour les approches de type APVI et LPV200 en considérant les mesures GPS L1/L5 
et Galileo E1/E5b. 
 
Une disponibilité de 100 % a été obtenue pour les trois algorithmes, en considerant à la fois 
GPS et Galileo, des mesures bi frequences, prenant en compte les pannes multiples (detectant 
que les pannes uniques), pour les approches APV I et LPV200 (VAL=35m). Pour les RAIM 
LSR et MSS, tous les xPL calculés étaient inférieurs aux niveaux d‟alerte correspondants pour 
tous les points de la grille utilisateur et à chaque époque. La probabilité de detection manquée 
prédite du GLR contraint était systematiquement inférieure à la probabilité de detection 
manquée requise. La disponibilité de la fonction de detection/exclusion de pannes du RAIM 
LSR a également été evalué à 100 % pour chaque point de la grille utilisateur. 
 
Etant donné que la manière dont les mesures de pseudodistance GPS et Galileo vont être 
combinées dans les récepteurs aviation civile n‟est pas définie, la capacité du RAIM à assurer 
le contrôle d‟integrité pour les approches à guidage vertical en ne considerant qu‟une seule 
constellation a également été étudiée.  
 
Les résultats obtenus sont particulierement pessimistes pour GPS, puisquee une constellation 
comprenant seulement 24 satellites a été considérée pour les simulations alors que plus de 
satellites peuvent être envisagés pour la future constellation GPS. On a ainsi vu qu‟en 
considerant une constellation de 24 satellites GPS, le RAIM ne pouvait pas assurer le contrôle 
d‟integrité pour les approches à guidage vertical avec une disponibilité suffisante. Même si 
des résultats prometteurs ont été obtenus pour la disponibilité de la fonction de détection en 
considérant une constellation de 27 satellites Galileo, une disponibilité de 88.2 % pour 
l‟APVI et de 81.4 % pour la LPV200 de la fonction de détection/exclusion du RAIM LSR ce 
qui n‟est pas suffisant pour avoir Galileo + RAIM comme moyen principal de navigation. 
 
Il faut rappeler que tous ces résultats ont été obtenus en supposant des mesures de 
pseudodistance de bonne qualité.  
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Quelques pistes peuvent être évoquées concernant de futurs travaux. 
 
La détection des pannes multiples peut être adressée d‟une autre manière que celle proposée 
dans cette thèse, c‟est à dire en essayant de les détecter. A cet effet, les algorithmes Maximum 
Solution Separation RAIM, DT-RAIM [Zhang et al., 2008], RANCO [Schroth et al., 2008] 
semblent être des méthodes très prometteuses mais des études complémentaires restent 
nécessaires. En particulier, le calcul des paramètres internes au RAIM conçus pour les pannes 
multiples, satifaisant à la fois les exigences aviation civiles et le modèle d‟erreur, et celui des 
niveaux de protection constitue une étape majeure. 
 
L‟amélioration majeure est l‟utilisation de measures bi fréquences qui permet de supprimer 
l‟erreur ionosphèrique de mesure de pseudo distance mais d‟autre améliorations telle qu‟une 
meilleure horloge et des informations s d‟éphémerides plus précises constiitue des hypothèses 
s importante de ces travaux de thèse. Ainsi bien que les outils de simulation utilisés ont été 
conçus pour être le plus proche possible des fututres conditions réelles, il serait intéressant de 
tester les differents algorithmes proposés sur des mesures de pseudodistances dérivées de 
données réelles. 
 
La satisfaction du critère de précision n‟a été vérifiée. Par exemple, les opérations de type 
LPV 200 exige que 95% de la valeur absolue de l‟erreur verticale de position soit inférieure à 
4 mètres .Cela constitue une condition supplémentaire qu‟il faudra vérifier. 
 
On a pu voir que l‟idée d‟utiliser à la fois les mesures de pseudodistances GPS et Galileo est 
très interessante du point de vue de la disponibilité du RAIM. Cependant des considerations 
stratégiques ou politique pourraient favoriser l‟usage d‟un seul système de navigation. Dans 
ce cas, des simulations impliquant différentes tailles de constellation sont nécesaires pour 
traiter pleinement la question de la disponibilité du RAIM. 
 
Alors que le guidage vertical semble possible sans aide externe en considérant deux 
constellations, il pourrait être intéressant d‟étudier la combinaison des mesures bi fréquences 
GNSS avec celles d‟autres capteurs dans le cas ou l‟on ne considérerait qu‟une seule 
constellation. 
 
Ainsi des études complémentaires sont nécessaires pour définitivement conclure quant à 
l‟utilisation du RAIM pour les approaches à guidage vertical mais ces premiers résultats 
semblent prometteurs. 
 
 175 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions and future work 
 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions from the results obtained in the previous chapters and 
draws some perspectives for future work. 
 
7-1 Conclusions 
 
A complete model of pseudo range measurements, including interference effects and satellites 
failures, has been proposed. The fault free case as well as the faulty case have been addressed 
in this pseudorange error model study. The User Equivalent Range Error variance 
computation has been investigated and the receiver noise contribution has been particularly 
detailed. It has been seen that the improvement in the quality of measurements (dual 
frequency measurements, better clock and ephemeris information, better ranging signals) has 
significantly decreased the UERE variance. Considering that UERE is the major parameter of 
position estimation and autonomous integrity monitoring performance, great RAIM 
availability could be expected from an UERE standard deviation of approximately one meter. 
The faulty case study addresses satellite failure as well as interference phenomenon. In 
particular, wide band and CW interference effects on pseudorange measurement have been 
investigated. 
 
The concept of smallest bias on a single pseudorange measurement that leads to a positioning 
failure has been developed. It is based on the fact that integrity monitoring requires that the 
navigation system detects the presence of an unacceptably large position error for a given 
mode of flight. Therefore, only faults that lead to a positioning failure (horizontal or vertical) 
need to be detected. The constrained Generalized Likelihood Ratio test design is based on this 
fact. 
 
Three distinct classes of RAIM have been addressed in this study. The Least Square Residual 
method in which the sum of the squares of the pseudorange residuals plays the role of the 
basic observable has been first recalled. The Maximum Solution Separation method, which is 
based on the observation of the separation between the position estimate generated by a full-
set filter (using all the satellite measurements) and the one generated by each one of the subset 
filters (each using all but one of the satellite measurements), has been discussed and an 
improved way of computing the associated protection level has been proposed. Finally, a new 
method based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio test has been developed and several 
implementations have been described. First a snapshot one that does not take into account 
nominal biases and for which an analytical threshold expression that satisfies a given 
probability of false alarm and a predictive probability of missed detection have been 
presented. A snapshot implementation that takes into account potential nominal biases has 
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also been proposed. Finally, two sequential techniques have been described: one designed to 
detect step error and another one design to detect step plus ramp failure. 
 
The way RAIM technique can be implemented in order to take into account both civil 
aviation requirement and threat model has been then addressed. Thus a complete review of the 
assumptions that are made in RAIM simulations has been detailed in this thesis. The way the 
required probability of false alarm and the required probability of missed detection can be set 
has been particularly investigated. 
 
It has been demonstrated that, for the single failure case using GPS + Galileo constellations, 
the amplitude of pseudo range additional biases that lead to a positioning failure 
systematically belongs to the major service failure category for both APV I and LPV 200 
operations. Therefore even if the targeted phases of flight are characterized by smaller 
horizontal and vertical tolerable position errors compared to NPA, this effect is mitigated by 
the great number of available measurements that reduces the impact a of single satellite bias 
on the global positioning error. Thus only Major Service Failures are taken into account for 
single failure case consideration. 
 
Nevertheless, multiple failure case has been addressed in this thesis. It has been decided to 
benefit from the fact that multiple failures are very rare. It is thus possible not to try to detect 
these multiple failures and therefore to set the probability of detecting an integrity failure 
caused by multiple faults to zero (corresponding 𝑃𝑚𝑑  equal to one). This operation leads to 
more stringent required probability of missed detection for single failure but allows the use of 
various detection algorithms that have been designed assuming only one pseudorange failure 
at the same time. 
 
An issue has been raised concerning the response that is to be expected from RAIM detection 
function in presence of a bias larger than nominal biases but smaller than its corresponding 
critical biases. 
 
Least Squared Residual, Maximum Solution Separation and constrained Generalized 
Likelihood Ratio RAIM availabilities have been computed for APVI and LPV200 approaches 
using both GPS L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5b pseudorange measurements. 
 
An availability of 100 % has been obtained for the three algorithms, considering both GPS 
and Galileo constellations, dual frequency measurements, assuming multiple failures 
(detecting only single failure), for both APV I and LPV200 (VAL=35m) operations. For the 
LSR RAIM and the Solution Separation RAIM, all computed xPL were below the 
corresponding xAL for every point of the user grid and for each epoch. Constrained GLR 
predicted probability of missed detection was systematically below the required probability of 
missed detection. The availability of the LSR Failure Detection/Exclusion function has been 
also evaluated at 100 % for each point of the user grid. 
 
As the way future GPS and Galileo pseudorange measurement are going to be combined in 
civil aviation receivers is not defined yet, RAIM capability to provide integrity monitoring for 
approaches with vertical guidance considering only one constellation has been also addressed.  
 
The obtained results were particularly pessimistic for GPS, since a 24 satellites constellation 
has been taken into account for simulations whereas more satellites could be expected for the 
future GPS constellation. It has been seen that considering a 24 satellite GPS constellation, 
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RAIM can‟t provide integrity monitoring for approach with vertical guidance with a sufficient 
availability. Even if some promising results has been obtain for fault detection function 
availability considering 27 satellite Galileo constellation, LSR RAIM FDE availabilities of 
88.2 % for APVI and 81.4 % for LPV200 have been obtained which is not sufficient to have 
Galileo + RAIM as a sole means of navigation. 
 
It is to be noticed that all those results have been obtained assuming high pseudorange 
measurements quality and in particular a high signal in space accuracy, that is to say a very 
good URA. 
 
7-2 Perspectives for future work 
 
The detection of multiple failures could be addressed in a different way by trying to detect 
them. For this purpose, Maximum Solution Separation RAIM, DT-RAIM [Zhang et al., 
2008], RANCO [Schroth et al., 2008] algorithms seem to be promising methods but complete 
studies need to be conducted. In particular, the computation of internal RAIM parameters 
designed for multiple failures detection, coping with both civil aviation requirements and 
threat model, and the associated protection level prediction would constitute a major step. 
 
Even if major improvement is due to the use of dual frequency measurements that allow 
removing ionosphere error from pseudorange measurements, other improvements such as 
better clock and ephemeris information constitute some major assumptions of this work and 
need to be achieved by satellite navigation systems. Although simulation tools used in this 
thesis were designed to be as close as possible to actual conditions, it would be valuable to 
test the various proposed algorithms on pseudo range error measurements derived from real 
data. 
 
A key assumption of this thesis is that if a satellite does not have a major service failure, it 
follows a nominal distribution. Unfortunately historical off-line monitoring of GPS satellites 
has not focused on errors smaller than 30 m and the true probability that the satellite errors 
not well-described by nominal distribution is not currently known [Walter,2008]. This 
probability would be the relevant input for every integrity monitoring algorithm. This is why 
a service history against this future high signal in space accuracy is needed. 
 
It has been seen that the idea of using both GPS and Galileo pseudorange measurements is 
very attractive from RAIM availability point of view. Yet, some strategic or political 
considerations could favor the use of only one navigation system. In this case, simulations 
implying different sizes of constellation are needed to fully address the question of RAIM 
availability. 
 
Whereas vertical guidance seems achievable without any external augmentation considering 
dual constellation, it could be interesting to investigate the combination of dual frequency 
GNSS with other sensors for single constellation considerations. 
 
Thus, further studies are needed to definitively conclude on the use of RAIM for approaches 
with vertical guidance even if these results seem promising. 
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Appendix A 
 
Critical bias computation 
 
The aim of this section is to detail the computation for each pseudo range of the bias 
ib  that 
will lead to a horizontal positioning failure with a given probability. 
 
A-1 First method 
 
Let us consider the case where there is a bias on the pseudo range i,  
 
The error in the position domain is: 
Δ𝑋WGS 84 =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 
where 
𝐸~𝑁 𝐵, Σ  
 
Σ =  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
 , 𝐵 =
 
 
 
 
 
0
:
𝑏𝑖
:
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the matrix H is expressed in the local geographic frame such as: 
 
𝐻 =  
cos 𝐸1 cos 𝐴1 cos 𝐸1 sin 𝐴1 sin 𝐸1 1
      ⋮                        ⋮         ⋮        ⋮  
cos 𝐸𝑁 cos 𝐴𝑁 cos 𝐸𝑁 sin 𝐴𝑁 sin 𝐸𝑁 1
  
 
Then the positioning error is directly expressed in the local geographic frame 
 
 Δ𝑋local =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 (A-1) 
 
The covariance matrix C of the error is such as: 
 
𝐶 = 𝐸 Δ𝑋local . Δ𝑋local
t =   𝐻𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1 Σ   𝐻𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
𝑡
 
 
 𝐶 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1 (A-2) 
 
The horizontal positioning error is a two dimensions vector which follows a gaussian bi-
dimensional law of mean 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  the projection of 𝑏𝑖  in the horizontal plane and of 
covariance matrix 𝐶𝐻, such as 𝐶𝐻 = 𝐶 1: 2,1: 2 , 𝑏𝑖 ,local =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1B and 
𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local = 𝑏𝑖 ,local  1: 2  
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Its density function is: 
𝑓Δ𝑋H ,local  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝐻 
exp  −
1
2
 X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  
t
. 𝐶𝐻
−1.  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local    
  (A-3) 
 
where X is expressed in the Nord East local frame such as 𝑋 =  
𝑥𝑁
𝑥𝐸
  
 
Since 𝐶𝐻 is a covariance matrix, 𝐶𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, it is diagonalizable and its 
eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an orthonormal basis  2,1 eeB   that is 
composed of eigenvectors 
ii
ee
,2,1
,  corresponding to the eigenvalues 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 and such as: 
 
 
𝐶𝐻 = P⊥ . ∆. P⊥
t  (A-4) 
where 
∆= diag 𝜆1 ,  𝜆2 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of 𝐶𝐻 
P⊥ is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑒 1 , 𝑒 2 . In particular 
P⊥ is orthogonal: P⊥
−1 = P⊥
t
 
 
Then, det 𝐶𝐻 = 𝜆1 𝜆2 and 𝐶𝐻
−1 = P⊥ . ∆
−1. P⊥
t 
 
 X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  
t
. 𝐶𝐻
−1.  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  =  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  
t
. P⊥ . ∆
−1. P⊥
t .  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local   
     =  P⊥
t X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local   
t
. ∆−1.  P⊥
t .  X − 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local    
 
Denoting 𝑋⊥ = P⊥
t . X and Ω = P⊥
t . 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local , 𝑋⊥ is the vector X expressed in the new local 
frame and   is the vector 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  in the new local frame. 
 
 
𝑓Δ𝑋H ,local ,b 𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝜆1 𝜆2
exp  −
1
2
 
 x⊥ − Ω1 
2
λ1
+
 y⊥ − Ω2 
2
λ2
   (A-5) 
 
The probability that a couple  𝑥, 𝑦  be such that 𝑥2 + 𝑦2 ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 is the probability that 
𝑥⊥
2 + 𝑦⊥
2 ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿2and considering the distribution of the horizontal positioning error, this 
probability is: 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,local ∈ D =  
1
2𝜋 𝜆1 𝜆2
exp  −
1
2
 
 𝑥⊥ − Ω1 
2
λ1
+
 𝑦⊥ − Ω2 
2
λ2
  d𝑥 d𝑦
𝐷
 
 
denoting D the domain such as 𝑥⊥
2 + 𝑦⊥
2 ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿2. 
 
Let‟s make a change of coordinates such as we could have: 
 𝑥⊥ − Ω1 
2
λ1
+
 𝑦⊥ − Ω2 
2
λ2
= r2 
 𝑥⊥ , 𝑦⊥  re-written this way: 
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𝑥⊥ = Ω1 + r cos θ  λ1
𝑦⊥ = Ω2 + r sin θ  λ2
   
 
The equation 𝑥⊥
2 + 𝑦⊥
2 = 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 that defines the boundaries of the integration domain 
becomes:  
𝑥⊥
2 + 𝑦⊥
2 =  Ω1 + r cos θ λ1 
2
+  Ω2 + r sin θ λ2 
2
 
= Ω1
2 + r2 λ1cos
2 θ + 2Ω1r  λ1cos θ + Ω2
2 + r2 λ2sin
2 θ + 2Ω2r  λ2sin θ = 𝐻𝐴𝐿
2 
 
r2 λ1cos
2 θ + λ2sin
2 θ + 𝑟 2Ω1  λ1cos θ + 2Ω2  λ2sin θ +  Ω1
2 + Ω2
2
−𝐻𝐴𝐿2 = 0 
 
Finally, denoting  𝑎 𝜃 =  λ1cos
2 θ + λ2sin
2 θ  
  𝑏 𝜃 =  2Ω1  λ1cos θ + 2Ω2  λ2sin θ  
   𝑐 𝜃 =  Ω1
2 + Ω2
2
−𝐻𝐴𝐿2  
 
Solving this equation, two roots 𝑟1 𝜃  and 𝑟2 𝜃  for 𝜃𝜖 0, 𝜋  are obtained such as: 
 
 
𝑥⊥ = Ω1 + 𝑟1 𝜃 cos θ  λ1
𝑦⊥ = Ω2 + 𝑟1 𝜃 sin θ  λ2
, 𝜃𝜖 0, 𝜋         and         
𝑥⊥ = Ω1 +  𝑟2 𝜃 cos θ  λ1
𝑦⊥ = Ω2 +  𝑟2 𝜃 sin θ  λ2
 , 𝜃𝜖 0, 𝜋  
define the boundaries of the integration domain. 
 
The jacobian of this transformation is computed to make the change of coordinates               
𝐽 =  𝑟  λ1λ2, and: 
 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,local ∈ D =  
 𝑟 
2𝜋
 exp  −𝑟
2
2  
𝐷′
d𝑟d𝜃 
 
where the new domain D‟ is defined by  
 𝑟 − 𝑟1 𝜃   𝑟 − 𝑟2 𝜃  ≤ 0
𝜃𝜖 0, 𝜋 
 . 
 
Considering properties of second order polynomials: 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,local ∈ D =
1
2𝜋
   r exp  −𝑟
2
2  d𝑟d𝜃
r=𝑟2 𝜃 
r=𝑟1 𝜃 
θ=π
θ=0
 
 
Assuming for example that 𝑟1 𝜃 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑟2 𝜃 ,  
 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,loca l ∈ D =
1
2𝜋
  −  rexp  −𝑟
2
2  d𝑟 +  rexp  
−𝑟2
2  d𝑟
r=𝑟2 𝜃 
r=0
r=0
r=𝑟1 𝜃 
 d𝜃
θ=π
θ=0
 
 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,local ∈ D = 1 −
1
2𝜋
  exp  
−𝑟2 𝜃 
2
2
  + exp  
−𝑟1 𝜃 
2
2
   d𝜃
θ=π
θ=0
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This last integral is computed numerically. 
 
Thus the probability that the point 𝑥, 𝑦  representing the horizontal position error is out of the 
circle of radius 𝐻𝐴𝐿 is: 
𝑃 Δ𝑋H,local ∉ D =
1
2𝜋
  exp  
−𝑟2 𝜃 
2
2
  + exp  
−𝑟1 𝜃 
2
2
   d𝜃
θ=π
θ=0
 
  (A-6) 
 
A-2 Second method 
 
The error in the position domain is: 
Δ𝑋WGS 84 =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 
where 
𝐸~𝑁 𝐵, Σ  
 
Σ =  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
 , 𝐵 =
 
 
 
 
 
0
:
𝑏𝑖
:
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the matrix H is expressed in the local geographic frame such as: 
 
𝐻 =  
cos 𝐸1 cos 𝐴1 cos 𝐸1 sin 𝐴1 sin 𝐸1 1
      ⋮                        ⋮         ⋮        ⋮  
cos 𝐸𝑁 cos 𝐴𝑁 cos 𝐸𝑁 sin 𝐴𝑁 sin 𝐸𝑁 1
  
 
Then the positioning error is directly expressed in the local geographic frame 
 
Δ𝑋local =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1𝐸 
 
 
The covariance matrix C of the error is such as: 
 
𝐶 = 𝐸 Δ𝑋local . Δ𝑋local
t =   𝐻𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1 Σ   𝐻𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
𝑡
 
𝐶 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
 
 
The horizontal positioning error is a two dimensions vector which follows a gaussian bi-
dimensional law of mean 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  the projection of 𝑏𝑖  in the horizontal plane and of 
covariance matrix 𝐶𝐻, such as 𝐶𝐻 = 𝐶 1: 2,1: 2 , 𝑏𝑖 ,local =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1B and 
𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local = 𝑏𝑖 ,local  1: 2  
 
This method rather considers that 𝐸 = 𝜉 + 𝐵 where 𝜉~𝑁 0, Σ . 
 
So the horizontal positioning error is such Δ𝑋𝐻 = 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
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such as 𝜀𝐻 = 𝜀 1: 2  with ε =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1ξ and 𝜀𝐻 = 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐶𝐻  
 
We have  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 = Δ𝑋𝐻
tΔ𝑋𝐻 =  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 
We denote the matrix S such as 𝐶𝐻 = 𝑆𝑆 as the matrix 𝐶𝐻 the matrix S and 𝑆
−1are symmetric. 
 
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
=  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑆−1𝑆  𝑆𝑆−1 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
=  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑆−1𝐶𝐻   𝑆
−1 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝐶𝐻    𝑆
−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
  (A-7) 
 
with 𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 = 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐼2  
 
Since 𝐶𝐻 is a covariance matrix, 𝐶𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, it is diagonalizable and its 
eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an orthonormal basis  2,1 eeB   that is 
composed of eigenvectors 
ii
ee
,2,1
,  corresponding to the eigenvalues 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 and such as: 
𝐶𝐻 = P⊥ . ∆. P⊥
t 
where 
∆= diag 𝜆1 ,  𝜆2 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of 𝐶𝐻 
P⊥ is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑒 1 , 𝑒 2 . In particular 
P⊥ is orthogonal: P⊥
−1 = P⊥
t
 
 
Then, det 𝐶𝐻 = 𝜆1 𝜆2 and 𝐶𝐻
−1 = P⊥ . ∆
−1. P⊥
t 
 
And we obtain 
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑃⊥  Δ 𝑃⊥
𝑡 𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
Δ  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 
So we have 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2  
= 𝑃   𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
 Δ  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 ≤ HAL
2  
 
Let us denote Ωnorm = 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 and 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 = 𝑃   𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 +  Ωnorm  
𝑡
Δ 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 +  Ωnorm  ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿
2  
  (A-8) 
where 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 ∼ 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐼2 , Ωnorm  and Δ are determinist. 
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Then P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =    f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  s ds 𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + Ωnorm  
𝑡
Δ 𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + Ωnorm  ≤𝐻𝐴𝐿2
 
 
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 =  
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1 
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2 
  such as 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1   and 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2 are independent.  
 
Therefore for  𝑢, 𝑣 𝜖ℝ2,  f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  u, v = f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1  u × f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2  v  
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =   f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1  u × f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2  v du dv
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤𝐻𝐴𝐿2
 
 
=   
1
 2π
e−
u2
2 ×
1
 2π
e−
v2
2 du dv
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤𝐻𝐴𝐿2
 
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =   
1
2π
e−
 W 2
2 dW
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤𝐻𝐴𝐿2
 
  (A-9) 
with 𝑊 =  
𝑢
𝑣
  
Let us make a change of coordinate such as  
𝑢 = 𝜌 cos 𝜃
𝑣 = 𝜌 sin 𝜃
 . 
The Jacobian of the transformation is 𝐽 =  𝜌  
 
The integration domain will be defined as  𝜃, 𝜌 ∈ ℝ2 , 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 2𝜋, 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝑟 𝜃   
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =  
1
2π
  ρe−
ρ2
2
 dρ dθ =
1
2π
  −e−
ρ2
2
  
ρ=0
ρ=r θ 
θ=2π
θ=0
ρ=r θ 
ρ=0
θ=2π
θ=0
dθ 
  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =  
1
2π
  1 − −e−
r θ 2
2
  
θ=2π
θ=0
dθ 
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 =  
1
2π
  1−e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ +
1
2π
  1−e−
r2 θ 
2
2
  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ HAL2 = 1 −  
1
2π
  e−
r1 θ 
2
2 + e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≥ HAL2 =
1
2π
  e−
r1 θ 
2
2 + e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
  (A-10) 
And this integral is computed numerically 
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𝑟1 𝜃  and 𝑟2 𝜃  are obtained thanks to the equation  𝑊 +  Ωnorm  
𝑡Δ 𝑊 +  Ωnorm  = 𝐻𝐴𝐿
2 
that defines the boundaries of the integration domain: 
 
𝜆1 𝑢 + Ωnorm ,1 
2
+ 𝜆2 𝑣 + Ωnorm ,2 
2
= 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 
𝜆1 𝜌 cos 𝜃 + Ωnorm ,1 
2
+ 𝜆2 𝜌 sin 𝜃 + Ωnorm ,2 
2
= 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 
 
𝜌2 𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜃 + 𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛
2𝜃 + 𝜌 2𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 Ωnorm ,1 + 2𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 Ωnorm ,2 
+  𝜆1  Ωnorm ,1
2 + 𝜆2  Ωnorm ,2
2 − 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 = 0 
 
Finally, denoting  𝑎 𝜃 = 𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜃 + 𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛
2𝜃, 
 𝑏 𝜃 = 2𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 Ωnorm ,1 + 2𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 Ωnorm ,2  
 𝑐 𝜃 = 𝜆1  Ωnorm ,1
2 + 𝜆2  Ωnorm ,2
2 − 𝐻𝐴𝐿2 
 
We have 
 
𝑟1 𝜃 =
−𝑏 𝜃 −  𝑏 𝜃 2 − 4𝑎 𝜃 𝑐 𝜃 
2𝑎 𝜃 
 (A-11) 
 
and  
 
𝑟2 𝜃 =
−𝑏 𝜃 +  𝑏 𝜃 2 − 4𝑎 𝜃 𝑐 𝜃 
2𝑎 𝜃 
 (A-12) 
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Appendix B 
 
Least square Residual Method: Adaptation to 
nominal biases 
 
The objective of this appendix is to present the inclusion of nominal biases in the classical 
LSR method. 
 
As in section 4-2, the detection threshold is obtained by considering the test statistic in the 
fault free case  
 
As nominal biases are taken into account, the measurement error E is not noise only anymore 
but it is such as: 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑗  𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑗
⋮
𝑎𝑁 
 
 
 
 
 with 𝑛𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜍𝑖
2  (B-1) 
As in section 4-2, let‟s denote: 
 
 
𝑠2 =
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝜍2
 (B-2) 
or 
 𝑠2 = 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 (B-3) 
 
In both cases, 𝑠2 represents the sum of the squares of the range residual errors normalized by 
the standard deviation of the measurement errors. 
 
If we take into account nominal biases, 𝑠2 is chi-squared distributed with N-4 degrees of 
freedom and non-centrality parameter 𝜆 𝑎  such as 𝑠2~𝜒𝜆 𝑎 ,𝑁−4
2 . This means that 𝑠2 can be 
written like this: 
 
 ∃𝜉𝑖  , 𝑠
2 = 𝜉1
2 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑁−4 
2  𝑖𝑖𝑑, 𝜉𝑖~𝑁 𝜇𝑖 𝑎 , 1  (B-4) 
 
 
𝜆 𝑎 =  𝜇𝑖
2
𝑁−4
𝑖=1
 𝑎  (B-5) 
 
The nominal bias model could be simplified such as: 
 
𝑎1 = ⋯ = 𝑎𝑗 = ⋯ = 𝑎𝑁 
That is to say such as: 
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𝑎 = 𝑎0
 
 
 
 
1
⋮
1
⋮
1 
 
 
 
 (B-6) 
But in this case all bias values have the same magnitude and sign which could mimic a clock 
offset and not affect the position error. 
 
The nominal biases could also be assumed to line up with the user position matrix signs such 
as [Walter, 2008]: 
 
𝑎 = 𝑎0
 
 
 
 
 
 
sgn 𝐴𝑉,1 
⋮
sgn 𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗  
⋮
sgn 𝐴𝑉,𝑁  
 
 
 
 
 
 (B-7) 
 
with 𝐴 =  𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1such as: 
 
Δ𝑋 = 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋  𝑘 = 𝐴 × 𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
…
…
𝐴𝑁,𝑗
𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
…
…
⋯ 𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗 …
⋯ 𝐴𝑇,𝑗 … 
 
 
 
 
× 𝐸 𝑘  
 
The non-centrality parameter 𝜆 𝑎  is computed as follow. 
 
As 𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝐸𝑡 𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 𝐸, denoting 𝑃 = 𝐼 − 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1and 
𝑎 = 𝑎0
 
 
 
 
 
𝛿1
⋮
𝛿𝑗
⋮
𝛿𝑛 
 
 
 
 
 with for 𝑖𝜖 1, 𝑁 , 𝛿𝑗 = ±1 ,we obtain: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝑎0
2    δ𝑖δ𝑗 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗 =1
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (B-8) 
 
And the relation between the nominal bias on the every pseudorange and the test statistic can 
be simplified as: 
 
 
𝜍2𝜆 𝑎 = 𝑎0
2    δ𝑖δ𝑗𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (B-9) 
where 𝜍 = max𝑖∈ 1,𝑁 𝜍𝑖   
 
The probability of false alarm is used to determine the normalised detection threshold 
𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎  𝑎  such as: 
 
𝑃  
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝜍2
> 𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎  𝑎  = 𝑃𝑓𝑎  (B-10) 
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𝑃𝑓𝑎 =  𝑓𝜒𝜆 𝑎 ,𝑁−4
2  𝑥 
∞
𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎  𝑎 
𝑑𝑥 (B-11) 
 
Finally, the threshold that it is compared to our criteria is: 
 
𝑇𝑕 =  
𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎  𝑎 𝜍2
𝑁 − 4
 (B-12) 
 
 
Figure 65 - Fault free LSR statistical test distribution 
 
The protection levels derive from the smallest bias the algorithm is able to detect satisfying 
the false alarm and the missed detection requirement. 
 
Let„s consider that the measurement error E is noise and a bias b on one satellite j such as: 
 
 
𝐸 𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
𝑛1 𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑗  𝑘 
⋮
𝑛𝑁 𝑘  
 
 
 
 
+ 𝑎0
 
 
 
 
 
𝛿1
⋮
𝛿𝑗
⋮
𝛿𝑛 
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏
⋮
0 
 
 
 
 
 (B-13) 
 
In this case, SSE is chi-squared distributed with N-4 degrees of freedom and non-centrality 
parameter 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏  such as SSE~𝜒𝜆 𝑎 ,𝑏 ,𝑁−4
2 .  
 
The non centrality parameter 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏   is computed in order to satisfy the Pmd requirement 
such as: 
𝝀 𝒂  
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𝑃𝑚𝑑 =  𝑓𝜒𝜆 𝑎 ,𝑏 ,𝑁−4
2  𝑥 
𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎 𝑎 
0
d𝑥 (B-14) 
 
The determination of 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏  is the same as the classic LSR without nominal biases one. The 
only difference is that the detection threshold 𝑕𝑃𝑓𝑎  𝑎  is higher due to nominal biases. 
 
 
Figure 66 - Fault free and faulty LSR statistical test distribution  
As in section 4-2-2, the relation between the smallest detectable bias on the pseudorange j and 
the test statistic is simplified. 
 
𝜍2𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 =  𝑎0 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑗𝑗  𝑎0 + 𝑏 = 𝑝𝑗𝑗  𝑎0 + 𝑏 
2 
or as 
𝜍2𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑃𝑗𝑗  𝑎0 − 𝑏 
2 
 
depending on the sign of 𝛿𝑗 . 𝑏 
 
The smallest detectable measurement bias 𝑏 on satellite j can be then expressed as: 
 
 
𝑏𝑗 = 𝜍 
𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 
𝑃𝑗𝑗
± 𝑎0 (B-15) 
depending on the sign of 𝛿𝑗 . 𝑏 
 
Considering the worst case (the one that will lead to the most conservative protection levels) 
we obtain: 
𝝀 𝒂, 𝒃  
𝝀 𝒂  
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𝑏𝑗 = 𝜍 
𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 
𝑃𝑗𝑗
+ 𝑎0 
 
As previously, the impact of the bias 𝑏𝑗  in position domain is obtained by: 
 
Δ𝑋 = 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋  𝑘 =
 
 
 
 
 
…
…
𝐴𝑁,𝑗
𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
…
…
⋯ 𝐴𝐷,𝑗 …
⋯ 𝐴𝑇,𝑗 … 
 
 
 
 
×
 
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
𝑏𝑗
⋮
0  
 
 
 
 
 
Then, 
∆𝑋H =  ∆𝑋𝑉
2 + ∆𝑋E
2 =  𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑗
2 × bj 
∆𝑋V = 𝐴𝑉,𝑗 × 𝑏𝑗  
Denoting, 
 𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 1 − 𝐵𝑗,𝑗 (B-16) 
 
where 𝐵 = 𝐻 𝐻𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 = 𝐻𝐴 
 
∆𝑋H =
 𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
2
 1 − Bj,j
×  𝜍 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 +  1 − Bj,j𝑎0  
 
∆𝑋V =
 𝐴𝑉,𝑗  
 1 − Bj,j
×  𝜍 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 +  1 − Bj,j𝑎0  
Denoting, 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 =
 𝐴𝑉 ,𝑗  
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
 , 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 =
 𝐴𝑁,𝑗
2 + 𝐴𝐸 ,𝑗
2
 1 − 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑗
 
 
The protection levels are computed referring to the worst satellite:
  
𝐻𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑗
 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 ×  𝜍 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 +  1 − Bj,j𝑎0   
  (B-17) 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐿 = max
𝑗
 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑗 ×  𝜍 𝜆 𝑎, 𝑏 +  1 − Bj,j𝑎0   
  (B-18) 
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Appendix C 
 
Maximum Solution Separation Method 
 
C-1 Existing protection level computation 
 
The objective of this section is to detail the way the term  𝑋 − 𝑋 𝑖 𝐻 is over bound. 
 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 is a bi-dimensional random variable following a Gaussian distribution such as
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻~𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻  and the general expression of the probability density function of the 
variable ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 is given by: 
 
𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝐻  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 
exp  −
1
2
Xt . 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻
−1. X  
(C-1) 
Since 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 is not diagonal, the components of ∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝐻 are not mutually independent and the 
separations on the North and East axes are correlated. But as 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, 
it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an 
orthonormal basis 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑢  1,𝑖 , 𝑢  2,𝑖  that is composed of eigenvectors 𝑢  1,𝑖  and 𝑢  2,𝑖  
corresponding with the eigenvalues 𝜇1,𝑖  and 𝜇2,𝑖   of 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 and we have: 
 
 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 = Π⊥,i . Mi . Π⊥,i 
t (C-2) 
where, 
Mi = diag 𝜇1,𝑖 , 𝜇2,𝑖 is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻 
Π⊥,i  is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑢  1,𝑖  and 𝑢  2,𝑖  
In particular Π⊥,i  is orthogonal  Π⊥,i 
−1 = Π⊥,i 
t. 
 
Let ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ be the projection of ∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 in the orthonormal basis 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑢  1,𝑖 , 𝑢  2,𝑖  such as: 
 
 ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ = Π⊥,i 
t∆𝑋𝑖,𝐻 (C-3) 
 
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ is a 2-dimensional Gaussian vector whose covariance matrix is the diagonal matrix Mi, 
∆𝑋𝑖,⊥~𝑁   
0
0
 , Mi . In particular, the components of ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ are mutually independent and the 
general expression of the probability density function of variable ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ is given by: 
 
 
𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥  𝑋 =
1
2𝜋 𝜇1,𝑖  𝜇2,𝑖
exp  −
1
2
Xt . Mi
−1. X  (C-4) 
 
Let‟s denote 
 200 
 
𝑠𝑖
2 = ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥
t
. Mi
−1. ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ 
 
𝑠𝑖
2 is chi-squared distributed with 2 degrees of freedom, 𝑠𝑖
2~𝜒2
2, and we can easily find 𝛿𝑖  
such as: 
 𝑃 𝑠𝑖
2 > 𝛿𝑖 = 𝑃𝑚𝑑  (C-5) 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =  𝑓𝜒22 𝑥 
∞
𝛿𝑖
d𝑥 (C-6) 
 
The set of points ℇ𝛼 ,𝑖 =  𝑋 ∈ ℝ
2: 𝑋t . Mi
−1. 𝑋 = α2  is an ellipse whose semi-major axis is 
oriented along 𝑢  1,𝑖  and whose semi-minor axis is oriented along 𝑢  2,𝑖. This ellipse defines an 
equipotential curve of the probability density function: 
 
𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ 𝑋 ∈ ℇ𝛼 ,𝑖 =
1
2𝜋 𝜇1,𝑖  𝜇2,𝑖
e−
α2
2  
 
The probability that the point corresponding to ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥ belongs to the region 𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖  delimited by 
ℇ𝛼 ,𝑖  is: 
𝑃 ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥  ∈ 𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖 =  𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥  𝑋 d𝑋
𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖
 
The analytical expression of this ellipse is in the coordinate frame  𝑂, 𝑢  1,𝑖 , 𝑢  2,𝑖  : 
𝑋1
2
𝜇1,𝑖
+
𝑋2
2
𝜇2,𝑖
= 𝛼2 
 
O  is the centre of this ellipse, it  is at full-solution position. The length of the semi-major axis 
is 𝛼 𝜇1,𝑖  and the length of the semi-minor axis is 𝛼 𝜇2,𝑖. 
 
We want to find the ellipse that contains this vector with the probability 1 − 𝑝, that is to say 
find 𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖  such as: 
 
 𝑓∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥  𝑥1, 𝑥2 
𝑋∈𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖
𝑑𝑥1𝑑𝑥2 =
1
2𝜋 𝜇1𝜇2
 exp  −
1
2
 
𝑥1
2
𝜇1
+
𝑥2
2
𝜇2
  
𝑋∈𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖
𝑑𝑥1𝑑𝑥2 = 1 − 𝑝 
 
Let us set 
𝑢 =
𝑥1
 𝜇1
 
𝑣 =
𝑥2
 𝜇2
 
 , the elliptical region 𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖  becomes the disk 𝑅𝛼  of radius 𝛼 and we get: 
𝑃 ∆𝑋𝑖,⊥  ∈ 𝐷𝛼 ,𝑖 =
1
2𝜋
 exp  −
1
2
 𝑣 2 𝑑𝑣 = 1 − exp  −
𝛼2
2
 
𝑅𝛼
 
 
The ellipse ℇ𝛼 ,𝑖  that contains the vector ∆𝑋𝑖 ,⊥ with the probability 1 − 𝑝 is such that  
𝛼 =  −2 ln 𝑝  
 
For any vector X  inside the ellipse ℇ𝛼 ,𝑖 :  
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𝑋1
2
𝜇1,𝑖
+
𝑋2
2
𝜇2,𝑖
≤ 𝛼2                      
𝑋1
2
𝜇1,𝑖
+
𝑋2
2
𝜇2,𝑖
≤ 𝛼 
 
Assuming that  𝜇1,𝑖 = max 𝜇1,𝑖 , 𝜇2,𝑖 , 
 𝑋1
2 +
𝜇1,𝑖
𝜇2,𝑖
𝑋2
2 ≤ 𝛼 𝜇1,𝑖  
and  
 𝑋 =  𝑋1
2 + 𝑋2
2 ≤  𝑋1
2 +
𝜇1,𝑖
𝜇2,𝑖
𝑋2
2 ≤ 𝛼 𝜇1,𝑖  
 
Therefore,  𝑋 ≤ 𝛼 𝜇𝑖  with 𝜇𝑖  the maximum eigenvalue of 𝐶𝑖 ,𝐻. 
 
If we choose 𝛼 =  −2 ln 𝑝 , any vector X  inside the corresponding ellipse is such as: 
 
  𝑋 ≤  −2 ln 𝑝  𝜇𝑖  (C-7) 
 
C-2 Proposed protection level computation 
 
The objective of this section is to study the impact of a bias of amplitude 𝑏𝑖  on the 
pseudorange i on the full filter position estimation and find a bound δ0,𝑖  such as: 
 
 𝑃   𝑋 − 𝑋 0 𝐻 ≤ δ0,𝑖 ∃ a bias of size 𝑏𝑖
 on the  ith pseudorange = 𝑝0 (C-8) 
 
The relationship between the full filter position error and the measurement error can be 
expressed such as: 
 
Δ𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = − 𝐻
𝑡Σ−1𝐻 −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 × 𝐸 𝑘  
 
that is to say, 
 𝑋 𝑘 − 𝑋 0 𝑘 = −𝐴0 × 𝐸 𝑘  (C-9) 
 
with 𝐴0 =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1 
 
In our case, we have 
𝐸~𝑁 𝐵, Σ  
 
Σ =  
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜍𝑁
2
 , 𝐵 =
 
 
 
 
 
0
:
𝑏𝑖
:
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The behaviour of the horizontal component of the full filter position error, denoted ∆𝑋0,𝐻, is 
studied here. 
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The horizontal positioning error ∆𝑋0,𝐻 is a bi-dimensional random variable following a 
Gaussian distribution such as: 
 
∆𝑋0,𝐻~𝑁 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local , 𝐶0,𝐻  
 
where the mean vector 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local is the projection of 𝑏𝑖  in the horizontal plane such as: 
 𝑏𝑖,local =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
𝐻𝑡Σ−1B 
𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local = 𝑏𝑖 ,local  1: 2  
 
the covariance matrix 𝐶0,𝐻, such as 𝐶0,𝐻 = 𝐶0 1: 2,1: 2  with 𝐶0 =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H 
−1
 
 
Let‟s denote the measurement error such as: 
 
𝐸 = 𝜉 + 𝐵 where 𝜉~𝑁 0, Σ  
 
So the horizontal positioning error is such as: 
 
∆𝑋0,𝐻 = 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  
 
with 𝜀𝐻 = 𝜀 1: 2  with ε =  𝐻
𝑡Σ−1H −1𝐻𝑡Σ−1ξ and 𝜀𝐻 = 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐶0,𝐻  
 
We have  ∆𝑋0,𝐻 
2
= ∆𝑋0,𝐻
t∆𝑋0,𝐻 =  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local  
𝑡
 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐻,local   
 
We denote the matrix S such as 𝐶0,𝐻 = 𝑆𝑆 as the matrix 𝐶0,𝐻 the matrix S and 𝑆
−1are 
symmetric. 
 
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
=  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎 𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑆−1𝑆  𝑆𝑆−1 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
=  𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑆−1𝐶𝐻   𝑆
−1 𝜀𝐻 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 
 Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 =  𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝐶𝐻    𝑆
−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
with 𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 = 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐼2  
 
Since 𝐶0,𝐻 is not diagonal, the components of ∆𝑋0,𝐻 are not mutually independent and the 
separations on the North and East axes are correlated. But as 𝐶0,𝐻 is a positive definite matrix, 
it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are all positive. In particular we can find an 
orthonormal basis 𝛽0 =  𝑢  1,0, 𝑢  2,0  that is composed of eigenvectors 𝑢  1,0 and 𝑢  2,0 
corresponding with the eigenvalues 𝜇1,0 and 𝜇2,0  of 𝐶0,𝐻 and we have: 
 
 𝐶0,𝐻 = Π⊥,0 . M0. Π⊥,0 
t (C-10) 
where, 
M0 = diag 𝜇1,0, 𝜇2,0  is the diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of 𝐶0,𝐻 
Π⊥,0  is the projection matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors 𝑢  1,0 and 𝑢  2,0. In 
particular Π⊥,0  is orthogonal  Π⊥,0 
−1 = Π⊥,0 
t. 
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Then, det 𝐶0,𝐻 = 𝜇1,0𝜇2,0 and 𝐶0,𝐻
−1 = Π⊥,0 . M0
−1. Π⊥,0 
t 
 
And we obtain 
 ∆𝑋0,𝐻 
2
=  𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
𝑃⊥  Δ 𝑃⊥
𝑡 𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑆
−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 ∆𝑋0,𝐻 
2
=  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
Δ  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻  
 
So we have 
P   ∆𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2  
= 𝑃   𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 
𝑡
 Δ  𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 + 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 ≤ δ0,𝑖
2  
 
Let us denote Ωnorm = 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ,𝐻 and 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 𝑃⊥
𝑡𝑆−1𝜀𝐻 
 
P  Δ𝑋𝐻 
2 ≤ δ0,𝑖
2 = 𝑃   𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 +  Ωnorm  
𝑡
Δ 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 +  Ωnorm  ≤ δ0,𝑖
2  
 
where 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 ∼ 𝑁   
0
0
 , 𝐼2 , Ωnorm  and Δ are determinist. 
 
Then P   ∆𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 =    f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  s ds 𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + Ωnorm  
𝑡
Δ 𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + Ωnorm  ≤𝐻𝐴𝐿2
 
 
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 =  
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1 
𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2 
  such as 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1   and 𝜀⊥,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2 are independent.  
 
Therefore for  𝑢, 𝑣 𝜖ℝ2,  f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  u, v = f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1  u × f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2  v  
 
P   Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 =   f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  1  u × f𝜀⊥ ,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚  2  v du dv
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤δ0,𝑖
2
 
 
=   
1
 2π
e−
u2
2 ×
1
 2π
e−
v2
2 du dv
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤δ0,𝑖
2
 
=   
1
2π
e−
 W 2
2 dW
 𝑊+ Ωnorm  𝑡Δ 𝑊+ Ωnorm  ≤δ0,𝑖
2
 
 
with 𝑊 =  
𝑢
𝑣
  
Let us make a change of coordinate such as  
𝑢 = 𝜌 cos 𝜃
𝑣 = 𝜌 sin 𝜃
 . 
The Jacobian of the transformation is 𝐽 =  𝜌  
 
The integration domain will be defined as  𝜃, 𝜌 ∈ ℝ2 , 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 2𝜋, 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝑟 𝜃   
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P   Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 =  
1
2π
  ρe−
ρ2
2
 dρ dθ =
1
2π
  −e−
ρ2
2
  
ρ=0
ρ=r θ 
θ=2π
θ=0
ρ=r θ 
ρ=0
θ=2π
θ=0
dθ 
  Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 =  
1
2π
  1 − −e−
r θ 2
2
  
θ=2π
θ=0
dθ 
 
P   Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 =  
1
2π
  1−e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ +
1
2π
  1−e−
r2 θ 
2
2
  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
P   Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≤ δ0,𝑖
2 = 1 −  
1
2π
  e−
r1 θ 
2
2 + e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
P   Δ𝑋0,𝐻 
2
≥ δ0,𝑖
2 =
1
2π
  e−
r1 θ 
2
2 + e−
r1 θ 
2
2  
θ=π
θ=0
dθ 
And this integral is computed numerically 
 
𝑟1 𝜃  and 𝑟2 𝜃  are obtained thanks to the equation  𝑊 +  Ωnorm  
𝑡Δ 𝑊 +  Ωnorm  = δ0,𝑖
2
 
that defines the boundaries of the integration domain: 
 
𝜆1 𝑢 + Ωnorm ,1 
2
+ 𝜆2 𝑣 + Ωnorm ,2 
2
= δ0,𝑖
2
 
𝜆1 𝜌 cos 𝜃 + Ωnorm ,1 
2
+ 𝜆2 𝜌 sin 𝜃 + Ωnorm ,2 
2
= δ0,𝑖
2
 
 
𝜌2 𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜃 + 𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛
2𝜃 + 𝜌 2𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 Ωnorm ,1 + 2𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 Ωnorm ,2 
+  𝜆1  Ωnorm ,1
2 + 𝜆2  Ωnorm ,2
2 − δ0,𝑖
2 = 0 
 
Finally, denoting  𝑎 𝜃 = 𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜃 + 𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛
2𝜃, 
 𝑏 𝜃 = 2𝜆1 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 Ωnorm ,1 + 2𝜆2 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 Ωnorm ,2  
 𝑐 𝜃 = 𝜆1  Ωnorm ,1
2 + 𝜆2  Ωnorm ,2
2 − δ0,𝑖
2
 
 
and 𝑟1 𝜃 =
−𝑏− 𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
 and  𝑟2 𝜃 =
−𝑏+ 𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
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Appendix D 
 
Sequential Constrained Generalized Likelihood 
Ratio Test adapted to step + ramp failure detection 
 
 
D-1 Introduction 
 
As introduced in 4-4-4, the sequential constrained GLR adapted to step + ramp failure 
detection consists in considering the m last observations and minimizing under constrain the 
following expression: 
 
 𝑍1 − 𝑊𝑖
𝑣𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2
+
1
1 − 𝑎2
  𝑍𝑘 − 𝑎𝑍𝑘−1 −   1 − 𝑎 𝑣𝑖 +   1 − 𝑎 𝑘 + 2𝑎 − 1 𝑣 𝑖 
𝑊𝑖
𝜍𝑖
 
2m
k=2
 
  (D-1) 
 
with respect to 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑣𝑖 , that represent the initial position (amplitude of the step) and the 
speed (rate of the slope) of the failure. 
 
As formerly, the least square residual vector is used to represent these values, for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁  
and after simplifications, the following function of two variables is finally obtained: 
 
𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 =  1 +
 1 − 𝑎 2
1 − 𝑎2
 𝑚 − 1   
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 x2 − 2
1 − 𝑎
1 − 𝑎2
𝛼
𝜍𝑖2
𝑥 −
2
1 − 𝑎2
𝛽
𝜍𝑖2
𝑦 
+
1
1 − 𝑎2
  1 − 𝑎 2  
𝑚 𝑚 + 1  2𝑚 + 1 
6
− 1 +  2𝑎 − 1 2 𝑚 − 1 
+ 2 1 − 𝑎  2𝑎 − 1  
𝑚 𝑚 + 1 
2
− 1  
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
 𝑦2
+
2
1 − 𝑎2
 
 1 − 𝑎 2  
𝑚 𝑚 − 1 
2
− 1 
+ 1 − 𝑎  2𝑎 − 1  𝑚 − 1 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜍𝑖2
𝑥𝑦 
 
This function of two variables not considers constant terms and uses two cumulative sums: 
 
 
𝛼 = Δ𝑌1 +  1 − 𝑎  Δ𝑌k
m−1
k=2
+ Δ𝑌m  (D-2) 
 
𝛽 = −𝑎Δ𝑌1 +  𝑎
2 + 2𝑎 − 1   1 − k Δ𝑌k
m−1
k=2
+   1 − 𝑎 𝑚 + 2𝑎 − 1 Δ𝑌m  (D-3) 
 
 206 
 
Here again two functions are defined for 𝑖 ∈  1, 𝑁 : 
 
- 𝑆0 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = 𝑔 𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑦 𝑖  with  𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑦 𝑖 = arg min 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦  :  𝑥 + 𝑡𝑦 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑥 ∈ ℝ, 𝑦 ∈
ℝ, 𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 , which represents the  probability that there is no fault or no significant fault on 
the pseudo range i. 
 
- 𝑆1 ∆𝑌, 𝑖 = 𝑔 𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑦 𝑖  with  𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑦 𝑖 = arg min 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦  :  𝑥 + 𝑡𝑦 > 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑥 ∈ ℝ, 𝑦 ∈
ℝ, 𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 , which represents the probability that there is a bias on the channel i that will 
lead to a positioning failure. 
 
The method will be a little bit more complicated since a recursive function of two variables 
has to minimize under more complex constraints. 
 
D-2 Simplification of the constraint criteria 
 
Under the assumption 𝑣 𝑖  constant: 
 
  ∃𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖 + 𝑡𝑣 𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 &  𝑣𝑖 < 𝑏𝑖 ⇒   𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑏𝑖  (D-4) 
 
A couple (a constant step 𝑣𝑖  and a constant slope 𝑣 𝑖) will be considered as faulty if  𝑣𝑖 +
∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖  or if  𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖  as shows the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 , faulty 
   𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖  > 𝑏𝑖 , faulty 
   ∃𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖 + 𝑡𝑣 𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖  &  𝑣𝑖 < 𝑏𝑖 & 𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖 < 𝑏𝑖  but 𝑣 𝑖  is not a 
constant and this case is not taken into account 
 
This is why, 
 
  𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖 :  𝑣𝑖  < 𝑏𝑖 , ∃𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖 + 𝑡𝑣 𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 ,  ⟺   𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖 :  𝑣𝑖 < 𝑏𝑖 ,  𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖  ≥ 𝑏𝑖  
  (D-5) 
 
0t  
ib  
ib  
tt 0
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and the likelihood function has to be minimized on: 
 
  𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖 :  𝑣𝑖  < 𝑏𝑖 , ∃𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖 + 𝑡𝑣 𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 ,   
=   𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖 :  𝑣𝑖 < 𝑏𝑖 ,  𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖  ≥ 𝑏𝑖 +   𝑣𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖  
 
Thus the likelihood function is first minimized under the constraint   𝑣𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖  and then under 
the constraint  𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝑡𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖 . The minimum of these two minimizations will be finally 
chosen. By this way  𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑖  the most likely couple considering the m last observations and 
under the constraint  ∃𝑡 ∈  0, ∆𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖 + 𝑡𝑣 𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖 , is obtained. 
 
D-3 Computation of the GLR test 
 
The minimum of the function g can be found by computing its gradient and finding its zeros. 
Effectively, numerical values of the polynomial coefficients are such that this function 
reaches a minimum and not a maximum. 
 
𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 is re written this way: 
 
𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑦2 + 2𝑐𝑥𝑦 − 2𝑑𝑥 − 2𝑒𝑦 
 
then ∇  𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 =  
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑦
 =  
−2𝑑 + 2𝑎𝑥 + 2𝑐𝑦
−2𝑒 + 2𝑏𝑦 + 2𝑐𝑥
  
 
which results in solving a simple linear system of two equations and two unknowns: 
 
 ∇  𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 = 0 ⇔  
𝑎𝑥 + 𝑐𝑦 = 𝑑
𝑏𝑦 + 𝑐𝑥 = 𝑒
 ⇔  
𝑥 =
𝑒𝑐 − 𝑑𝑏
𝑐2 − 𝑎𝑏
𝑦 =
𝑐𝑑 − 𝑎𝑒
𝑐2 − 𝑎𝑏
  
under the constraint 𝑐2 − 𝑎𝑏 ≠ 0 
 
Nevertheless, if the absolute minimum of this likelihood function is not in the constraint 
domain, we will carry out another way. 
 
Minimizing 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑦2 + 2𝑐𝑥𝑦 − 2𝑑𝑥 − 2𝑒𝑦 under the constraint  𝑥 + ∆𝑡𝑦 ≥ 𝑏𝑖  
results, considering function 𝑔 properties (monotonous, regular), in minimizing under the 
constraint  𝑥 + ∆𝑡𝑦 = 𝑏𝑖  that is to say to consider the limits of the constraint domain. This is 
due to the fact that 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦  forms a paraboloid. 
 
𝑥 + ∆𝑡𝑦 = 𝑏𝑖  and 𝑥 + ∆𝑡𝑦 = −𝑏𝑖  are successively set, which results in considering the 
functions: 
𝑔 𝑦 = 𝑎 𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 
2 + 𝑏𝑦2 + 2𝑐 𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 𝑦 − 2𝑑 𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 − 2𝑒𝑦 
or 
𝑔 𝑦 = 𝑎 −𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 
2 + 𝑏𝑦2 + 2𝑐 −𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 𝑦 − 2𝑑 −𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦 − 2𝑒𝑦 
 
Thus two « constrained » minimums are obtained: 
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𝑦1 =
∆𝑡 𝑎 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑑 + 𝑒
𝑎 ∆𝑡2 + 𝑏 − ∆𝑡 𝑐
  ,    𝑥1 = 𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦1 
 
𝑦2 =
−∆𝑡 𝑎 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑑 + 𝑒
𝑎 ∆𝑡2 + 𝑏 − ∆𝑡 𝑐
  ,    𝑥2 = 𝑏𝑖 − ∆𝑡 𝑦2 
  (D-6) 
 
Likewise minimizing 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑦2 + 2𝑐𝑥𝑦 − 2𝑑𝑥 − 2𝑒𝑦 under the constraint 
 𝑥 ≥ 𝑏𝑖  results, considering function 𝑔 properties (monotonous, regular), in minimizing 
under the constraint 𝑥 =  𝑏𝑖 , that is to say two cases: 𝑥 = 𝑏𝑖  and 𝑥 = −𝑏𝑖 . 
 
If the memory has been reset (m=1) the likelihood function is 𝑔 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥2 − 2𝑑𝑥 and its 
absolute minimum 𝑥 =
𝑑
𝑎
.  
 
In the same way, if this absolute minimum does not respond to the constraints, the algorithm 
has to choose between the limits of the domain 𝑥 = −𝑏𝑖 or 𝑥 = 𝑏𝑖  to find the “constrained” 
minimum. 
 
A threshold that satisfies the Pfa as well as the predicted probability of missed detection are 
computed numerically. 
 
